

Supplementary Materials for

Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce anti-democratic attitudes and partisan animosity

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S0 Materials and Methods

S0.1 Ethics Information

The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Stanford University (Protocol ID: IRB-55755). All participants provide informed consent and were paid a small monetary fee for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to their condition and blind to the study design. We did not use deception. Because the study was conducted online, there was no interaction between the experimenter and participants.

S0.2 Sample

Sampling Plan

The target sample for the study was 31,000 complete responses from American partisans. Partisans were defined as participants who identified as Democrats, independents closer to the Democratic party, Republicans, or independents closer to the Republican party. Independents who did not identify as closer to either party or political “others” were not included. The target sample size per condition was 1,000 participants per treatment condition, 1,000 participants in the alternative control condition, and 5,000 participants in the null control condition.

The target sample size was based on preregistered power analyses. The power analyses were conducted with G*Power (72). As preregistered, we used $\alpha = 0.05$ and one-tailed tests. These power analyses indicate that we had 95% power to detect effect sizes of $d \geq 0.11$ for treatment vs null control analyses and $d \geq 0.15$ for treatment vs treatment analyses.

Data collection was managed by [Bovitz-Forthright](#). Due to the size of this project, the panel supplier Bovitz-Forthright, brought in two additional companies ([Luth](#) and [Dynata](#)) to ensure it could recruit enough participants to satisfy the pre-registered sample size. Bovitz-Forthright supplied 19% of the full sample from their panel, Luth supplied 18%, and Dynata supplied 63% to achieve the targeted sample size. Data collection stopped after 31,000 participants had fully completed the survey. Notably, participants who attrited from the study (see Supplementary Materials (SM) section S13.2 for details) did not count toward the target of 31,000 participants. Participants did not count towards the target of 31,000 if they: (i) answered any of the pre-treatment attention checks incorrectly, (ii) identified as independent and did not subsequently identify as “closer” toward either the Democratic or Republican parties) or political “other”, (iii) took the survey more than once (as defined by participants’ IDs; keeping only the first case; individuals who tried to participate for a second time via a different platform were identified by Bovitz-Forthright and removed using a combination of IP addresses and cookies), (iv) were identified as using Internet Explorer (as it created technical issues with some treatments), (v) were not able or willing to turn on their audio, or (vi) did not complete the full survey.

While the sample was designed to be representative of the U.S. population of Democrats and Republicans with respect to several demographic benchmarks, it was not a probability sample. Specifically, the sample was quota-matched for: gender, age, race, education (quotas were separately applied within the groups of Democrats and Republicans; see Table S0.2.1). Achieving demographic quotas was implemented by the sample providers, who accounted for attrition so that quotas would be achieved for the final, working sample. With regard to partisan

identity, targets were 50% Democrats (or independents who reported being closer to the Democratic party) and 50% Republicans (or independents who reported being closer to the Republican party). We used 50% Democrats and 50% Republicans to be maximally powered for subgroup analyses in both groups. Within each partisan group, we targeted 45-55% identifying as strong partisans, 20-30% identifying as weak partisans, and 20-30% identifying as independents who are closer toward one of the parties. We decided to include independents who reported being closer to one party than another because prior research suggests that this group behaves like other partisans (73, 74). Both procedures, the inclusion of participants who report being closer to one party than another as well as the exclusion of independents who do not, is consistent with prior work on partisan animosity (75). These numbers are based on the data from the 2020 American National Election Studies (76).

Due to the importance of partisan identification for our project, we administered the standard ANES measure of partisan identification at the beginning of our survey to all participants to ensure that the partisan identity we used in the survey corresponded to the political group participants identified with on the day of the survey. Comparing the responses from this party identification measure to the measure used by the sample provider for recruitment, we found that 98.6% of participants who identified as Democrats (including independents closer to the Democratic Party) also identified as Democrats in the sample provider data. 98.7% of participants who identified as Republicans (including independents closer to the Republican Party) also identified as Republicans in the sample provider data.

We attempted to maximize the number of completed participants in the first 13 days in order to have sufficient power to estimate effect sizes for all 25 conditions to support selection of a subset of ten treatments that were included in the durability data collection. The durability test (including criteria for the selection of treatments for the durability test) is described below in SM section S9.

Final Sample

53,144 participants began the study. We filtered out participants based on several preregistered criteria all administered before participants were randomly assigned to conditions and experienced treatment or control materials. Filters are described here in order of occurrence. First, we filtered out 1,201 participants who did not agree to pay attention and participate in all sections of the study. Second, we filtered out 10,397 participants who failed at least one of the two attention checks (see section SM section 3.1 for the wording of the attention checks). Third, we filtered out 1,552 participants who did not identify as partisans (i.e., independents who did not identify as closer to one of the parties and those who identified as ‘other’). We did not include a “don’t know” option for the partisan identification questions, though participants could skip the question if they did not agree with any response option. Participants who refused to answer the first partisan identification question (Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?) were filtered out ($n = 10$; 0.02% of the sample) and did not participate in the rest of the study. Participants who identified as independent and refused to answer the second partisan identification question (Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?) were also filtered out ($n = 20$; 0.04% of the sample) and did not participate in the rest of the study. Participants who identified as Republican or Democrat and refused to answer the second question (Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat?) were not

filtered out because they had already provided the necessary information to classify their partisan affiliation ($n = 126$). We did not exclude participants who identified as independent and then, on a follow-up question, indicated that they are closer toward the Democratic or Republican party. Fourth, we filtered out 4,053 participants who dropped out of the study before random assignment to condition. Fifth, we filtered out 689 cases with the same participant ID, keeping only the first case that was assigned to a condition.

The remaining 35,252 participants were assigned to an experimental condition. We used all participants in our statistical analyses who had completed the outcome variable being analyzed. Thus, the final sample size is somewhat different for each outcome: partisan animosity ($n = 31,835$), support for undemocratic practices ($n = 31,856$), support for partisan violence ($n = 31,837$), support for undemocratic candidates ($n = 31,470$), opposition to bipartisan cooperation ($n = 31,239$), social distrust ($n = 31,247$), social distance ($n = 31,228$), biased evaluation of politicized facts ($n = 31,186$). The final sample we report in the main text is the number of participants who completed at least one of the primary outcomes, partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, or support for partisan violence: ($n = 32,059$).

The final sample was representative of American partisans on key demographics. Most of the targeted quotas listed in Table S0.2.1 were approximately achieved. White people were slightly overrepresented, and people with relatively low education levels and independents who reported being closer to one of the parties were slightly underrepresented, in the final sample. We loosened our quotas for the strength of partisan identification because we anticipated that stricter quotas would slow the data collection process.

We are interested in testing for causal effects and in estimating effect sizes, not in describing levels of the surveyed attitudes in a precisely representative way. Prior research suggests that opt-in internet panels generate very similar estimated experimental effect sizes as probability samples, importantly, even when opt-in panels are not representative of the U.S. population on any dimensions (77-79). The reason for this finding is that treatment effects often show similar effects across different groups of respondents, and consistent with that reasoning, we find very limited evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects (see SM section S8). Nonetheless, we have little doubt that treatment effects estimated from a probability sample would most likely be slightly different from our estimated treatment effects, and would be more representative of the effect size for the population of U.S. Democrats and Republicans. Therefore, all else being equal, we would have preferred to use a probability sample for this experiment. However, due to the far greater cost, we would only have been able to test 8 to 10 treatments instead of 25, perhaps fewer. We did not think that the balance of evidence - which to our knowledge shows small, insignificant differences in estimated treatment effects between opt-in and probability samples - supported making that trade-off in the knowledge our study would likely generate, since it would so greatly reduce the range of treatments we could test.

S0.3 Procedure

The entire study was conducted online. Participants first completed a short demographic survey designed by the sample provider, then proceeded to our main survey. The main survey consisted of three parts. The questionnaire with all items and response options are available online as a [Google doc](#), a [pdf](#), and a [Qualtrics file](#). The questionnaire can be taken from a participant's perspective by clicking [here](#). For all outcome variables that were measured using multiple items, we formed composites by averaging the items. This procedure was preregistered

for the three targeted outcome variables. We report reliability estimates for these composites in Table S0.3.1.

In the first part of the main survey, participants completed several demographic and filter questions. Participants' *partisan identity* was measured using standard questions from the American National Election Studies (76) which distinguish between Democrats (including strong, weak, and independents who are closer toward the Democratic party), Republicans (including strong, weak, and independents who are closer toward the Republican party), independents (who are not closer toward one party or another), and those who respond "other." Participants who identified as independents who were neither closer toward the Democratic nor Republican parties or other were filtered out of the study. Additionally, participants' *strength of partisan identity* was measured with a single item: "How important is being a [Republican/Democrat] to you?" (80).

In the second part of the main survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of twenty-seven conditions. In other words, the experiment featured a between-subjects design with 27 conditions. In the "null control" condition, participants advanced *directly* to the third part of the main survey. In the 25 treatment conditions and the alternative control condition, participants completed the content specific to that experimental condition. All treatments, including authors, descriptions and links to the content, as well as the control conditions are available in SM section 3.2.

In the third part of the main survey, participants completed the outcome variables. All items were measured on 101-point slider scales ranging from "0" to "100" unless specified otherwise below. First, participants completed measures of the three primary outcome variables. The order of these three outcomes was randomized. *Partisan animosity* was measured with two items. The first item was a 101-point feeling thermometer toward outpartisans that we reverse-coded so that higher values indicate colder/more unfavorable feelings. Feeling thermometers are the most common measures in research on affective polarization and partisan animosity (14, 81). We used the feeling thermometer for outpartisans instead of a difference score between inpartisans and outpartisans, because we aimed to incentivize submitters to reduce partisan animosity by inducing warmer feelings toward outpartisans. However, we also collected feeling thermometers for inpartisans. Treatment effects for the outpartisan feeling thermometer were extremely highly correlated ($r = .97$) with the treatment effects for the difference score.

As the second item, we used a dictator game with an outpartisan, another common measure from research on affective polarization and partisan animosity (14, 74). The response scale for the dictator game ranged from "0 cents" to "50 cents." Allocation decisions were rescaled and reverse-recoded to range from "0% kept for self" to "100% kept for self." All decisions in dictator games made by participants resulted in payments to the participant and an outpartisan partner that corresponded to the participant's choices. We asked participants to divide a pool of 50 cents, rather than a larger number, in order to keep the costs of implementing the dictator game manageable. For example, using a pool size of 50 cents instead of 100 cents saved us more than \$15,000. Two pieces of evidence provide support for the validity of this measure. First, previous research suggests that there is partisan bias in dictator game allocation decisions. Iyengar and Westwood (74) randomly assigned participants to play a dictator game with either an opposing partisan, an independent, a copartisan, or a person with an unspecified partisan affiliation. They found that participants allocated significantly more money to a copartisan (~40% of the endowment) than to an independent or a person with unspecified partisan affiliation (~33%), and in particular compared to an opposing partisan (~26%). Second, we are

able to identify many significant treatment effects on this measure. While the responses in the dictator game are likely a function of generosity and partisan affect, we believe that the treatment effects - i.e., differences in average responses across experimental conditions - likely are primarily due to reductions in partisan affect. Consistent with this claim, treatment effects on the feeling thermometer and the dictator game were highly correlated ($r = .83$).

Support for undemocratic practices was measured with four items (e.g., “[Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]”; adapted from Graham and Svobik (10)). *Support for partisan violence* was measured with four items (e.g., “How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans/Democrats] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?”; adapted from Kalmoe and Mason (23)).

Second, participants completed two secondary outcome variables. The order of these two outcomes was randomized. *Support for undemocratic candidates* was measured with four items (e.g., “How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]?”; adapted from Graham and Svobik (10)). *Opposition to proposed structural democratic reforms* was measured with participants’ support for or opposition to four proposed structural democratic reforms (e.g., “Automatically registering eligible Americans to vote”).

Third, participants completed eight tertiary outcome variables. The order of these eight outcomes was randomized. *Biased evaluation of politicized facts* was measured with four items (several adapted from Peterson and Iyengar (82)). The items were different for Democratic (e.g., “Donald Trump was lawfully elected President in the 2016 election against Hillary Clinton”) and Republican participants (e.g., “Joe Biden was lawfully elected President in the 2020 election against Donald Trump”). Sources for the validity of all statements are in Table S0.3.2. While measurement error for this construct (such as that created by a portion of the sample perhaps reasonably believing, based on a defensible review of available evidence, that one or more of the items were not factual) is an important issue, our primary interest is in the causal effects of treatments on outcomes. This means our central interest lies in relative differences between randomly assigned conditions. Given participants are randomly assigned to the treatments and control conditions, measurement error would make our test of the effects of the 25 treatments on this outcome a conservative one. Thus, we believe that the observed effects of treatments on biased evaluations of politicized facts we present here are meaningful. *Political attitudes* were measured with participants’ support for or opposition to six policy positions (e.g., “Reducing access to abortion”). These six items were recoded so that 0 was the most conservative position and 100 the most liberal and then averaged to create a single composite. *Opposition to bipartisan cooperation* was measured with two items (e.g., “To what extent would you like to see Democratic and Republican elected representatives work together?”; Santos and colleagues (83)). *Partisan animosity toward voters* was measured with a feeling thermometer toward outparty voters (based on Druckman and Levendusky (75)). *Partisan animosity toward politicians* was measured with a feeling thermometer toward outparty politicians (based on Druckman and Levendusky (75)). *Voting intentions* were measured with one item (“In the general 2024 presidential election, which party’s candidate do you plan to vote for?). The response options were “The Republican Party candidate”, “The Democratic Party candidate”, “An Independent candidate”, “Another candidate”, “I am undecided”, and “I would not vote”. *Social distrust* was measured with one item (“Generally speaking, would you say that most

people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?"; based on the World Values Survey (84)). *Social distance* was measured with two items (e.g., "How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are [Democrats/Republicans]?"; adapted from Iyengar and colleagues (47)).

Fourth, participants completed measures of six potential mediating variables (hereafter "mediators"). The order of these six mediators was randomized. *Perceived similarity with outpartisans* was measured with one item ("How similar are you to [Democrats/Republicans]?"). *Strength of partisan identity* was measured with one item ("How important is being a [Republican/Democrat] to you?"). *Anger toward outpartisans* was measured with one item ("How much anger do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?"). *Empathy toward outpartisans* was measured with one item ("How much empathy do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?"). *Perceived unity against a common enemy* was measured with one item ("To what extent should Democrats and Republicans see themselves as united against a common enemy?"). *Perceived threat from outpartisans* was measured with one item ("To what extent do you view [Democrats/Republicans] as a serious threat to the country's well-being?"). Finally, participants completed a one-item measure of *vaccine intentions* ("If periodic booster shots are needed in the future to prevent the spread of COVID-19, how likely are you to get the booster shots?").

S0.4 Analysis Plan

Treatment vs Null Control Analyses

We tested the effects of each of the 25 treatments relative to the null control condition with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. Each dependent variable was separately regressed on experimental condition. Experimental condition was coded as a series of dummy variables. The null control condition was the reference category. We controlled for participants' gender, ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and sample supplier (all dummy-coded) as well as participants' age and strength of partisan identification (using continuous measures). We corrected for differential attrition via inverse-probability weighting (see SM section S13.2). The analyses for the three target outcomes (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence) were preregistered. We used the same preregistered modeling approach for testing the effects of the treatments on the other outcome variables.

Other Analyses

Strategies for all other analyses are reported below in the corresponding sections.

Missing Values

We only used participants who completed the measure that served as the dependent variable being analyzed. Thus, a participant who had missing values for one outcome was still included in analyses of the other outcomes for which they provided data. To account for potential biases caused by differential attrition (see SM section S13.2 for more details), we conducted inverse probability weighting (IPW). This procedure reweighted the data so that individuals who

completed the study but had high underlying propensities for attriting, as inferred from a model predicting attrition as a function of baseline covariates and treatment assignment, were upweighted to counterbalance the missing outcomes from attriting participants. The key assumption needed for this procedure to accurately estimate average treatment effects is that attrition is independent of potential outcomes, once variations in attrition due to the baseline covariates have been addressed. Because attrition could be a complex function of interactions among our covariates (e.g. older women are more likely to leave in certain treatment conditions), we used random forests to calculate each participant's propensity to attrit from the study. As predictors, we included experimental condition, gender, age, race, education, party identification, strength of party identification, and the panel the participant was recruited from (e.g. Bovitz, Luth, or Dynata). The results are similar if we use a parametric approach of regressing an indicator for attrition on experimental condition indicators, all baseline covariates, and their full interactions. We calculated weights for each outcome separately, thus we do not assume that the patterns of selection that led to attrition for one dependent variable are identical for the others. Based on this model for attrition, we calculated the estimated probabilities of attrition for each participant, and we use the inverse of these probabilities as weights in our regression analyses.

Outliers

We considered all values on the 101-pt scales as reasonable responses. Therefore, we did not exclude any potential outliers.

Inference Criteria

We used p-values as our criterion for inferring statistically significant effects. We used one-tailed tests to test for main effects of the treatments, relative to the null control condition, on the outcome variables. We used two-tailed tests for all other analyses (including backfire effects). We report $p \leq .05$ as significant effects, $.05 < p \leq .1$ as marginally significant effects, and $p > .1$ as nonsignificant effects. We did not use corrections for multiple tests because our main interest was in the individual effects of the treatments on the different outcomes, instead of testing the same hypothesis in different ways (for a full discussion of how we addressed multiple testing concerns, please see SM section S13.3).

S0.5 Preregistration, Materials Data, and Code Availability

The preregistration, materials, anonymized data, and analysis code for our study are publicly available via <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JZBNT>.

S1 Supplementary Text: List of Example “Bridging” Organizations

Here we define “bridging” organizations as organizations working on overcoming political divisions – and other social and cultural divisions associated with political divisions – in the U.S. at either an interpersonal or societal level. Below is a non-exhaustive list of several U.S.-based organizations for whom bridging these sorts of group divides is a major focus:

AllSides, American Exchange Project, American Public Square, Better Arguments Project, Beyond Conflict, Bipartisan Policy Center, Braver Angels, BridgeUSA, Civi, Civic Genius, Civity, Common Ground Committee, Constructive Dialogue Institute, Convergence Center for Policy Resolution, Crossing Party Lines, Divided We Fall, FixUS, In This Together, Living Room Conversations, Millennial Action Project, More in Common, National Institute for Civil Discourse, One America Movement, ProCon, Project Divided, Resetting the Table, The Flip Side, The Village Square, Unify America, YOUNify.

S2 Supplementary Text: Recruitment and Selection of Treatments

The identification of treatments to be included in the Strengthening Democracy Challenge proceeded in two stages: recruitment and selection. The recruitment stage involved several steps to maximize the number and diversity of high-quality submissions. The selection stage was the process we used to choose 25 treatments to test from the 252 submissions.

S2.1 Recruitment

We recruited submissions from July 20, 2021, to October 1, 2021. We used five methods to recruit as many submissions from academics across the social sciences and practitioners as possible.

1. Before putting out the official call for submissions, we elicited preliminary commitments to submit from nearly 30 well-known scholars and practitioners who work on polarization and/or democracy.
2. We sent targeted invitations to more than 600 researchers from the different social science disciplines who have studied the topics. We also sent such invitations to more than 100 practitioners from organizations who work on polarization, democracy, or related topics. We asked all these individuals to share the information about the Strengthening Democracy Challenge with others who might be interested.
3. Along with the members of our Advisory Board, we distributed information about the Strengthening Democracy Challenge via social media. Cumulatively, this reached over 200,000 Twitter users.
4. We sent the call for submissions to listservs and organizations' subscriber lists to reach more than 65,000 scholars, practitioners, and members of the general public with an interest in polarization and/or democracy.
5. We presented the challenge in 11 lab meetings of academic research groups who study topics related to the challenge.

In addition to advertising the Strengthening Democracy Challenge, we employed several methods to assist people in developing submissions.

1. We developed a [website](#) that explained the logistics of the project and facilitated submission of treatments.
2. We made an extensive [handbook](#) with details about the challenge, including information on how to submit, rules of the competition, and how we would measure the targeted dependent variables.
3. We held four zoom workshops, including workshops designed for practitioners and academic researchers, that provided details and guidance to potential submitters.
4. We held over 30 one-on-one Zoom meetings with individual submitter teams (often practitioners) to answer questions, clarify requirements, and help transform ideas into workable submissions.
5. We facilitate partnerships between scholars and practitioners. We recruited graduate students interested in collaborating with practitioners. We matched five practitioner teams with graduate students.

Authors submitted their treatments via an online form on the SDC website. On this form, submitters specified which outcomes they were targeting (they could target one, two, or all three – regardless of what they indicated, all treatments were tested with regard to all three outcomes). They also could describe whether they had conducted any prior related tests of the treatment (although doing so was not required).

In all, we received 252 submissions. Submissions came from nearly all social science disciplines (including psychology, political science, sociology, communication, and economics), and career stages (including professors, post docs, graduate students, undergraduate students, high school students), and from a wide range of practitioners from more than two dozen organizations.

S2.2 Selection

We had funding to test 25 treatments. Thus, we needed to select the 25 most promising treatments from the 252 submissions. The selection process proceeded in six steps:

1. Jan Voelkel checked every submission to ensure it met the criteria for inclusion: ethical (i.e., must be approvable by the Institutional Review Board), deployable on-line, scalable to hundreds of individuals who would participate asynchronously (e.g., it could not include a chat among all participants), short (i.e., no longer than 8 minutes), comprehensible in English, costless (i.e., could not pay participants beyond their base pay), and aligned (i.e., could not collect additional outcome measures). If a submission failed the check, the submitters could revise and resubmit it.
2. At least one member of our Editorial Board (consisting of James Druckman, David Rand, and Robb Willer) and one other member of the Strengthening Democracy Challenge Organization Team (Jan Voelkel, Nick Stagnaro, James Chu, and Sophia Pink) rated each treatment on a 5-point scale and provided comments/reactions. A subset of the team (James Druckman, Robb Willer, Jan Voelkel) then met and, based on these ratings and subsequent discussion, selected 70 treatments to send out for further review.
3. Each of the 70 treatments sent for further review were assigned two members of the Advisory Board (see list of members below). Each board member was provided with a form for evaluating each treatment on which they assessed the treatments assigned to them in terms of their expected effect size in reducing each of our three outcome variables (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence), and in terms of its novelty (in the context of the reviewer's professional experience). They also provided a brief justification for their evaluation and suggestions for how the submission could be improved.
4. Based on the ratings from advisory board members, a subset of the team (James Druckman, Robb Willer, Jan Voelkel) evaluated all 70 treatments and selected the top 50 treatments.
5. A team of seven evaluators (James Druckman, David Rand, Robb Willer, Jan Voelkel, Nick Stagnaro, James Chu, and Sophia Pink) evaluated the top 50 treatments and selected the 25 treatments to test in the study. In so doing, the team drew upon all prior reviews by Advisory Board and Organization Team members, as well as attending to diversity considerations in terms of strategies (not accepting too many treatments of any one strategy, e.g., misperception corrections), background (e.g., practitioner/academic,

academic discipline), and targeted outcomes (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence).

Once the top 25 treatments were accepted, we worked with the submitters on minor suggested revisions focused on fitting to the requirements of the challenge and the logistics of the testing environment, made updates to programming, and ensured all involved were comfortable with the final treatment.

S2.3 Advisory Board

We recruited 29 practitioners and academics to serve on an advisory board. The board was diverse in terms of professional background (8 practitioners), disciplines among academics (political science, sociology, psychology, economics, communication), and demographic background (e.g., career stage, gender, and racial/ethnic identity). The advisory board members were:

Mannie Ajayi, Pacific Fin Capital
 Chris Bail, Sociology, Duke University
 Loren Bendele, Gell
 Adam Berinsky, Political Science, MIT
 Pete Ditto, Psychology, University of California, Irvine
 Long Doan, Sociology, University of Maryland
 Corey Fields, Sociology, Georgetown University
 Eli Finkel, Psychology and Management and Organizations, Northwestern University
 Matt Gentzkow, Economics, Stanford University
 Cheryl Graeve, National Institute of Civil Discourse (NICD) at the University of Arizona
 Kristin Hansen, Civic Health Project
 Eszter Hargittai, Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich
 Vincent Hutchings, Political Science, University of Michigan
 Lucas Johnson, On Being
 Cindy Kam, Political Science, Vanderbilt University
 Adam Seth Levine, Government, Cornell University
 Neil Malhotra, Political Economy, Stanford University
 Lilliana Mason, Political Science, Johns Hopkins University
 Leslie McCall, Sociology and Political Science, City University of New York (CUNY)
 Melissa Michelson, Political Science, Menlo College
 Jenan Mohajir, Interfaith Youth Core
 Mohammed Naeem, American Immigration Council
 Mara Ostfeld, Political Science, University of Michigan
 Zeenat Rahman, University of Chicago
 Jaime Settle, Government, College of William & Mary
 Jesse Shapiro, Economics, Brown University
 Betsy Sinclair, Political Science, Washington University in St Louis
 Michelle Torres, Political Science, Rice University
 Julie Wronski, Political Science, University of Mississippi

S3 Supplementary Text: Questionnaire and Treatments

S3.1 Questionnaire

The questionnaire is available online as a [Google doc](#), a [pdf](#), and a [Qualtrics file](#).

S3.2 Treatments

The experimental conditions are described on the following pages.

Befriending Meditation

Submitters' Title: Befriending Meditation

Otto Simonsson

Karolinska Institute

Description: Participants take part in an eight-minute befriending meditation. They listen to an audio that emphasizes treating yourself well and extending kindness to others. The audio discusses being safe, happy, healthy, and having ease of being. It suggests thinking of a loved one in the same way. It then asks respondents to think of a stranger this way (wishing them safety, happiness, health, and ease of being). It then asks them to think of someone they find difficult in the same way. Finally, respondents are asked to extend the same kindness to all living beings. Respondents thus reflect on the importance of thinking positive thoughts about all beings.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/xfjfy2rn>.

Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz

Submitters' Title: Epistemic Rescue: Leveraging Knowledge Complementaries to Reduce Political Antipathy

Evan DeFilippis; Joshua Greene

Harvard Business School; Harvard University (Psychology Department)

Participants are paired with someone from the other party and they learn a little about them. They then privately answer twelve trivia questions (e.g., about cars, food, TV). Half the questions are likely to be correctly answered by Republicans (e.g., the last name of the family on Duck Dynasty) and half are likely to be correctly answered by Democrats (e.g., Ben and Jerry ice cream flavors). After answering each privately, the participant answers again, but this time they can choose to learn what their partner from the other party answered. They thus can learn how someone from the other party can help them.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/2v22fsxp>.

Common Economic Interests

Submitters' Title: A Common Economic Plight and a Common Economic Enemy

Joe Green; Nick R. Kay; Azim Shariff

The University of British Columbia; The University of British Columbia; The University of British Columbia

Description: Participants watch a video about how economic interests unite Americans across political divides. The video points out that other than the super rich, “we are all in this together,” and the super rich share little in common with other Americans. Instead, the super rich have more in common with each other regardless of their partisanship such as life expectancy, political donations and access to elite schools. And that income inequality has increased over time. Participants then write about what they thought of the video. Participants thus learn about how they share an identity with most Americans regardless of different partisanship.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/3248k33h>.

Common Exhausted Majority Identity

Submitters’ Title: Testing a ‘Values Alignment’ Approach to Reducing Partisan Animosity

Christopher Bryan; Cameron Hecht; Maytal Saar-Tsechansky; David Yeager; Margaret V. Clapper

The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin

Description: Participants read about how the news media creates political division and outrage to maximize its audience. They are provided with quotes from books along these lines. Data are provided that show the more news media one watches, the more inaccurate and exaggerated their perceptions of the other side. Instructions are provided on how to take control back from the media and participants are asked to provide advice to others on how to do this. Participants thus learn that the media has caused perceived divisions that are, in reality, much less stark. Finally, participants reflect on actions they can take in response.

Available for review upon request to christopher.bryan@mcombs.utexas.edu, cameron.hecht@utexas.edu, maytal.saar-tsechansky@mcombs.utexas.edu, dyeager@utexas.edu, and/or m.clapper@utexas.edu.

Common National Identity

Submitters’ Title: Common Identity-Based Intervention

Ali Javeed; Kimberly C. Doell; Steve Rathje; Jay Van J. Bavel

New York University; New York University; New York University; New York University

Description: Participants read about how democracy has been crucial to America’s success as a leader in technology (e.g., computers, cellphones) and culture (e.g., film, music). They then read that American democracy is at risk from extreme partisanship. Participants learn that, fortunately, research shows that the vast majority of Americans support democracy, and this is a common identity of Americans. Moreover, despite perceptions to the contrary, most members of both parties like each other, disdain violence, and support the rules of democracy. Participants write about their two favorite things about being American. Participants thus learn of a common American identity and that most partisans share more in common than they think.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/22nn6aaj>

Correcting Democracy Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Correcting Overestimates of Opposing Partisans' Willingness to Break Democratic Norms

Alia Braley; Gabriel Lenz; Dhaval Adjodah; Hossein Rahnama; Alex Pentland
University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Berkeley; MIT Media Lab;
Toronto Metropolitan University; MIT Connection Science

Description: Participants are told that most people do not know much about the other party. They are then asked to guess what people from the other party believe when it comes to actions that undermine how democracy works (e.g., using violence to block laws, reducing the number of polling stations to help the other party, or not accepting the results of elections if they lose). Participants answer eight such questions. After each, they receive the correct answer – that is, they are told what the other party actually believes, based on recent surveys. The answers make clear the other party does not support actions that undermine democracy. They thus learn the other party supports maintaining key elements of democracy.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/5bwtm7hz>

Correcting Division Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Reducing Political Polarization by Correcting Erroneous Meta-Perceptions: A Video Intervention

Samantha L. Moore-Berg; Michael H. Pasek; Rebecca Littman; Roman Gallardo; Nour Kteily

University of Pennsylvania; University of Illinois Chicago, Beyond Conflict; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University

Description: Participants watch a video showing some Democrats and Republicans reacting to survey findings on how much Democrats and Republicans actually agree on some issues (e.g., views on how much to open borders to immigrants). The partisans in the video learn that the extent to which Democrats and Republicans agree is much more than they expected. This can help participants learn that Americans tend to overestimate the extent to which partisans disagree. The viewers thus learn that partisans are not nearly as different as they typically think.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/6rht98vc>

Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Reducing False Beliefs About Outgroup Members' Willingness to Sacrifice Large-Scale Suffering for Political Gain

Charles Dorison; Nour Kteily

Kellogg School of Management; Kellogg School of Management

Description: Participants are asked to predict how people from the other party would have responded to a series of questions (e.g., rushing the COVID-19 vaccine for political gain). They then are informed of the actual answers from the other party, and how much they mis-estimated the beliefs for the other party (i.e., making them more extreme than they actually are). They also read actual comments from those from the other party. Participants thus learn that many overestimate how people from the other party prioritize their political gains at the expense of large-scale suffering.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/4jw7t59u>

Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Correcting Inaccurate Group Meta-Perceptions Reduces Polarization

Jeffrey Lees; Mina Cikara

Princeton University; Harvard University

Description: Participants read about actions their party might take to gain an electoral advantage (e.g., drawing voting districts to their advantage). They then estimate how much the other party would oppose those actions. Next, they learn that the average member of the other party typically is less opposed than most would estimate. Participants thus learn that the other party is not as against their party as they may have thought.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/2p9mb4x9>

Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot

Submitters' Title: Reducing Partisan Animosity Through a Common Ground Discovery Chatbot Quiz

Brandyn Keating; Aaron Lyles; Jay Rosato

YOUunify; CommonAlly; CommonAlly

Description: Participants answer questions (in a chat) about where they think the average Democrat and Republican fall on various issues (gun control, immigration, climate change). After each answer, they are given the correct answer from a credible source. They also are asked about and learn that more than 70% of Americans agree on various issues (concerning police, minimum wage, COVID). Participants learn that the parties are not nearly as far apart from each other than most people believe. Participants thus learn the parties are similar on many issues.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/3z78s4ev>

Counterfactual Partisan Selves

Submitters' Title: The Road Not Taken: Reflection on Counterfactual Selves as a Means to Reduce Animosity and Violence

Nathan Ballantyne; Jared Celniker; Mertcan Güngör; John Michael Kelly; Shiri Spitz Siddiqi

Arizona State University; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine

Description: Participants are asked about their views on various issues (e.g., abortion, gun control, immigration). They then answer the same questions but are asked to imagine their life had been different on each issue (e.g., raised in a Christian fundamentalist tradition, had a sister who was assaulted and became pregnant). Participants are then provided the results of their attitudes versus their attitudes under different circumstances. They are told that many opponents are good people with different environments. Participants thus learn about how the beliefs of those from the other side reflect valid experiences.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/239mhnr>

Democratic Collapse Threat

Submitters' Title: Appealing to Fear of Democratic Collapse

Katherine Clayton; Michael Tomz

Stanford University; Stanford University

Description: Participants watch a video about countries where democracy collapsed (Venezuela, Turkey). It explains what the rulers tried to do to stay in power by using violence and violating electoral rights. The video shows scenes of chaos. It then asks whether democracy could collapse in the US, showing scenes from the January 6th Capitol insurrection. Participants then read about what they could do to protect democracy such as defending the separation of powers, endorsing compromise, and rejecting violence. Participants thus learn about the consequences if the rules of democracy are violated.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/45295w3u>

Democratic System Justification

Submitters' Title: Democratic System Justification

Aaron Kay; John T. Jost; Daniela Goya-Tocchetto

Duke University; New York University; Duke University

Description: Participants read an article about how the American system is unique in that people do not turn on one another, instead they stay faithful to the principles of civility and respect even during economic recession, a pandemic, or natural disaster. The article notes people debate and have to deal with media outlets that inflate their differences, but they retain faith in the system and trust in each other. Participants thus learn that the majority of Americans remain committed to values of mutual respect.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/bdj3u2jn>

Describing a Likable Outpartisan

Submitters' Title: Thinking of Friends From Other Party Depolarizes

Matthew Levendusky

University of Pennsylvania

Description: Participants are asked to think about one person from the other party that they like and respect (and if none, then one they view most positively). They then are asked to reflect on and write about why they feel that way about the person. They answer a question about who the person is (e.g., friend, family member, co-worker), and how close they are to the person. Participants thus think about an individual positive example of the other party.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/3j5ceptm>

Moral Similarities and Differences

Submitters' Title: Uncovering the Psychological Roots of Political Divides

Caroline Mehl; Mylien Duong; Macrina Dieffenbach; Lauren Alpert Maurer

Constructive Dialogue Institute; Constructive Dialogue Institute; Facebook; Constructive Dialogue Institute

Participants read about how our brain works and how the same information can be interpreted differently by different individuals. Participants also learn about Moral Foundation Theory, which argues that we all share the same six moral foundations when interpreting information, but use them differently on different issues (i.e., some people consider "loyalty" more, while others consider "fairness" more). Participants then read conversation on abortion and gun control from two speakers who use the same set of moral foundations overall but use different foundations on each issue. Participants thus learn that we all actually share the same set of moral foundations.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/2nvp8wmk>

Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm

Submitters' Title: Sharing Harmful Personal Experiences Reduces Partisan Animosity

Emily Kubin; Curtis Puryear; Kurt Gray

Rhineland-Palatinate Technical University Kaiserslautern-Landau; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Participants hear from real people from the other party who explain their views come from personal experiences of suffering. For example, Republicans learn about someone who is anti-gun because his friend was murdered by someone who obtained a gun without a proper background check. Or, Democrats learn about someone who is pro-gun because one of his friends was murdered in a home invasion robbery. Participants thus learn that views from the other side reflect authentic experiences of vulnerability and suffering.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/4xvd7ckr>

Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn

Submitters' Title: Using Expressed Learning Goals to Overcome Partisan Animosity

Hanne Collins; Julia Minson; Charles Dorison; Molly Moore; Hayley Blunden; Kara Luo

Harvard University; Harvard University; Northwestern University; Harvard University; American University Kogod School of Business; Harvard University

Description: Participants exchange messages with someone from the other party who is seeking an open-minded exchange. The messages involve explaining why the participant and the person from the other party have the positions that they do (e.g., on taxes, income). Participants thus engage with an open-minded member of the other party to exchange views in a productive manner.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/375e7rkt>

Party Overlap on Policies

Submitters' Title: Exploring the Nuanced Partisan Overlap Between Political Parties

Victor Allis; Erez Yoeli; Sara Gifford

ActiVote; MIT Sloan School of Management; ActiVote

Description: Participants answer questions about views on eight policies (e.g., over the counter birth control, background checks for gun buying, legalization of marijuana). After each policy question, they are shown the high overlap in the views of Democrats and Republicans. At the end they are shown the average sizeable overlap across other issues which is 69%. They thus learn that the parties share a lot of views.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/3kx9rfvu>

Political Violence Inefficacy

Submitters' Title: Reducing Support for Partisan Violence by Questioning Efficacy

Peter Felsman; Colleen Seifert

Northern Michigan University; University of Michigan

Description: Participants read a news article about how non-violent protests are much more effective in bringing about change than violent protests. They then answer questions about the article and are asked, based on the article, how they would convince a political leader to use non-violent tactics. Participants are then asked, based on the article, how effective they believe political violence is. Participants thus learn and actively rehearse the lesson that using violent means to achieve political ends is a relatively ineffective strategy.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/5n74a8av>

Positive Contact Video

Submitters' Title: Using Media Trades to Incentivize Engagement With a Vivid Illustration of Contact Theory

Daniel F. Stone; David Francis; Michael Franz; Julia Minson

Bowdoin College; Bowdoin College; Bowdoin College; Harvard Kennedy School

Description: Participants watch a commercial from England that shows people with opposing political views bonding with one another despite learning of their political disagreements. The video shows pairs of people disagreeing on climate change, feminism, and transgender identity. It shows the pairs then working together, bonding, and deciding to spend time together (to drink a beer). They thus learn how people with different political views can get along. Before watching, participants are told that if they answer questions correctly about the video, they will get to choose an article or video to share with someone from the other party.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/2hd6zyy5>

Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues

Submitters' Title: One Nation Utah Governor Race Joint PSA

Ben Lyons

University of Utah

Description: Participants watch a video with a Democrat and a Republican candidate who were running against each other to be governor. Each candidate emphasizes that all votes will be counted and they will honor the peaceful transfer of power. They explain that is what the county is built upon. Participants thus learn that office seekers on both sides respect democratic elections.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/3fwvvh6>

Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues

Submitters' Title: Strengthening Democracy With Partisan Social Norms

James Martherus

Morning Consult

Description: Participants are asked to read a fictional op-ed with real quotes and statistics. It focuses on their own party's beliefs about democracy and violence. They learn that the leader of their party (Biden or Trump) condemns violence and supports democratic processes (e.g., right to vote, freedom of the press). The op-ed also cites social science data about how at least 90% of their own party do not support violence or breaking the rules to help their party win. Participants are asked to summarize the argument. Participants thus learn that their own party is against violence and supportive of democracy.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/yhn7tvpk>

Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat

Submitters' Title: Reducing Partisan Threat Perceptions

Matthew Hall; Wayde Marsh; Levi Allen; James Kirk

University of Notre Dame; University of Tennessee; University of Notre Dame;
University of Notre Dame

Description: Participants read about how their party is dominating American politics (e.g., controlling the three branches of government for Democrat respondents or controlling state government for Republican respondents) and their influence is likely to increase (e.g., having a growing voter base for Democrats, likely to do well in midterms for Republicans). Participants are told the country leans to their party in the foreseeable future. Participants thus may become less threatened by the other party.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/d5nmpk7e>

Sympathetic Personal Narratives

Submitters' Title: Civity Storytelling: Expanding the Pool of People Who Matter

Malka Kopell; Palma Strand; Gina Baleria; Maya Fiorella

Civity; Civity & Creighton University; Civity & Sonoma State University; Civity & Sonoma State University

Description: Participants watch an introductory animated video about the importance of individual stories. They then watch five videos where individuals talk about themselves and their experiences. Participants then watch another animated video about the importance of “civility” – connecting with people who are different and seeing them as members of their community. This final video describes how civility is important for a healthy democracy. Participants then explain their takeaways. They are thus prompted to learn and think about how democracy promotes and can handle differences.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/yh64c9sk>

Utility of Outparty Empathy

Submitters’ Title: Beliefs about Cross-Partisan Empathy

Luiza Almeida Santos; Jamil Zaki

Stanford University; Stanford University

Description: Participants read about the benefits of empathizing with people with different political beliefs. For instance, they read that empathizing with the other political side (e.g., someone with different beliefs on gun control) leads one to be more persuasive and liked, and that it builds consensus. They then write about how empathy can be useful in competitive contexts and how they could be more empathetic going forward in their own lives. They thus learn about how empathy with those from the other political side can be beneficial.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/ysjjm4re>

Null Control

Designed by the Strengthening Democracy Challenge organizing team

Description: Participants in this condition moved on directly to the DVs.

Alternative Control

Designed by the Strengthening Democracy Challenge organizing team

Description: Participants read some information about the three branches of government.

Available for review via <https://tinyurl.com/yuztjf2a>

S4 Supplementary Text: Outcomes Submitters of Treatments Focused On

Our study provides some evidence that researchers and practitioners are more likely to focus on partisan animosity than support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence. Submitters were asked: “Which of the following outcomes did you design your intervention to reduce? (Check all that apply.)” We stated that we would welcome and accept submissions that target one, two, and/or all three of the outcomes. For the vast majority of the 252 submitted treatments in our megastudy, submitters indicated that partisan animosity was their only target, or one of their targets (86% of 252 submissions and 96% of 25 selected treatments, versus 52% and 48% for support for undemocratic practices, and 66% and 64% for support for partisan violence; Table S4.1). Similar proportions were obtained among the 25 selected treatments. Table S4.2 provides the information submitters provided at the time of submission and Table S4.3 provides the predictions submitters sent before the main survey and the durability survey.

Submitters’ also reported more prior experience studying partisan animosity than the other two outcomes. We asked the 25 teams whose treatment was selected for experimental testing for the number of studies and experiments they had conducted on the three targets. For example, we asked: “How many experiments have you or other members of your team conducted in which you tested the effect of the intervention submitted to the challenge (or an intervention very close to it) with partisan animosity (or a measure very close to it) as dependent or outcome variable?”. 24 teams responded to our survey. They reported having previously conducted a total of 165 studies and 61 experiments on partisan animosity, while they reported having conducted 53 studies and 17 experiments on support for undemocratic practices, and 17 studies and 10 experiments on support for partisan violence, respectively.

S5 Supplementary Text: Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we report several descriptive findings.

S5.1 Raw Means and Standard Deviations by Experimental Condition

We report the raw means and standard deviations of the primary outcomes (Table S5.1.1) and the other outcomes (Table S5.1.2) for each experimental condition.

S5.2 Correlations between Key Measures

We report the pairwise correlations between the eight outcomes and several key political variables in the literature, including partisan identity (0 coded as Democrat, 1 coded as Republican), the seven-point ANES measure of partisan identity (ranging from “strong Democrat” to “strong Republican”), a 101-point measure of strength of partisan identity, a 7-point measure of ideology (ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative”), and a 4-point measure of ideological extremity (the absolute value of the distance from the midpoint of the ideology measure). We included only participants who were not exposed to a treatment (i.e., those in the null control condition). Table S5.2.1 provides the correlations across Democrats and Republicans. Table S5.2.2 provides the correlations among Democrats. Table S5.2.3 provides the correlations among Republicans.

S5.3 Differences between Democrats and Republicans

We report partisan differences on the eight outcome variables (Table S5.3.1). We regressed each outcome on a dummy variable representing partisan identity (0 coded as Democrat, 1 coded as Republican). We included only participants who were not exposed to a treatment (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that Republicans reported significantly higher support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distrust and significantly lower support for partisan violence and social distance than Democrats. We did not find significant differences in partisan animosity and biased evaluation of politicized facts.

S5.4 Differences between Less and More Strongly Identified Partisans

We report differences between more and less strongly identified partisans on the eight outcome variables (Table S5.4.1). We regressed each outcome on a measure of strength of partisan identity (on a 0-100 scale). We included only participants who were not exposed to a treatment (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that the participants who more strongly identified with their party reported more partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distance, and biased evaluation of political facts but less social distrust.

S5.5 Partisan Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effect

We test whether the association between strength of partisan identity and the outcome variables is different for Democrats and Republicans (Table S5.5.1). We regressed each outcome on the measure of strength of partisan identity (on a 0-100 scale), the dummy variable representing partisan identity (0 coded as Democrat, 1 coded as Republican), and their interaction. We included only participants who were not exposed to a treatment (i.e., the null control condition group).

We find evidence for such an interaction effect for six outcomes. For four of these outcomes (support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and biased evaluation of politicized facts), the interaction effect indicates that strongly identified Republicans score particularly high. For social distrust, the interaction effect indicates that weakly identified Democrats score particularly high. For social distance, the interaction effect indicates that strongly identified Democrats score particularly high.

For partisan animosity and support for partisan violence, we did not find significant interaction effects. In these cases, the main effects determine the highest scoring group. For partisan animosity, we observed a main effect for strength of partisan identity and no main effect for partisan identity. The group displaying the highest levels of partisan animosity were participants who strongly identified as partisans. For support for partisan violence, we observed a main effect for strength of partisan identity and a main effect for partisan identity. The group displaying the highest levels of support for partisan violence were strongly identified Democrats.

S5.6 Differences between Liberals and Conservatives

We report ideological differences on the eight outcome variables (Table S5.6.1). We regressed each outcome on our measure of political ideology (ranging from 1 coded as extremely liberal to 7 coded as extremely conservative). We included only participants who were not exposed to a treatment (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that conservatives reported higher levels on six of the eight outcomes: partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts (though note the Democratic and Republican formulations of biased evaluation of politicized facts varied in the content of the items). Liberals expressed higher levels on two of the outcomes: social distance and support for partisan violence.

S5.7 Differences between Ideological Moderate and Ideological Extreme People

We report differences between people with a moderate ideology and people with a more extreme ideology on the eight outcome variables (Table S5.7.1). We regressed each outcome on our measure of ideological extremity (ranging from 0 coded as moderate to 3 coded as extremely liberal/conservative). We included only participants who were not exposed to a treatment (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that ideologically extreme participants reported higher levels on seven of the eight outcomes: partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts (though note the Democratic and Republican formulations of biased evaluation of politicized facts varied in the

content of the items). Ideological extremity was not associated with significantly higher or lower levels of social distrust.

S6 Supplementary Text: Results of Treatment versus Null Control Analyses

We tested the effects of each of the 25 treatments relative to the null control condition on the primary outcomes and several other outcomes with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. Each dependent variable was separately regressed on experimental condition. Experimental condition was coded as a series of dummy variables. The null control condition was the reference category. We controlled for participants' gender, ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and sample supplier (all dummy-coded) as well as participants' age and strength of partisan identification (using continuous measures). We used one-tailed tests (except for the alternative control condition). We corrected for differential attrition via inverse-probability weighting (see SM section 13.2).

The results are reported in Tables S6.1-S6.22. The tables report the treatment effect as the regression coefficient, indicating the mean difference between treatment and null control. The tables also report the standard error, t-value, p-value, and Cohen's d as a standardized effect size that gives the treatment difference in standard deviations. The analyses for partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence (Tables S6.1-S6.3) were preregistered. We used the same preregistered modeling approach for testing the effects of the treatments on the other outcome variables.

S7 Supplementary Text: Results of Treatment versus Treatment Analyses

We tested the effects of each of the 25 treatments relative to the other treatments with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. Each dependent variable was separately regressed on experimental condition. Experimental condition was coded as a series of dummy variables. We reran the same model changing the reference categories of experimental condition. We controlled for participants' gender, ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and sample supplier (all dummy-coded) as well as participants' age and strength of partisan identification (using continuous measures). We corrected for differential attrition via inverse-probability weighting. The analyses were not preregistered, but used the same preregistered modeling approach for testing the effects of the treatments relative to the null control condition. In contrast to the treatment versus control analyses, we used two-tailed tests.

The results are reported in Tables S7.1-S7.3. The tables report the relative efficacy of the treatments. The column "rank" provides the order of treatments by effect size (with the treatment with the largest effect size being ranked first). The column "ranks of treatments with significantly smaller effects" provides the treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question (identified by their ranks in this table). The column "percentage of treatments with significantly smaller effects" provides the percentage of treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question.

One discrete strategy to identify 'most efficacious treatments' is to define a cut-off point for the percentage of treatments that most efficacious treatments need to be statistically distinguishable from. Here, we define most efficacious treatments as those that had statistically significantly larger effects than at least 80% of all other treatments. For partisan animosity, four treatments would qualify as most efficacious treatments (see Table S7.1). For support for undemocratic practices, two treatments would qualify as most efficacious treatments (see Table S7.2). For support for partisan violence, none of the treatments would qualify as the most efficacious treatment (see Table S7.3). However, choosing a threshold for categorizing treatments as most efficacious or impactful is not essential for making comparisons of relative effect size. The results for the relative efficacy of treatments for the other outcomes are available via <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JZBNT>.

S8 Supplementary Text: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

We examined the possibility that the treatments we tested might have heterogeneous effects on the outcome variables in several ways.

S8.1 Moderation by Partisan Identity

First, we tested whether the treatment effects were moderated by partisan identity, i.e., whether participants identified as Democrats or Republicans (Tables S8.1.1-S8.1.8). We used the same preregistered analytic strategy as for the treatment versus null control analyses. The only difference was that we added interaction terms for the experimental condition dummies and partisan identity.

Across the eight outcomes, we found statistically significant differences in treatment effects between Republicans and Democrats for nine treatments. Because of the large number of hypotheses tested (8 outcomes multiplied by 25 treatments = 200 hypotheses), we would expect 10 interaction effects to be statistically significant (by $p < .05$ threshold) by chance alone. Thus, there was very little evidence for moderation by partisan identity, similar to what would be expected merely by chance. Below, we describe the patterns of the significant interaction effects (see Table S8.1.9 for the simple effects test statistics):

- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* did not significantly affect partisan animosity among Democrats, but significantly increased partisan animosity among Republicans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among both Democrats and Republicans, but the effect was significantly stronger among Democrats.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among Democrats, but significantly increased support for partisan violence among Republicans.
- The *Alternative Control* condition significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among Democrats, but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among Republicans.
- *Describing a Likable Outpartisan* did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among Democrats, but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among Republicans.
- *Positive Contact Video* significantly reduced opposition to bipartisan cooperation among Democrats, but did not significantly affect opposition to bipartisan cooperation among Republicans.
- *Befriending Meditation* significantly reduced social distance among Democrats but did not significantly affect social distance among Republicans.
- *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* significantly increased social distance among Democrats but did not significantly affect social distance among Republicans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced social distance among Democrats but did not significantly affect social distance among Republicans.

Out of these interaction effects, we are most concerned about the backfire effect of *Democratic Collapse Threat* on support for partisan violence among Republicans ($p = .002$). We think that this interaction effect might be meaningful because this treatment used footage from

the January 6th riots, which may have upset the many Republicans who now perceive those riots as a legitimate protest (85), and/or may have influenced Republicans to be more supportive of violent protest as a result of showing footage of a violent, right-leaning protest. Future research should explore whether this treatment could be revised to avoid, or even reverse, this backfire effect, while preserving the positive effects of the treatment.

Despite the lack of evidence for widespread heterogeneous treatment effects, for descriptive purposes we report the effects of all treatments separately for Democrats (Tables S8.1.10-S8.1.17) and Republicans (Tables S8.1.18-S8.1.25). For these analyses, we restricted the sample to Democrats and Republicans, respectively. We followed the same analysis strategy as in the preregistered analyses except that (a) we did not control for partisan identity (doing so is impossible when analyzing a single partisan identity because the variable is constant for these subgroup analyses) and (b) we did not use inverse probability weighting to correct for differential attrition.

S8.2 Moderation by Strength of Partisan Identity

Second, we tested if the treatment effects were moderated by strength of partisan identity (Tables S8.2.1-S8.2.8). We used the same strategy as for the treatment vs null control analyses. The only difference was that we added interaction terms for the experimental condition dummies and strength of partisan identity.

Across the eight outcomes, we found that nineteen treatment effects were significantly moderated by strength of partisan identity. For comparison, we would expect 10 interaction effects to be significant just by chance. Thus, we found some evidence for moderation by strength of partisan identity. Below, we describe the patterns of the significant interaction effects for weakly (one standard deviation below the mean) and strongly (one standard deviation above the mean) identified partisans (see Table S8.2.9 for the simple effects test statistics):

- *Sympathetic Personal Narratives* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Common National Identity* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Correcting Division Misperceptions* significantly reduced support for partisan violence among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.

- *Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Bipartisan Joint Trivia Game* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- The *Alternative Control Condition* significantly increased opposition to bipartisan cooperation among weakly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among strongly identified partisans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced social distrust among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- The effect of the *Alternative Control Condition* on social distance went in different directions among weakly versus strongly identified partisans but neither of the two simple effects was statistically significant.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced social distance among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Bipartisan Joint Trivia Game* significantly reduced social distance among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced social distance among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced biased evaluation of politicized facts among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- The effect of *Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions* on biased evaluations of politicized facts went in different directions among weakly versus strongly identified partisans but neither of the two simple effects was statistically significant.

Overall, this evidence indicates that treatment effects were sometimes stronger among participants who more strongly identified with their partisan identity. However, it is difficult to predict which treatment effects will be moderated on which outcomes.

S8.3 Moderation by Political Ideology

We also tested if the treatment effects were moderated by political ideology (Tables S8.3.1-S8.3.8). We used the same strategy as for the treatment vs null control analyses. The only difference was that we added interaction terms for the experimental condition dummies and political ideology.

Across the eight outcomes, we found that 13 treatment effects were significantly moderated by political ideology. For comparison, we would expect 10 interaction effects to be significant just by chance. Thus, evidence for moderation by political ideology was weak. Below, we describe the patterns of the significant interaction effects for liberal (one standard deviation below the mean) and conservative (one standard deviation above the mean) identified partisans (see Table S8.3.9 for the simple effects test statistics):

- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both liberals and conservatives, but the effect was significantly stronger among conservatives.
- The Alternative Control significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic practices among conservatives.
- *Correcting Division Misperceptions* significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic practices among conservatives.
- The Alternative Control did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among liberals but significantly increased support for partisan violence among conservatives.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among liberals but significantly increased support for partisan violence among conservatives.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* significantly reduced support for partisan violence among liberals but did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among conservatives.
- The effect of Democratic System Justification on support for partisan violence was significantly moderated by political ideology, but the simple effects among liberals and conservatives were both non-significant.
- The Alternative Control significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.
- *Positive Contact Video* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among both liberals and conservatives but the effect was stronger among liberals.
- *Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.
- *Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions* did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.

S8.4 Backfire Effects

We observed a series of unexpected backfire effects (see Table S8.4.1). We conducted exploratory follow-up analysis to identify which subgroups of participants were driving these backfire effects. Below, we describe the patterns of the backfire effects for liberal (one standard deviation below the mean of political ideology) Democrats, conservative (one standard deviation above the mean) Democrats, liberal Republicans, and conservative Republicans (see Table S8.4.1 for the test statistics):

- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Republicans.
- *Describing a Likable Outpartisan* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among liberal Republicans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* increased support for partisan violence compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Republicans.
- *Counterfactual Partisan Selves* increased support for undemocratic candidates compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* increased opposition to bipartisan cooperation compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans.
- *Party Overlap on Policies* increased opposition to bipartisan cooperation compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Party Overlap on Policies* increased biased evaluation of politicized facts compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Republicans.

S8.5 Optimal Targeting

While the above analyses investigate subgroup effects by partisan identity and strength of partisan identity, there might be heterogeneity on other dimensions or combinations of characteristics (e.g. Republican men). To address this possibility, we turn to a general way of operationalizing heterogeneous treatment effects. Generally, evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects occurs if treatments are more efficacious for some groups than for others. We can measure the evidence in favor of heterogeneous treatment effects via the rank-weighted average treatment effect (RATE; 86). The RATE captures the difference in treatment effects obtained under optimal targeting, relative to random assignment.

Optimal targeting refers to assigning the treatment to participants who are most likely to be affected by it. To calculate this optimal targeting, we draw on generalized causal forests (87) to inductively identify the combination of participant characteristics that predict stronger (weaker) treatment effects. We used the following participant characteristics: gender, age, race,

education, political affiliation, perceived importance of partisan identity, and indicator variables for survey panel supplier. Generalized causal forests are an ensemble model that aggregate multiple decision trees, where each individual tree subdivides participants with differential treatment effects. We use 80% of the sample as a training set and leave 20% as a test set. We also use “honest” estimation, which uses different subsamples for constructing the trees and making predictions.

One way to visually illustrate the RATE is to see its relationship to a targeting operator characteristic curve (TOC). To generate a TOC, we first divide the population into groups, rank ordered by their conditional average treatment effects. Groups who are most likely to be affected by the treatment, for instance, are rank-ordered first. We then plot the effect if we only treated the top q percent of groups who are most sensitive to the treatment, relative to the average estimated effect for the whole population. For example, if we identify and treat only the top 5% of participants (in terms of how much they would be affected by the treatment), their treatment effect should be much larger in magnitude than the average. To estimate the RATE, we take the area under the targeting operator receiver characteristics curve, which aggregates the overall degree to which optimal targeting generates differential effects from the average treatment effect. Because optimal targeting is calibrated to maximize heterogeneity in treatment effects, this implies the RATE is an estimate of overall heterogeneous treatment effects. If our optimal targeting procedure (as based on generalized causal forests) successfully identifies individuals who are differentially affected by the treatment, we expect the RATE to be large in magnitude. Conversely, the RATE should be statistically indistinguishable from zero if our optimal targeting strategy cannot detect heterogeneous treatment effects.

As one concrete example, we plot the targeting operator characteristic curve for *Democratic Collapse Threat* on partisan animosity in Figure S8.5.1. The y-axis indicates the treatment effect in excess of the average treatment effect from rank ordering the top q percent of individuals. Because our treatments are intended to reduce various measures of potentially problematic attitudes concerning polarization and democracy, we reverse our outcomes here so that RATE can be understood as excess benefit to participants.

Figure S8.5.1 illustrates how much more partisan animosity would be reduced (out of a total scale of 100), if those who are most likely to benefit from the treatment are rank ordered. The estimated RATE is 2.55 with a standard error of 1.94, which is not statistically significant ($t = 1.32, p = 0.19$).

The estimated RATEs for each treatment, for each outcome, are plotted in Figure S8.5.2. The results generally show no statistically significant patterns of heterogeneous treatment effects. These results suggest that the participant characteristics in our model were generally insufficient to identify individuals more likely to be affected by the treatments, or that no such heterogeneity exists.

S9 Supplementary Text: Durability Test

Did the effects of the treatments endure for a longer period of time, or did they wear off? Prior treatments for intergroup bias have found that most effects do not persist beyond the initial session (88). Here, we report the results of a durability test conducted two weeks after participants completed the initial study.

S9.1 Method

Participants were invited to participate in a durability survey beginning 14 days after their initial participation. The main survey refers to the survey in which participants were assigned to a treatment or a control condition, completed the content of that experimental condition, and completed the outcomes for the first time. The durability survey refers to the survey in which those participants who were invited back complete the same outcomes a second time.

Financial constraints prevented us from testing the durability of all 25 treatments. Instead, we selected for inclusion in the durability test those treatments with the largest effect sizes, while also weighing diversity of outcomes affected, such that the treatments with the largest effect sizes for each of the three primary outcomes were included in the durability test. To ensure a two week period for each participant between main survey and invitation to the durability survey, we began inviting participants to complete the durability survey before all of the main survey was completed. Thus, the ten treatments for the durability test were chosen based on, (i) the effects of all 25 treatments when approximately 70% of the data was collected, with an effort to (ii) include the treatments that had the largest impact on the three primary outcome variables up to that point of the study. The experimental conditions that were included in the durability test were: Null Control, Alternative Control, Common Exhausted Majority Identity, Common National Identity, Correcting Democracy Misperceptions, Correcting Division Misperceptions, Democratic Collapse Threat, Positive Contact Video, Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues, Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues, Sympathetic Personal Narratives, and Utility of Outparty Empathy.

On Day 15 of the main survey, we began the process of recontacting individuals from the subset of conditions selected for the durability survey. Participants were recontacted in daily waves, inviting those participants who had taken part 14 days before, as well as reinviting participants previously invited to the durability survey who had not yet completed it.

The durability survey followed a similar but more minimal procedure as the main survey. Participants first saw a consent page. Next, participants answered demographic questions about their gender, race and partisan identity. Though participants' partisan identity was measured here, all items calibrated to partisan identity (e.g., items referencing inpartisans and/or outpartisans) were set to be based on the participant's partisan identity as reported in the main survey. After responding to the demographic questions, participants answered the same outcome measures as in the main survey.

S9.2 Retention Rates

In total, 18,227 individuals were randomly assigned to the relevant conditions in the main survey to be reinvited to the durability test. Of these 18,227 participants, $n = 16,780$ participants had completed at least one of the target outcomes in the main survey. Of these 16,780

participants, $n = 8,644$ (51.5%) completed at least one of the target outcomes in the durability survey.

S9.3 Analysis Strategy

We tested the effects of each of the 10 treatments relative to the null control condition with ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. Each dependent variable was separately regressed on experimental condition. Experimental condition was coded as a series of dummy variables. The null control condition was the reference category. We controlled for participants' gender, ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier (all dummy-coded) as well as participants' age and strength of partisan identification. We corrected for differential attrition via inverse-probability weighting (see SM section S13.2). We recalculated the weights for the durability survey using the same procedure as in the main survey. Analyses for the three target outcomes (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence) were preregistered. Analyses for the other outcomes used the same strategy.

We used two strategies to estimate the durability of the treatments. The first strategy (in the following referred to as *the preregistered strategy*) used only participants who completed the outcome in both the main survey and the durability survey (partisan animosity: $n = 8,527$; support for undemocratic practices: $n = 8,521$; support for partisan violence: $n = 8,520$). The benefit of this strategy is that included participants experienced the complete treatment. Due to the unexpectedly low retention rate, the sample size for this strategy was lower than expected.

The second strategy (in the following referred to as *the larger sample size strategy*) used all participants who completed the durability survey (i.e., including attriters from the main survey). This procedure increases the sample size substantially (partisan animosity: $n = 9,850$; support for undemocratic practices: $n = 9,845$; support for partisan violence: $n = 9,843$). However, this strategy may underestimate effect sizes because participants who did not complete the outcomes in the main survey may have experienced only part of the treatment. An advantage of this strategy is that there was no evidence for differential attrition when one includes all participants who completed the durability survey. This makes sense because retaking another survey a couple of weeks later is probably independent of the experimental condition participants were assigned in the main survey. Accordingly, we did not use IPW for these analyses.

S9.4 Preregistration, Data Availability, and Code Availability

The preregistration, anonymized data, and analysis code for the durability test is publicly available via <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JZBNT>.

S9.5 Results

Ten of the tested treatments had effects on partisan animosity in the main survey. Six treatments had durable effects on partisan animosity. According to the preregistered strategy, six treatments significantly reduced partisan animosity relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.1). The most efficacious treatment was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's $d = -0.21$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 29% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.17). According to the larger sample size strategy, six treatments significantly reduced

partisan animosity relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.9). The most efficacious treatment was *Common National Identity* (Cohen's $d = -0.15$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 20% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.17).

Six of the tested treatments had effects on support for undemocratic practices in the main survey. Zero to one treatments had durable effects on support for undemocratic practices. According to the preregistered strategy, no treatment significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.2). The most efficacious treatment was *Democratic Collapse Threat* (Cohen's $d = -0.04$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 4% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.18). According to the larger sample size strategy, one treatment significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.10). The most efficacious treatment was *Democratic Collapse Threat* (Cohen's $d = -0.08$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 11% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.18).

Four of the tested treatments had effects on support for partisan violence in the main survey. One treatment had a durable effect on support for partisan violence. According to the preregistered strategy, one treatment significantly reduced support for partisan violence relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.3). The most efficacious treatment was *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* (Cohen's $d = -0.13$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 63% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.19). According to the larger sample size strategy, one treatment significantly reduced support for partisan violence relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.11). The most efficacious treatment was *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* (Cohen's $d = -0.08$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 37% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.19).

Six of the tested treatments had effects on support for undemocratic candidates in the main survey. One to two treatments had durable effects on support for undemocratic candidates. According to the preregistered strategy, two treatments significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.4). The most efficacious treatment was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's $d = -0.10$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 45% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.20). According to the larger sample size strategy, one treatment significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.12). The most efficacious treatment was *Democratic Collapse Threat* (Cohen's $d = -0.09$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 32% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.20).

Six of the tested treatments had effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation in the main survey. Three to four treatments had durable effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. According to the preregistered strategy, two treatments significantly reduced opposition to bipartisan cooperation relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.5). The most efficacious treatment was *Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues* (Cohen's $d = -0.12$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the

durability survey amounted to 59% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.21). According to the larger sample size strategy, four treatments significantly reduced opposition to bipartisan cooperation relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.13). The most efficacious treatment was *Correcting Democracy Misperceptions* (Cohen's $d = -0.08$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 51% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.21).

Eight of the tested treatments had effects on social distrust in the main survey. One treatment had a durable effect on social distrust. According to the preregistered strategy, one treatment significantly reduced social distrust relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.6). The most efficacious treatment was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's $d = -0.10$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 25% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.22). According to the larger sample size strategy, one treatment significantly reduced social distrust relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.14). The most efficacious treatment was *Common National Identity* (Cohen's $d = -0.10$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 32% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.22).

Seven of the tested treatments had effects on social distance in the main survey. One to two treatments had durable effects on social distance. According to the preregistered strategy, two treatments significantly reduced social distance relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.7). The most efficacious treatment was *Correcting Division Misperceptions* (Cohen's $d = -0.14$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 23% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.23). According to the larger sample size strategy, four treatments significantly reduced social distance relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.15). The most efficacious treatment was *Correcting Division Misperceptions* (Cohen's $d = -0.08$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 18% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.23).

Four of the tested treatments had effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts in the main survey. Three treatments had durable effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. According to the preregistered strategy, three treatments significantly reduced biased evaluation of politicized facts relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.8). The most efficacious treatment was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's $d = -0.11$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 100% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.24). According to the larger sample size strategy, three treatments significantly reduced biased evaluation of politicized facts relative to the null control condition (Table S9.5.16). The most efficacious treatment was *Correcting Democracy Misperceptions* (Cohen's $d = -0.11$). Among treatments that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 72% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S9.5.24).

None of the treatments had significant backfire effects. Notably, this means that the backfire effect of *Democratic Collapse Threat* on support for partisan violence we observed in the main survey did not sustain until the durability survey (preregistered strategy: Cohen's $d = 0.04$; larger sample size strategy: Cohen's $d = 0.01$).

The evidence for sustainable treatment effects was similar, if not stronger, when using the alternative control condition instead of the null control condition as reference point (same

analysis strategy as for the preregistered analyses: Tables S9.5.25-S9.5.32; same strategy for the larger sample size analyses: Tables S9.5.33-S9.5.40).

S10 Supplementary Text: Forecasting Treatment Effects

We conducted a forecasting challenge to examine how accurately forecasters would predict the effects of the treatments. Details regarding the forecasting challenge will be described in a different paper. Here, we report results to support the claim that many scholars in the field contend that the different outcomes we study (i.e., the main outcomes of partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence) are indicators of the same underlying construct. An implication of this claim is that experts would forecast that the effects of treatments on one outcome would be strongly correlated with the effects of the treatments on the other (two) outcomes.

S10.1 Sample

Two cohorts of participants were invited to participate in the forecasting challenge: (a) practitioners and (b) academic social scientists (e.g., political science, psychology, sociology, economics). (We also invited members of the general public but that is not relevant to our purposes here.) Existing mailing lists for the Strengthening Democracy Challenge and lists from professional groups were used to recruit forecasters. To receive an invitation to participate as a practitioner, the individual had to self-identify as having worked in this “depolarization” or “bridging” sector (e.g. as a founder of a not-for-profit) in the past. Social science academics were invited if they identified as having studied the dependent variables of interest in the past. Hence, these two cohorts were likely to have different forms of expertise about the subject matter, with academics thinking more theoretically and in terms of falsification, and practitioners thinking more in terms of design and what would work.

S10.2 Procedure

The maximum number of forecasts was 75 (25 treatments and three outcomes – partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence). Each expert forecaster was invited to make 75 forecasts, but not all participants completed all forecasts (average forecasts completed per participant = 29).

Intake Survey

All participants completed an intake survey that asked them about their background, such as age, race, gender, education, and experience. This survey also contained potential predictors of forecast accuracy, such as numeracy or open-mindedness.

Training Module

All participants were required to complete a training module on how to make forecasts prior to registering forecasts. After the training module, participants took a short quiz that checked their knowledge about how to participate, were offered corrections to incorrect answers, and received basic logistical and measurement information. The training module included logistical information about how to register forecasts and how they would be paid. Additionally, it conveyed information about how each dependent variable was measured, details of the

experimental sample and statistical power, and how the success of the treatments would be measured (i.e., statistical significance at the .05 level using a one-tailed test relative to a control group). Finally, when making forecasts, participants were presented with a title and abstract of each treatment, and a link to the full treatment, exactly as participants in the experiment experienced it.

Registering Forecasts

Each participant was asked to forecast the effects of the treatments on *each* of the distinct outcomes (i.e., for each treatment, participants were asked to predict its effect on partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence). For each combination of treatment and outcome, participants were asked to assign probabilities to the following five mutually exclusive events: (i) a statistically significant backfire effect ($d > 0$), (ii) no statistically significant effect, (iii) a statistically significant small effect ($d < 0$ & $d \geq -0.3$), (iv) a statistically significant medium effect ($d < -0.3$ & $d \geq -0.6$), or (v) a statistically significant large effect ($d < -0.6$). A key reason for using categories was to ensure the forecasting was accessible to non-academics, who were also informed about the scale of effect sizes in absolute terms (based on pilot studies). By summing probabilities of statistically significant, non-backfire effects, we calculate the overall predicted likelihood of a treatment having a statistically significant effect (i.e., we can collapse the small, medium, and large effect categories as all indicating a significant effect).

Participants completed forecasts on a platform called “Cultivate Forecasts.” They could return to this site to complete forecasts over a longer period of time. This site also allowed participants to share rationales and see rationales from other forecasters.

Rewards

Forecasters received payment both for their participation and for accuracy. They earned \$10 for completing the intake survey, \$10 for forecasting the effects of 25 treatments on each dependent variable (for a maximum bonus of \$30), and a final bonus of \$15 for completing all 75 forecasts (a maximum participation payment of \$55).

Participants could earn up to another \$30 depending on the accuracy of their predictions. If the corresponding treatment had an effect in the predicted direction, participants were further paid 20 cents and \$0 otherwise (a maximum bonus of $0.2 \times 75 = \$15$). They were paid an *additional* 20 cents for selecting the correct effect size category, scaled by the likelihood they placed on that category, e.g. a 20% likelihood would result in $0.2 \times 20 = 4$ cents). To ensure people would freely share their rationales and ideas, these rewards were not zero-sum. Participants received accuracy pay regardless of the number of treatments they forecasted.

S10.3 Analysis Strategy

We used the forecasting data to examine whether experts would forecast that the effects of treatments on one outcome are strongly correlated with the effects of the treatments on the other outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we calculated the forecasted treatment effect for each forecast by summing the products of assigned likelihood and the median of each effect size category. (A predicted significant backfire effect was coded as $d = .15$). We then calculated the

Pearson correlations between the *predicted* treatment effects for partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence, among academic and practitioner expert forecasters.

S10.4 Preregistration, Data Availability, and Code Availability

While the forecasting challenge had a preregistration, the analysis reported here were not preregistered. The anonymized data and analysis code for the forecasting challenge are publicly available via <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JZBNT>.

S10.5 Results

We found that expert forecasters expected treatment effects on different outcomes to be highly correlated. Among academic expert forecasters, forecasted treatment effects on partisan animosity were highly correlated with forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices ($r = .457$) and support for partisan violence ($r = .455$). Forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices were also strongly correlated with forecasted treatment effects on support for partisan violence ($r = .538$). Similar results were obtained among practitioner expert forecasters. Forecasted treatment effects on partisan animosity were highly correlated with forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices ($r = .499$) and support for partisan violence ($r = .509$). Forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices were also strongly correlated with forecasted treatment effects on support for partisan violence ($r = .726$). We found similarly strong correlations in a robustness check in which we only distinguished between a forecasted null or backfire effect (coded as 0) and a significant treatment effect in the desired direction (coded as 1). Results about the accuracy of the forecasts are available in the aforementioned distinct paper.

S11 Supplementary Text: Relationships between Outcomes

As we report in the main text, we estimated how correlated the 25 treatment effect sizes were for each pair of outcome variables. For example, we used the effects of the 25 treatments on partisan animosity (see Table S6.1) and the effects of the 25 treatments on support for undemocratic practices (see Table S6.2) and estimated whether effects on partisan animosity were correlated with effects on support for undemocratic practices. A strong correlation between two outcomes implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in a similar way (effect size correlations between outcome variables ranged from $-.24$ to $.74$).

For these analyses, we used eight outcome variables: partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distrust, social distance, and biased evaluation of politicized facts. For the rationale for selecting these outcomes, please see SM section S14. We visualized the correlations in a network diagram. The location of variables in the network is based on their relative correlations with one another. Hence, variables that are located closer are more strongly correlated.

As we report in the main text, partisan animosity, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts respond to treatments similarly, but in a manner that is distinct from the pattern of responses for support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence (which is somewhat divergent from all other outcomes, although see discussion of this below). Effect sizes for support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance are correlated with effect sizes for all outcomes, except for support for partisan violence. Figure 3 in the main text shows these findings in a network visualization (Figure 3A) with the corresponding correlation matrix (Figure 3B) for the full sample. Results are similar when we use the alternative control condition instead of the null control condition as reference category (see Figure S11.1 and Table S11.1).

The relatively low correlation in effect sizes between (a) support for undemocratic practices and (b) support for partisan violence is largely driven by the *Democratic Collapse Threat* treatment. Excluding this treatment from the analysis (see Figure S11.2 and Table S11.2), effects on support for undemocratic practices and effects on support for partisan violence were highly correlated: $r = .69$. For comparison, including *Democratic Collapse Threat* treatment in the analysis, the correlation was much weaker: $r = .28$. However, it remains an open question whether the analysis with or without *Democratic Collapse Threat* is preferable. On the one hand, *Democratic Collapse Threat* appears to be an outlier in its diverging effects on support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence. On the other hand, the design of the Strengthening Democracy Challenge rewards treatments that simultaneously affect multiple outcomes, potentially resulting in an overestimation of the true relationships between outcomes. Future research is needed to examine the relationship between support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence. Note that another explanation for the relatively low effect size correlations between support for partisan violence and other variables is that only a small fraction of the population report support for partisan violence and, for those who do, it may be largely rooted in non-political motives (21).

We investigate whether the psychology underlying polarization and democracy differs for Democrats and Republicans. We examined this question by analyzing how correlated the 25 treatment effect sizes were for each pair of outcome variables, restricting the sample to Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Results were very similar to the ones described above

among both Democrats (Figure S11.3 and Table S11.3) and Republicans (Figure S11.4 and Table S11.4). Significance tests for the comparison of the two correlation coefficients (Table S11.5) suggests that only one of the 28 correlation was significantly different among Democrats versus Republicans. Specifically, effects on partisan animosity were more strongly associated with effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts among Democrats ($r = .64$) than among Republicans ($r = .15$). The low number of statistically significant differences suggests that the extent to which treatments affected the different outcomes was similar across different partisan identities, although the analysis is not well powered to detect such differences

Is the psychology underlying polarization and democracy different for weakly and strongly identified partisans? We examined this question by analyzing how correlated the 25 treatment effect sizes were for each pair of outcome variables restricting the sample to weakly identified partisans and strongly identified partisans, respectively. (As with our factor analysis, we use the median to divide strong versus weak partisans.) Results were very similar to the ones described above among both weakly identified partisans (Figure S11.5 and Table S11.6) and strongly identified partisans (Figure S11.6 and Table S11.7). Significance tests for the comparison of the two correlation coefficients (Table S11.8) suggests that three of the 28 correlations were significantly different among weakly identified versus strongly identified partisans. First, effects on support for partisan violence were positively associated with effects on social distrust among weakly identified partisans ($r = .32$) but negatively associated among strongly identified partisans ($r = -.48$). Second, effects on support for partisan violence were positively associated with effects on social distance among weakly identified partisans ($r = .43$) but negatively associated among strongly identified partisans ($r = -.14$). Finally, effects on social distrust were less strongly associated with effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts among weakly identified partisans ($r = .22$) than among strongly identified partisans ($r = .69$). The low number of significance differences again suggests that the extent to which treatments affected the different outcomes was similar across different strengths of partisan identities, but the analysis is not well powered to detect such differences.

S12 Supplementary Text: Treatment Characteristics

We conducted an exploratory analysis to examine which underlying characteristics of treatments were associated with stronger effect sizes. The dependent variables in these analyses were the effect sizes reported in Tables S6.1-S.6.9. The independent variables were created based on the ratings of Jan G. Voelkel and Michael N. Stagnaro who coded all 25 treatments to measure several treatment characteristics. The codings are available via <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JZBNT>. The definition of each characteristic and reliability of the codings for this characteristic are available in Table S12.0.1. Here, we summarize our key findings.

S12.1 References to Outcomes

We coded to what extent treatments explicitly referred to partisan animosity, undemocratic practices, and partisan violence. We regressed effect sizes for each of the three primary outcomes on the these codings (Table S12.1.1). We first examined how explicit reference to each of these three outcomes correlates with treatments' effect on partisan animosity. Treatments that more explicitly referenced partisan animosity reduced partisan animosity significantly more. The extent to which treatments explicitly referenced undemocratic practices and partisan violence, however, were not significantly associated with the treatment effects on partisan animosity.

Second, we examined how explicit reference to the three outcomes correlates with treatment effect sizes for support for undemocratic practices. We found that treatments that more explicitly referenced undemocratic practices reduced support for undemocratic practices significantly more. The extent to which treatments explicitly referenced partisan animosity and partisan violence, however, were not significantly associated with the treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices. For example, while several treatments sought to correct exaggerated stereotypes of outpartisans (e.g., *Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot*, *Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions*), *Correcting Democracy Misperceptions* was more efficacious in reducing support for undemocratic practices than the other treatments using corrections of misperceptions.

Finally, we investigated how explicit reference to the three outcomes correlates with treatment effect sizes for support for partisan violence. In this case, we did *not* find that treatments that explicitly referenced partisan violence had stronger effects on partisan violence. Additionally, the extent to which treatments explicitly referenced partisan animosity or support for undemocratic practices were also not significantly associated with the treatment effects on support for partisan violence.

S12.2 Number of Strategies

We coded to what extent the 25 treatments deployed different theoretical strategies. We regressed effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes and a composite of these eight outcomes on these codings (Table S12.2.1). We found that treatments that deployed more strategies tended to reduce the outcomes more strongly. The effect was statistically significant for support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and the composite of all eight outcomes.

S12.3 Engagingness

We coded for perceived production quality and how engaging the treatment was. Because the ratings for the two were highly correlated with each other and with a binary indicator of whether the treatment contained a video, we averaged the two ratings and the video indicator into a composite (Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$) which we used as our measure of how engaging the treatments were. We regressed effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes and a composite of these eight outcomes on this independent variable (Table S12.3.1). We found that more engaging treatments tended to reduce the outcomes more strongly. The effect was significant for support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and the composite of all eight outcomes.

S12.4 Length

We used the median time that participants took to complete the treatment as our measure of the length of the treatment. We regressed effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes and the composite on this independent variable (Table S12.4.1). We found that the longer the treatments were, the more efficacious the treatments were in reducing the outcomes. The effect was significant for partisan animosity, and social distrust. However, the effect went in the opposite direction for support for partisan violence.

S12.5 Academics versus Practitioners

19 treatments were developed by academics, three treatments by practitioners, and another three treatments by hybrid teams consisting of academics and practitioners. We regressed effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes and the composite on a dummy-coded measure of submitter background using academics as the reference category (Table S12.5.1). While the small sample size prevents meaningful significance tests, we found that hybrid teams designed the most efficacious treatments for six of the eight outcomes and the composite.

S13 Supplementary Text: Addressing Alternative Accounts

S13.1 Demand Effects

One alternative account of our results is that the observed effects are not meaningful because they are demand effects. The logic of demand effects is that participants infer how the experimenter would like them to answer and then alter their behavior to be in line with their perceptions of the experimenter's preferences. When it comes to experiments, the concern is that some conditions may trigger stronger demand effects than others (in particular, stronger than in the control condition).

We note that treatments that attempt to persuade people in a non-deceitful way often cannot avoid a signal that the message source desires a change in the attitudes and behaviors in the recipient, in a way that parallels many real-world settings where political persuasion may occur and which may involve a demand component (political speeches, canvassing, TV and internet campaign ads, peer-to-peer conversations, direct mail, etc.). Thus, demand characteristics of treatments are not per se undesirable. That said, demand effects are problematic when they are the primary mechanism driving an effect but researchers argue that a different concept is responsible for the effect.

We do not think that our results are primarily driven by demand effects for several reasons. First, the literature suggests that demand effects should not be assumed by default. A recent paper (89) experimentally tested how demand effects influence treatment effects. Online survey experiments that manipulated an experimenter's apparent preferences found that both information and financial incentives to comply with the preferences of the experimenter did not consistently increase treatment effects. In short, participants may simply not be easily motivated to answer consistently with the preferences of experimenters, at least in online survey experiments.

Second, we found significant effects across both attitudinal and incentivized behavioral measures of partisan animosity, which we measured with a feeling thermometer and a dictator game with real financial incentives. If demand effects were driving the results, we would expect that the treatment effects would be lower for behavioral outcomes with financial incentives. However, we found that 22 of 25 treatments improved both the attitudinal (Table S6.10, average Cohen's $d = -0.22$) and the incentivized behavioral components (Table S6.11, average Cohen's $d = -0.18$) of partisan animosity and that effects were similar in size.

Third, we found many significant effects in a durability test (see SM section 9). If we assume participants are unlikely to both (a) remember their perceptions of an experimenter's preferences multiple weeks after participating in a study, and (b) realize that the follow-up study was fielded by the same experimenter who fielded the original study, then we would expect demand effects to not be influential in durability tests. However, we find that many significant effects remained detectable after two weeks.

Fourth, we found significant effects when using an alternative control condition as the reference category instead of a null control condition. The alternative control condition presented basic information about how the three branches of government represent important cornerstones of American democracy. We designed this control condition to be similar to many treatments in terms of length, medium, and in referencing politics and democratic processes. In order for demand effects to explain a large proportion of the apparently meaningful effects we detected, it would need to be the case that merely being exposed to content related to politics and democracy

is sufficient to signal experimenters' preferences for participants' behavior (since there is little else that all, or nearly, of the treatments have in common). If this were the case, we would expect participants in the alternative control condition to differ significantly in their responses compared to participants in the null control condition.

However, we did not find such effects for seven of the eight outcomes and the composite of the eight outcomes (see Tables S13.1.2-S13.1.9). The only exception was that participants in the alternative control condition reported significantly less partisan animosity than participants in the null control condition (Table S13.1.1). Interestingly, the effect of the alternative control condition was driven by the behavioral component of our measure of partisan animosity (Table S6.11). But even for partisan animosity, 16 treatments still had significant effects on partisan animosity when compared with the alternative control condition (Table S13.1.1).

Overall, these findings suggest that demand effects are unlikely to be a primary mechanism driving our findings. While we cannot argue that any of these findings perfectly rules out demand effects for specific treatments and specific outcome variables, the literature and the various findings from our own analyses provide little evidence to believe that demand effects are responsible for a large proportion of the observed effects.

S13.2 Differential Attrition

Another alternative account of our results is that the observed effects are driven by differential attrition of participants across experimental conditions. Differential attrition is an important concern for the internal validity of experiments (90). The logic is that some treatments increase the likelihood that certain participants drop out of the experiment and that these participants who drop out differ from those participants who stay in the study, biasing estimated treatment effects.

Below we address the issue of differential attrition in two steps. First, we test for evidence of differential attrition. Second, we explain how our preregistered strategy (inverse-probability weighting) accounts for differential attrition in the results that we report in the main text. Third, we show the results of several robustness checks that account for differential attrition in different ways, including a novel method for including attriters that were recaptured by recontacting them immediately after they dropped out in our analyses. Overall, results of these robustness checks suggest that our results are not driven by differential attrition.

Step 1: Evidence for Differential Attrition

We define that a participant attrited for an outcome if (i) the participant was randomly assigned to an experimental condition, but (ii) did not respond to all item(s) measuring the outcome, irrespective of whether they fully answered other outcomes. Following recommended practice in experimental design (91), we test for differential attrition using two preregistered tests. For both tests, we consider p-values below .05 as evidence of differential attrition. We consider our study to have differential attrition if *either* test yields $p < .05$.

First, we tested whether rates of attrition differed significantly across experimental conditions. To answer this question, we conducted a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test (92) of the hypothesis that none of the experimental conditions affect the attrition rate (i.e., that attrition rates in each of the treatment conditions is equal to the attrition rate in the control condition).

Second, we tested whether different kinds of participants attrited within different experimental conditions. In a linear regression, we regressed a binary variable for attrition on experimental condition, all baseline covariates pre-registered in the balance test, and all condition-covariate interactions. We then conducted a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test of the hypothesis that all the interaction coefficients are zero.

We found clear evidence of differential attrition. There were significant differences in the rate at which participants attrited across experimental conditions. We illustrate the evidence for differential attrition focusing on partisan animosity. However, differential attrition is present for all eight outcomes and the composite of the eight outcomes.

In total, 35,252 participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition. Of these participants, 31,835 participants completed the items measuring partisan animosity. In other words, 3,417 attrited before completing our measure of partisan animosity. For partisan animosity, attrition varied widely across conditions, ranging from 1.6% to 23.0%. Thus, we found clear evidence that some conditions resulted in significantly more participants dropping out than other conditions did. Tables S13.2.1-S13.2.8 below show attrition rates by experimental condition for the eight outcomes.

The evidence for differential attrition brings up the question of whether significant differences in attrition rates across conditions threaten the validity of causal inferences we have made from our data. For example, if participants with higher levels of partisan animosity were more likely to drop out in condition A than condition B, analyses that do not correct for differential attrition might wrongly suggest that condition A caused a reduction in partisan animosity compared to condition B. Although it is impossible to know how attrited participants differed from non-attrited participants, there are several ways to examine to what extent differential attrition may have biased the results.

Step 2: Preregistered Strategy to Account for Differential Attrition

Our preregistered strategy to correct for differential attrition used inverse probability weighting (IPW). This procedure reweights the data so that individuals who completed the study but had high underlying propensities for attriting, as inferred from a model predicting attrition as a function of baseline covariates, are upweighted to counterbalance the missing outcomes from attriting participants. The key assumption needed for this procedure to accurately estimate average treatment effects is that attrition is independent of potential outcomes, conditional on the specified baseline covariates. To calculate each participant's propensity to attrit, we use random forests to predict attrition (and to avoid over-fitting). We include all baseline covariates as predictors of attrition, including experimental condition, gender, age, race, education, party identification, strength of party identification, and the panel the participant was recruited from (e.g. Bovitz, Luth, or Dynata). The results are similar if we use a parametric approach of regressing an indicator for attrition on experimental condition indicators, all baseline covariates, and their full interactions. We calculate weights for each outcome separately, such that we do not assume that the patterns of selection that led to attrition for one dependent variable are identical for the others. Based on this model for attrition, we calculate the fitted probabilities of attrition for each participant, and we use the inverse of these probabilities as weights in our regression analyses. The results using IPW are the results described in the main text (see Tables S6.1-S6.9).

Below, we first describe a variety of robustness checks that specify alternative ways of dealing with attrition. Afterwards, we compare the results from the different strategies.

Step 3: Baseline Results

To examine how much differential attrition impacts the treatment effects, our first check is that we compare the results described in the main text to the results that do not correct for differential attrition. By not correcting for differential attrition, we mean that we ran the same regression analyses without inverse-probability weighting. These results are given in Tables S13.2.9-S13.2.17.

Step 4: Recapturing Attriters to Account for Differential Attrition

In addition to the preregistered IPW approach detailed above, we developed a new strategy for recapturing attriters. This involved (i) identifying participants who attrited, (ii) creating a secondary survey that included the measures from the main survey of the three primary outcome variables (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence), and (iii) recruiting participants into this “recapture survey” as quickly as possible to mitigate any timing differences and attempt to capture possible treatment effects.

We operationalized attrition as inactivity for at least one hour after treatment assignment (the main survey took roughly 16 min for participants to complete). We tracked participants’ progress and identified participants who stopped participating for at least one hour (this strategy implies that a participant could take repeated breaks of up to 59 min and then continue with the survey without being labeled as attrited). At that point, the survey was closed and the participant was excluded from further participation in the main study. If the participant attrited after assignment to condition, a series of steps were taken to recapture that participant’s data. Assignment to condition took place after demographics and attention checks were collected. Since these parts of the survey did not vary across conditions, if participants dropped out of the survey before being assigned to a condition, attrition was not driven by any feature that differed between conditions. As a result, such dropping out does not threaten internal validity.

Attriters were reinvited for a follow-up survey. Depending on the sample provider platform, participants were either immediately invited to a follow-up study that asked the key outcomes (Bovitz-Forthright), or were invited to the follow-up study at six time points each day (Luth and Dynata). The attriter survey was *not* tied to the main survey participants had just attrited from. This attriter survey was much shorter, including only the key outcome variables, and did not reference the study participants had just attrited from. However, compensation for completing it was the same as what participants would have received if they had not attrited. This increased the incentive to complete the follow-up survey. If participants did not participate in the attriter survey by the end of that calendar day, they would begin to receive daily reminder emails to encourage their participation. For this stage of the study design, the focus was on doing whatever was possible to obtain data for the three primary outcome variables.

This recapturing procedure allowed us to get the main outcomes from approximately 47% of attriters. As a result, differential attrition was still evident, but much reduced. For example, without the recaptured attriters, attrition for partisan animosity ranged from 1.6% to 23.0% across experimental conditions. Including the recaptured attriters, attrition for partisan animosity ranged from 0.9% to 12.7% across experimental conditions. Tables S13.2.1-S13.2.3 shows the percentages of attriters we recaptured for each experimental condition and outcome. Table S13.2.18 shows the results of comparisons between non-attriters and recaptured attriters.

We reran the regression models including the recaptured attriters. That is, we added the responses provided in the attriter survey in place of the missing values from the main survey. If a participant responded to an outcome in both the main survey and the attriter survey, we used the measure participants completed from the main survey. Since differential attrition was still evident, we used inverse-probability weighting to account for the attriters we were not able to recapture. The results are available in Tables S13.2.19-S13.2.21.

Step 5: Using the Alternative Control to Account for Differential Attrition

Another strategy we used to account for differential attrition was including an alternative control condition. The alternative control condition was more similar to the treatments in length, and in asking participants to consume content concerning politics and government, than was the null control condition. Thus, participants who dropped out in the alternative control condition may be similar to the participants who drop out in the treatment conditions. As a result, if differential attrition biases estimated treatment effects, the alternative control condition would show different results than the null control condition and comparisons between the treatments and the alternative control condition may provide more unbiased treatment effects. The results are in Tables S13.1.1-S13.1.9.

Results

Comparing the results across these different models should help us to estimate whether, and to what extent, differential attrition biases our estimates of treatment effects. If differential attrition biases the treatment effects (and the techniques we used correct at least partially for these biases), we would expect that the results differ across these different analysis strategies.

Encouragingly, we find no major differences between these analyses. The numbers of efficacious treatments across procedures were very similar for all the outcomes we collected in the follow-up survey: partisan animosity (without correction: 23 out of 25; with IPW correction: 23 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 22 out of 25), support for undemocratic practices (without correction: 6 out of 25; with IPW correction: 6 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 5 out of 25), and support for partisan violence (without correction: 5 out of 25; with IPW correction: 5 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 5 out of 25). Thus, these analyses suggest that, while differential attrition is clearly present in our study, we find no evidence that it causes systematic bias in estimates of treatment effects.

However, we cannot rule out that attrition biased our effect estimates. Of the participants who attrited, we recaptured approximately 47%. Thus, the possibility remains that non-recovered attriters were meaningfully different from the rest of the sample, such that their inclusion would have affected our estimated treatment effects in meaningful ways. However, as noted above, the attriter survey bore only minimal similarity to the main study participants attrited from, in that the attriter survey was shorter, did not itself include demographic questions, nor a treatment. The only close similarity between the attriter survey and main survey was the text of the main outcome variables, which many attriters had not seen at the point they attrited. Beyond that, the attriter survey concerned politics and political parties, which also generally resembles the topics of the main survey, though these topics are not unusual for survey respondents. As a result, if participants attrited from the main study due to some reaction to the content they experienced in

it, it is likely that many, or even most, of them would not be able to identify a connection between the two studies and opt out of taking the attriter survey. Therefore, content specific factors were unlikely to play a large role in inhibiting the recapture of participants via the attriter survey, which would allow for differential attrition by condition based on the content of conditions, the precise problem we sought to address with the attriter survey. Instead, other factors, independent of the content of the experimental condition participants were assigned to, were likely the primary determinants of whether participants took part in the attriter survey. A piece of evidence for this perspective comes from the fact that attriter recapture rates varied across the three sample providers; with those best able to immediately recontact participants (Bovitz-Forthright) showing the highest rate of recapture (81%), and those showing the slowest (Dynata) producing the lowest recapture rates (36%). If the main impediment to recapturing attriters was their experience in the study they attrited from, we would expect contacting them when their memory of that experience was fresh would show *lower* recapture rates, not higher. Conversely, if the main impediment to recapture was some extrinsic factors, contacting participants long after they have gotten off of their device, and stopped a session of working online, should show the lowest recapture rates, as was the case in our study.

S13.3 Multiple Hypothesis Testing

We did not correct for multiple testing for the results reported in the main text. This is consistent with the approach taken by other megastudies (e.g., 31, 88, 93). The reason is that we were here primarily interested in testing the individual effects of treatments on specific outcome variables, which we viewed as tests of separate hypotheses. For example, one hypothesis we tested was whether the treatment *Positive Contact Video* would decrease partisan animosity. A *different* hypothesis was whether the treatment *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* decreases partisan animosity.

However, readers may be concerned that some statistically significant results are false positives that occurred because we tested so many hypotheses at once. One reason to correct for multiple testing is to control the rate of false discoveries. This is relevant for our paper because we make statements in the main text summarizing the number of effects on the different outcome variables. For example, we state that “23 out of the 25 treatments we tested significantly reduced partisan animosity”. One could argue that the 25 tests for significant effects of the 25 treatments constitute multiple tests of a single hypothesis (e.g., a test of whether treatments reduce partisan animosity in general). To address this possibility, we have also conducted robustness checks calculating p-values with adjustments for multiple testing, which we summarize in the two subsections that follow.

Controlling the False Discovery Rate

The first robustness check controls for the false discovery rate (a similar robustness check was conducted by Milkman and colleagues (31, 93). The false discovery rate is defined as the expected proportion of rejected null hypotheses (i.e., results suggesting that the treatments worked) that are false (i.e., the treatment in fact does not work) among all rejected null hypotheses. By adjusting the p-values, we can set the false discovery rate to 5%. That is, among the significant effects, one in twenty significant effects is expected to be false.

We calculated the adjusted p-values using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. This procedure (94) rank orders the p-values of the multiple hypothesis tests (from smaller to larger). An adjusted critical value for the p-value is calculated by multiplying the false discovery rate (5%) by the rank and then dividing the product by the total number of hypotheses to be tested (here 25). The largest p-value that is still less than this adjusted critical value is deemed statistically significant, and we accept the null hypothesis for all p-values greater than this adjusted critical value. One implication of the procedure is that, as the number of hypotheses increases, p-values must be smaller to be considered statistically significant.

The results when applying this procedure suggest that most significant effects remain significant. Tables S13.3.1-S13.3.9 reports the treatments, original p-values, ranks of the original p-values, adjusted critical p-values, and the results of the comparisons of the original p-values to the adjusted critical values. For partisan animosity, 23 of 23 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic practices, 4 of 6 effects remain significant. For support for partisan violence, 4 of 5 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic candidates, 5 of 6 effects remain significant. For opposition to bipartisan cooperation, 2 of 6 effects remain significant. For social distrust, 9 of 11 effects remain significant. For social distance, 10 of 12 effects remain significant. For biased evaluation of politicized facts, 4 of 5 effects remain significant.

Controlling the Family-Wise Error Rate

The second robustness check controls for the family-wise error rate. The family-wise error rate is defined as the probability to reject at least one null hypothesis that is actually true among all tested hypotheses. For an individual test of a null hypothesis, the probability to falsely reject the null hypothesis was set to 5%. However, if all 25 treatments were actually inefficacious at moving at outcome, the probability to falsely reject at least one of the null hypotheses would be 72%. By adjusting the p-values, we set the family-wise error rate back to 5%.

We calculated the adjusted p-values using the Holm procedure (95). The Holm procedure rank orders the p-values of multiple hypothesis tests (from smaller to larger). An adjusted critical value for the p-value is calculated by dividing the family-wise error rate (5%) by the difference between (a) the sum of the total number of hypotheses to be tested and 1 (here $25 + 1$) and (b) the rank. The largest p-value that is still lower than this adjusted critical value is deemed statistically significant, and we accept the *null* hypothesis for p-values larger than this adjusted critical value.

Most significant effects remain significant following application of this adjustment procedure. Tables S13.3.10-S13.3.18 reports the treatment, the original p-values, the rank of the p-value, the adjusted critical values for the p-values, and the result of the comparison of the original p-values to the adjusted critical values. For partisan animosity, 22 of 23 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic practices, 4 of 6 effects remain significant. For support for partisan violence, 2 of 5 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic candidates, 5 of 6 effects remain significant. For opposition to bipartisan cooperation, 2 of 6 effects remain significant. For social distrust, 5 of 11 effects remain significant. For social distance, 5 of 12 effects remain significant. For biased evaluation of politicized facts, 3 of 5 effects remain significant.

Although the Holm correction to control the family-wise error rate is a common approach, it heavily weighs minimizing the likelihood of false positives over maintaining power.

In many cases, people may be willing to tolerate a certain proportion of false positives to maintain more power to identify treatments that actually worked, i.e., in many settings false negatives and false positives may be of equal concern, in which case the Holm correction procedure would be overly conservative.

S13.4 Measurement

Another potential critique of the validity of our findings is that our measures do not capture actual support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence. Our measures of anti-democratic attitudes refer to situations in which participants are confronted with undemocratic or violent actions by fellow ingroup-members. Although Americans typically support democratic principles at very high levels in the abstract (96-97), recent research suggests that partisans are largely *unwilling* to prioritize democratic principles over partisan ends (10, 96). Thus, tolerance of undemocratic practices and violence by fellow inpartisans is a substantial threat to democracies. This prior work led us to measure these attitudes in scenarios where loyalty to one's own party might lead partisans to express anti-democratic attitudes.

A potential issue with our measure of support for undemocratic practices is that participants may not perceive the practices we study as undemocratic. For example, participants may agree with the statement that “[Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]” because they think their side winning will ultimately do more for democracy. Yet, it is a clear violation of an essential democratic process of equal voting rights, a consensus principle endorsed by citizens and experts (98).

However, actual data suggest that participants perceive the selected practices (used in our measure) as undemocratic. We selected three of our items based on previous research by Graham and Svolik (10). They conducted a survey asking participants to rate how democratic they perceived several practices to be on a scale from 1 (not at all democratic) to 10 (completely democratic). The three items that closely relate to the items we selected received average ratings between 2.5 and 2.7 on the scale: (i) “the government cut the number of polling stations in areas that support the opposition”, (ii) “the government prosecutes journalists who criticize the president and refuse to reveal sources”, and (iii) “the government ignores unfavorable court rulings”. The fourth item we used – “[Republicans/Democrats] should not accept the results of elections if they lose” – was not based on Graham and Svolik (10). We included it because of the high relevance of this attitude in light of the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election. Because the item specifies that election results are rejected after a loss and provides no justification for the refusal of election results, we believe that most participants would perceive this behavior to be undemocratic. Consistent with this, other conceptual work (99) states, “I also include here [i.e., a violation of the law] questions about the rejection of election results where the question clearly indicates that the candidate has lost...Violations of the law represent the most egregious of democratic transgressions.” Thus, we believe that the items we used to measure support for undemocratic practices are widely perceived as highly undemocratic.

Another potential critique is that the items describe hypothetical scenarios that are not relevant in the real world. As a result, it might be easy to convince participants to reject such practices. However, work by Graham and Svolik (10) identifies that there are real-world examples for the items that we used. For example, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker and Republican lawmakers attempted to restrict the number of polling stations in the

Democrat-leaning city of Milwaukee (100). Former president Donald Trump encouraged then FBI director James Comey to jail journalists for refusing to reveal sources (101). Texas Senator Ted Cruz encouraged states not directly named in the case *Obergefell v. Hodges* on same-sex marriage to ignore the ruling of the Supreme Court (102). Recent work by FiveThirtyEight (103) suggests at least 199 Republican nominees for major office in 2022 denied the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election (see also [PBS](#)). More examples are available in Appendix B of Graham and Svulik (10).

We selected the survey measures of support for undemocratic practices and support for undemocratic candidates to provide us with insights into efficacious strategies for reducing actual voting for undemocratic politicians. Our reasoning is that survey measures are the best proxies of actual voting because actual voting is in effect an anonymous, self-report, multiple choice survey measure. There is also evidence that politicians pay attention to the type of public beliefs that we measure in our study (e.g., 66-71). For example, we have shown in recent work (67) that state legislators' own support for anti-democratic practices is causally related to their perceptions of what voters from the other party believe. When state legislators received survey data about other party voters' beliefs, they adjusted their own endorsement of anti-democratic practices. While this too relies on state legislators' survey responses, it provides compelling evidence that the public's opinions as expressed in surveys are taken seriously by politicians, and are consequential for politicians' own attitudes. Thus, we believe that the items we used to measure support for undemocratic practices meaningfully connect to events that have happened and could happen again in the real world.

A distinct critique is that the endorsement of undemocratic practices only is problematic when endorsed by a large number of individuals or pursued by many officeholders. However, Grillo and Prato (106) show that democratic erosion can occur even when most citizens and politicians value democracy. Such erosion is possible because leeway provided by a small number of voters can allow a small number of politicians to take actions that lead to backsliding.

A potential criticism of our measure of support for partisan violence is that recent evidence suggests that responses to survey items about support for partisan violence are exaggerated (21). One reason for this is that, in some surveys, some participants do not pay attention to the questions. Because the average support for partisan violence among engaged respondents is very low, random responses result in overestimates of support for partisan violence.

Two features of our study address this important issue. First, consistent with Westwood and colleagues (21), we included several attention checks to filter out unattentive participants. These filters should keep the number of disengaged participants relatively low. Consistent with this, we find decent levels of test-retest reliability among the participants in the null control condition who completed the measure of support for partisan violence in the main survey and the durability survey ($r = .63$). The size of the correlation was comparable to the correlations for the other polarization and democracy related attitudes (range of $r = [.60, .75]$).

Second, we were most interested in the causal effects of treatments on support for partisan violence. This means our interest lies in relative differences between randomly assigned conditions. Due to random assignment to the treatments and control conditions, disengagement cannot explain differences between experimental conditions. If anything, disengaged participants being especially influential on responses for this measure would make our test of the effects of the 25 treatments on this outcome a conservative one. Furthermore, it is reassuring that the most promising strategies we identified (corrections of exaggerated stereotypes about outpartisans and

elite cues) are consistent with results in the published literature (22-23) and are robust when testing the efficacy of treatments for reducing the percentage of individuals reporting support for partisan violence above the 25-pt threshold on our 101-point composite measure of support for partisan violence, a threshold we view as a meaningful level of support (see 42 and Table S13.4.1). Thus, we believe that the observed effects of treatments on support for partisan violence are meaningful.

S13.5 Left-Censored Distributions of Outcome Variables

A final alternative account is that we actually *underestimated* the number of efficacious treatments because some of the outcomes were left-censored. Left-censoring can occur when participants' actual level of an attitude is below the lowest possible value on a scale. For example, many participants reported the lowest possible value (0) for support for partisan violence. However, the scale fails to distinguish between those who more or less strongly reject partisan violence. An issue with left-censored outcomes in the present research is that treatments may have significantly increased rejection of partisan violence, but there is no "room" on the scale to measure this effect.

Our descriptive data suggests that several of our dependent variables are left censored (see Figure 1). Large proportions of participants report the lowest possible value (0) for support for undemocratic practices¹, support for partisan violence, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance.

To account for this possibility, we conducted censored regression models (also called tobit models) as a robustness check. At a high level, a tobit model assumes a *latent* dependent variable that was not censored. It assumes that the censored dependent variable we observe is a function of this latent variable, which equals zero whenever the latent variable is less than zero. In other words, this latent dependent variable assumes the values of the dependent variable in fact could have been negative but were artificially fixed to 0 if under 0. The regression is then run with this latent variable.

The results show that the number of significant effects in which treatments reduced the eight outcome variables increased slightly for some of the left-censored outcomes. Tables S13.5.1-S13.5.8 reports the results. For the variables with limited evidence of left-censoring – partisan animosity, support for undemocratic candidates, and social distrust – the number of significant effects remained exactly the same. For biased evaluation of politicized facts, another variable that was not clearly left-censored, the number of significant effects increased from 5 to 6. For 3 of the 4 variables listed above with clear evidence of left-censoring, the number of significant effects increased: support for partisan violence (from 5 to 7), opposition to bipartisan cooperation (from 6 to 8), and social distance (from 12 to 13). For support for undemocratic practices, the number of significant effects stayed the same.

The results also show that the number of significant backfire effects remains very similar. For most variables – partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distrust, social distance,

¹ Note that while the distribution of support for undemocratic practices is left-censored, the highly related outcome variable support for undemocratic candidates is not. If left-censoring of support for undemocratic practices had a substantial effect on the substantive results of the treatments on this outcome, then we would expect very different results for support for undemocratic candidates. However, results for these two outcomes were in fact quite similar (effect sizes were highly correlated: $r = .75$).

and biased evaluation of politicized facts – the number of significant backfire effects remained exactly the same. For support for partisan violence, the number of significant backfire effects increased (from 1 to 2).

S14 Supplementary Text: Rationale for Selected Outcomes

We collected several additional outcomes beyond the eight outcomes described in our analysis of relationships between outcomes in the main text, e.g., attitudinal polarization. Our goal for including additional outcomes was that our massive data collection was an opportunity to collect data on the effects of the 25 treatments on various dependent measures of interest, and collecting these additional variables may be useful for further investigations by ourselves and other scholars who wish to conduct secondary analyses with our dataset.

Our main criterion for including outcome variables in the main text of the manuscript was that the outcomes were deemed by us potentially problematic for healthy democratic functioning. We did not include a measure of political attitudes (either attitudinal extremity or attitudinal liberalism versus conservatism), nor candidate voting intentions in the general 2024 presidential election (note that for the latter, the choice was between “The Republican Party candidate”, “The Democratic Party candidate”, “An Independent candidate”, “Another candidate”, “I am undecided”, and “I would not vote”) in the analysis of relationships between outcomes in the manuscript because disagreement about political issues and candidates (that are not clearly specified as undemocratic) is not necessarily problematic for healthy democratic functioning; indeed, productively representing diverse views on issues and candidates is often viewed as a core purpose of democracy. Note as well that it was unclear when data was collected who the 2024 Democratic and Republican nominees for president would be. We also did not include resistance to getting the COVID vaccine in this analysis because, while we think that higher COVID vaccination rates are clearly desirable, we do not think they have direct impacts on healthy democratic functioning (indeed, this item was included for purely exploratory purposes because the study was conducted in the midst of the COVID pandemic). We also did not include the “mediator” items in this analysis because none of the psychological constructs (perceived similarity with outpartisans; strength of partisan identity; anger toward outpartisans; empathy with outpartisans; shared common enemy with outpartisans; perceived threat of outpartisans) are necessarily problematic for democratic functioning in and of themselves. For results of exploratory analyses of the mediator items, see Tables S6.17-S6.22. In addition, we did not include opposition to proposed structural democratic reforms in this analysis because the items did not form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.23$). This low reliability score was driven by the negative correlation of the required voter identification policy item with the other three items. To be thorough, however, we report results for these four items individually here in the Supplementary Materials (see Tables S6.12-S6.15). We also did not include feeling thermometers for outpartisan voters and politicians in the analysis of relationships between outcomes because the effects were so strongly correlated with effects on partisan animosity (r ’s $> .87$). We included these items based on a recent paper (75), suggesting that the distinction between animosity towards outparty politicians versus outparty voters might be important, but our analyses do not suggest it mattered much for our experimental results.

We acknowledge that our approach of including exploratory outcomes in the manuscript (in addition to our three pre-registered outcome variables that submitters were asked to target) could increase “researcher degrees of freedom” for the outcomes that were not pre-registered. To minimize this concern, we (1) have focused our analyses in the main text of the manuscript on the treatment effects on the three preregistered outcome variables, and (2) we followed the same preregistered analysis strategy for estimating the treatment effects on all non-preregistered outcomes as for the preregistered outcomes.

Supplementary Figures

Figure S8.5.1

Targeting operator characteristic curve for *Democratic Collapse Threat* on partisan animosity. The y-axis indicates the treatment effect in excess of the average treatment effect from rank ordering the top q percent of individuals, indicating how much more partisan animosity would be reduced (scale from 0 to 100), if those who are most likely to benefit from the treatment were prioritized.





Figure S8.5.2. Estimated RATE (magnitude of treatment effect heterogeneity) by outcome and treatment.



Note: 95% Confidence Intervals Shown. RATEs are estimated with 80% of sample in training set.

PA = Partisan Animosity; SUP = Support for Undemocratic Practices

SPV = Support for Partisan Violence; SUC = Support for Undemocratic Candidates

OBC = Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation; SDT = Social Distrust

SDE = Social Distance; BEPF = Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts

The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes across all 25 treatments compared to the alternative control condition, for each pair of outcome variables. Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.





Figure S11.2.

The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes across 24 treatments (without the Democratic Collapse Threat Treatment) compared to the null control condition, for each pair of outcome variables. Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.



The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among Democrats across all 25 treatments compared to the null control condition, for each pair of outcome variables. Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.




Figure S11.4.

The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among Republicans across all 25 treatments compared to the null control condition, for each pair of outcome variables. Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.




Figure S11.5.

The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among weakly identified partisans across all 25 treatments compared to the null control condition, for each pair of outcome variables. Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.




Figure S11.6.

The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among strongly identified partisans across all 25 treatments compared to the null control condition, for each pair of outcome variables. Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.





Figure S11.7.

The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes across all 25 treatments compared to the null control condition, for each pair of outcome variables including the potential mediators. Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that treatments that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.



Supplementary Tables

Table S0.2.1.

Quotas for key demographic benchmarks. The targeted quotas are based on the 2020 survey of the American National Election Study. The achieved quotas are based on the participants who completed at least one of the main outcomes.

Variable	Category	Targeted		Achieved	
		Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat
Gender	Female	47%	57%	51%	56%
Gender	Male	53%	43%	48%	43%
Gender	Other	-	-	0%	1%
Age	18-24	7%	13%	4%	8%
Age	25-34	14%	17%	12%	17%
Age	35-44	16%	17%	16%	20%
Age	45-54	17%	15%	18%	16%
Age	55-64	21%	17%	23%	18%
Age	65-75	16%	15%	21%	17%
Age	75+	9%	5%	5%	4%
Race/Ethnicity	White (non-Hispanic)	82%	54%	86%	62%
Race/Ethnicity	Black (non-Hispanic)	3%	20%	2%	17%
Race/Ethnicity	Hispanic	8%	16%	7%	12%
Race/Ethnicity	Asian / Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander	3%	5%	2%	5%
Race/Ethnicity	Native American / Alaskan Native	2%	2%	1%	0%
Race/Ethnicity	Multiple Races (non-Hispanic)	2%	4%	2%	2%
Race/Ethnicity	Other	-	-	1%	1%
Education	No high school degree	7%	7%	2%	1%
Education	High school graduate	28%	24%	19%	16%
Education	Some college	32%	26%	38%	36%
Education	Bachelor's degree	23%	26%	27%	29%
Education	Graduate degree	11%	17%	14%	18%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Independent closer to one party	20-30%	20-30%	14%	13%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Not Strong	20-30%	20-30%	33%	31%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Strong	45-55%	45-55%	53%	56%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Missing	-	-	0%	0%
Sample size		15,500	15,500	15726	16333

Table S0.3.1.

Reliability estimates for measured outcomes. Reliability is estimated with the Spearman-Brown coefficient for two item scales (partisan animosity, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance) and with Cronbach's alpha for the other scales. There is no reliability estimate for social distrust because it was measured with a single item. There is no reliability estimate for biased evaluation of politicized facts for the full sample because we used different items for Democrats and Republicans.

Outcome	Full Sample	Democrats	Republicans
Partisan Animosity	0.56	0.56	0.56
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.80	0.82	0.78
Support for Partisan Violence	0.95	0.96	0.95
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.92	0.92	0.91
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.83	0.83	0.83
Social Distrust	-	-	-
Social Distance	0.93	0.92	0.94
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-	0.69	0.65

Table S0.3.2.

Sources for items used to measure biased evaluation of politicized facts. Republican participants responded to items 1-4. Democratic participants responded to items 5-8.

Item	Source	Response options
The vast majority (more than 90%) of climate scientists believe that climate change is an established fact and that it is most likely caused by human-made emissions.	Anderegg et al. (105); The AAAS Climate Science Panel (106)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
The crime rate among illegal immigrants is lower than the crime rate among American citizens.	Light et al. (107); National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (108)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
White Americans own homes at a higher rate than Black Americans, and this gap is larger now than it was in the late 1960s.	Choi et al. (109)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
Joe Biden was lawfully elected President in the 2020 election against Donald Trump.	The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (110)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
During Donald Trump's presidency, there was the lowest rate of Black people and Hispanics in poverty since these data began being collected in 1966.	Council of Economic Advisers (111)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
The Trump administration deported fewer undocumented immigrants in its first three years than the Obama administration did in its first three years.	Watson (112)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
During Donald Trump's presidency, the unemployment rate reached its lowest level since 1969.	Council of Economic Advisers (111)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
Donald Trump was lawfully elected President in the 2016 election against Hillary Clinton.	The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (113)	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”

Table S4.1.

Submitters' targeted outcomes among all submitted treatments. A submission is counted for a subgroup if at least one member self-identified as belonging to this category. For example, a submission counts as a practitioner submission if at least one self-identified practitioner belongs to that category.

Submitters	n	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
All	252	216 (86%)	131 (52%)	167 (66%)
Psychology	107	90 (84%)	57 (53%)	75 (70%)
Political Science	60	47 (78%)	36 (60%)	38 (63%)
Practitioners	53	52 (98%)	25 (47%)	31 (58%)
Sociology	22	18 (82%)	15 (68%)	17 (77%)
Communication	19	18 (95%)	10 (53%)	14 (74%)
Economics	16	14 (88%)	6 (38%)	7 (44%)
Other Research	45	35 (78%)	22 (49%)	30 (67%)
Other	32	31 (97%)	17 (53%)	22 (69%)

Table S4.2.

Submitters' targeted outcomes among the selected treatments. A submission is counted for a subgroup if at least one member self-identified as belonging to this category. For example, a submission counts as a practitioner submission if at least one self-identified practitioner belongs to that category.

Submitters	n	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
All	25	24 (96%)	12 (48%)	16 (64%)
Psychology	15	14 (93%)	4 (27%)	8 (53%)
Political Science	6	6 (100%)	3 (50%)	3 (50%)
Practitioners	6	6 (100%)	4 (67%)	5 (83%)
Sociology	1	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	1 (100%)
Communication	3	2 (67%)	2 (67%)	3 (100%)
Economics	2	2 (100%)	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
Other Research	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
Other	3	3 (100%)	2 (67%)	2 (67%)

Table S4.3.

Submitters' predictions for the treatment effects in the main survey and the durability survey. Submitters were asked whether they expected their treatment to significantly reduce the main outcomes before the main survey and before the durability survey. 1: Restrictions on the length of the treatment forced the submitters to cut features they would normally include to bolster longer-term effects so, although they have some hope/expectation that the tested version of their treatment might have effects that last as long as 2 weeks, they make that prediction with only low-to-moderate confidence.

Treatment	Predicted Effect					
	Main Survey			Durability Survey		
	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemo. Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemo. Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
Befriending Meditation	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Common Economic Interests	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Common Exhausted Majority Identity ¹	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Common National Identity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Correcting Division Misperceptions	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Democratic Collapse Threat	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratic System Justification	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Moral Similarities and Differences	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Yes	No	No			
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Party Overlap on Policies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Political Violence Inefficacy	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Positive Contact Video	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Utility of Outparty Empathy	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No

Table S5.1.1

Descriptive statistics for the primary outcomes by experimental Condition. The reported statistics are the mean and the standard deviation (the latter is shown in parentheses). All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100.

Condition	Partisan Animosity	Partisan Animosity - Thermometer	Partisan Animosity - Dictator Game	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
Null Control	68.1 (20.5)	71.3 (23.0)	64.9 (25.8)	26.5 (23.2)	10.8 (20.3)
Alternative Control	66.3 (20.4)	70.0 (23.7)	62.6 (24.3)	25.8 (23.5)	11.6 (21.0)
Befriending Meditation	62.4 (20.2)	65.4 (23.9)	59.5 (24.7)	26.6 (23.8)	11.3 (20.9)
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	64.9 (19.2)	67.9 (21.6)	61.9 (24.4)	27.2 (22.6)	10.1 (18.3)
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	59.2 (19.9)	62.2 (23.8)	56.1 (23.5)	25.8 (23.7)	11.3 (22.0)
Common National Identity	59.0 (19.1)	59.5 (23.1)	58.6 (22.8)	24.9 (22.9)	10.2 (19.6)
Positive Contact Video	57.4 (19.4)	62.3 (22.8)	52.5 (24.4)	26.0 (23.2)	10.5 (21.2)
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	66.3 (20.3)	69.2 (22.9)	63.3 (25.4)	27.9 (22.4)	11.1 (19.6)
Democratic Collapse Threat	63.4 (19.6)	67.2 (24.3)	59.6 (23.8)	22.0 (23.7)	13.2 (21.9)
Common Economic Interests	67.0 (19.9)	70.5 (22.8)	63.4 (24.9)	28.3 (24.2)	10.9 (20.1)
Utility of Outparty Empathy	60.8 (18.6)	64.0 (22.5)	57.6 (23.5)	27.2 (22.7)	11.6 (21.7)
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	64.0 (19.5)	67.9 (22.7)	60.1 (24.7)	26.8 (22.6)	10.7 (19.4)
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	66.2 (20.5)	69.6 (23.3)	62.8 (25.9)	26.9 (23.4)	10.8 (20.2)
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	65.7 (19.7)	69.2 (22.6)	62.3 (24.8)	25.9 (22.6)	9.4 (18.6)
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	62.7 (19.8)	65.1 (23.3)	60.3 (24.9)	26.3 (23.3)	9.6 (19.6)
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	57.9 (18.9)	60.2 (23.0)	55.7 (22.9)	27.9 (23.5)	11.4 (20.8)
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	65.1 (19.9)	66.9 (23.2)	63.2 (24.9)	27.1 (23.0)	10.0 (19.6)
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	62.0 (19.4)	63.7 (23.3)	60.3 (24.2)	20.9 (23.0)	9.3 (19.9)
Correcting Division Misperceptions	60.0 (19.8)	61.0 (23.9)	59.0 (23.3)	24.3 (21.4)	7.7 (16.1)
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	62.0 (20.6)	65.2 (23.6)	58.9 (25.7)	28.4 (23.6)	11.8 (21.2)
Moral Similarities and Differences	62.9 (19.2)	66.4 (23.1)	59.4 (24.0)	27.7 (22.3)	11.7 (19.8)
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	63.0 (21.4)	66.1 (24.4)	59.9 (25.9)	28.6 (24.1)	12.2 (22.1)
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	68.9 (19.8)	72.1 (22.6)	65.6 (24.5)	28.3 (23.7)	10.1 (18.6)
Party Overlap on Policies	64.6 (19.0)	67.7 (22.8)	61.6 (24.3)	27.5 (22.3)	11.1 (19.7)
Democratic System Justification	65.8 (19.9)	69.5 (23.3)	62.3 (24.9)	27.1 (23.0)	11.2 (20.1)
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	66.1 (20.6)	68.0 (24.5)	64.3 (25.0)	24.7 (22.1)	9.0 (17.9)
Political Violence Inefficacy	66.9 (20.6)	69.8 (23.4)	64.1 (25.4)	26.2 (22.7)	11.4 (20.5)

Table S5.1.2.

Descriptive statistics for the other outcomes by experimental condition. The reported statistics are the mean and the standard deviation (the latter is shown in parentheses). All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100.

Condition	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Social Distrust	Social Distance	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts
Null Control	52.5 (23.6)	20.9 (21.7)	53.5 (27.7)	30.7 (27.1)	51.6 (21.5)
Alternative Control	52.0 (23.6)	21.7 (22.4)	52.8 (27.8)	30.9 (27.5)	51.6 (21.5)
Befriending Meditation	53.2 (24.4)	20.5 (21.1)	51.5 (27.3)	29.1 (26.1)	51.2 (21.2)
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	51.9 (23.0)	20.2 (20.2)	52.5 (26.4)	31.9 (27.1)	50.8 (20.4)
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	51.4 (23.8)	18.7 (20.5)	49.5 (27.6)	27.4 (26.1)	50.0 (21.0)
Common National Identity	49.9 (23.0)	19.8 (21.1)	49.6 (27.4)	28.4 (26.7)	49.1 (20.6)
Positive Contact Video	50.5 (22.5)	19.6 (21.0)	52.1 (27.2)	29.6 (26.1)	51.7 (20.6)
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	55.1 (23.0)	21.3 (22.4)	53.3 (27.7)	31.5 (27.2)	52.1 (21.2)
Democratic Collapse Threat	48.3 (24.7)	19.3 (21.1)	50.5 (27.1)	29.0 (27.3)	50.8 (21.4)
Common Economic Interests	53.4 (24.0)	21.5 (22.4)	53.6 (27.1)	30.9 (27.3)	52.2 (21.6)
Utility of Outparty Empathy	52.4 (22.2)	21.5 (22.2)	52.3 (27.9)	31.0 (27.3)	50.4 (21.7)
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	51.5 (23.5)	21.1 (21.9)	52.4 (26.3)	29.2 (25.5)	51.9 (20.3)
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	52.4 (23.4)	19.9 (21.7)	53.1 (28.0)	30.9 (28.6)	51.9 (22.1)
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	51.4 (23.1)	20.4 (20.4)	52.7 (26.8)	31.8 (26.7)	52.0 (21.5)
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	52.1 (23.7)	20.8 (21.2)	52.4 (26.6)	28.9 (26.8)	52.4 (22.3)
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	49.8 (23.0)	18.3 (20.1)	49.6 (27.4)	27.0 (26.0)	49.7 (21.0)
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	53.7 (23.1)	20.1 (21.0)	52.5 (28.1)	28.6 (26.8)	51.4 (20.6)
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	48.3 (23.7)	19.9 (21.4)	51.2 (28.6)	27.9 (26.0)	49.5 (21.4)
Correcting Division Misperceptions	52.3 (23.2)	19.1 (20.9)	51.1 (27.9)	27.1 (26.6)	52.1 (20.8)
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	53.6 (22.9)	21.5 (21.9)	52.4 (26.6)	29.4 (26.7)	51.2 (21.3)
Moral Similarities and Differences	51.9 (22.8)	22.1 (22.0)	50.2 (27.6)	30.3 (26.7)	51.7 (21.4)
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	53.2 (24.4)	20.6 (22.2)	52.5 (27.6)	30.4 (27.3)	51.7 (22.8)
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	54.1 (24.6)	22.6 (22.4)	53.2 (27.0)	30.5 (26.3)	51.1 (21.2)
Party Overlap on Policies	53.2 (22.7)	22.9 (22.2)	52.2 (27.3)	31.6 (26.9)	53.9 (20.9)
Democratic System Justification	53.1 (23.6)	21.4 (22.5)	51.5 (27.2)	30.7 (27.9)	52.0 (21.2)
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	51.7 (23.9)	19.7 (22.0)	54.5 (27.7)	29.9 (27.2)	52.1 (21.1)
Political Violence Inefficacy	52.9 (23.4)	20.6 (21.6)	52.3 (28.1)	30.7 (26.8)	50.2 (21.5)

Table S5.2.1.

Correlations between the outcomes and key political variables. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were included in these analyses. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient with pairwise deletion.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF	PI	PI7	SPI	IDE	IDX
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	-0.05	-0.20	0.19	0.14	0.22	0.33	0.34	0.01	-0.03	0.16	0.05	0.14
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	-0.05	1.00	0.60	0.42	0.27	0.00	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.22	0.13	0.06
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.20	0.60	1.00	0.30	0.23	-0.13	0.16	-0.14	-0.03	-0.05	0.13	-0.05	0.06
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.19	0.42	0.30	1.00	0.21	0.04	0.26	0.19	0.06	-0.01	0.33	0.05	0.25
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.14	0.27	0.23	0.21	1.00	0.13	0.37	0.18	0.11	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.12
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.22	0.00	-0.13	0.04	0.13	1.00	0.19	0.18	0.06	0.07	-0.07	0.08	-0.02
Social Distance (SDE)	0.33	0.21	0.16	0.26	0.37	0.19	1.00	0.30	-0.17	-0.19	0.18	-0.15	0.17
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.34	0.07	-0.14	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.30	1.00	0.01	-0.02	0.18	0.09	0.16
Partisan Identity (PI)	0.01	0.12	-0.03	0.06	0.11	0.06	-0.17	0.01	1.00	0.95	-0.01	0.71	0.09
Partisan Identity 7pt (PI7)	-0.03	0.09	-0.05	-0.01	0.10	0.07	-0.19	-0.02	0.95	1.00	-0.11	0.69	0.01
Strength of Partisan Identity (SPI)	0.16	0.22	0.13	0.33	0.04	-0.07	0.18	0.18	-0.01	-0.11	1.00	0.02	0.34
Ideology (IDE)	0.05	0.13	-0.05	0.05	0.10	0.08	-0.15	0.09	0.71	0.69	0.02	1.00	0.03
Ideological Extremity (IDX)	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.25	0.12	-0.02	0.17	0.16	0.09	0.01	0.34	0.03	1.00

Table S5.2.2.

Correlations between the outcomes and key political variables among Democrats. Only participants assigned to the null control condition who identified as Democrats were used in these analyses. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient with pairwise deletion.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF	PI7	SPI	IDE	IDX
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	-0.18	-0.25	0.12	0.04	0.20	0.35	0.27	-0.10	0.13	-0.13	0.09
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	-0.18	1.00	0.67	0.40	0.26	-0.07	0.14	-0.05	-0.10	0.15	0.10	0.00
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.25	0.67	1.00	0.34	0.27	-0.16	0.11	-0.19	-0.12	0.12	0.02	0.09
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.12	0.40	0.34	1.00	0.17	-0.04	0.26	0.06	-0.23	0.29	-0.15	0.21
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.04	0.26	0.27	0.17	1.00	0.11	0.38	0.07	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06	0.08
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.20	-0.07	-0.16	-0.04	0.11	1.00	0.21	0.15	0.10	-0.14	0.05	-0.08
Social Distance (SDE)	0.35	0.14	0.11	0.26	0.38	0.21	1.00	0.26	-0.11	0.13	-0.21	0.21
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.27	-0.05	-0.19	0.06	0.07	0.15	0.26	1.00	-0.07	0.12	-0.08	0.04
Partisan Identity 7pt (PI7)	-0.10	-0.10	-0.12	-0.23	-0.03	0.10	-0.11	-0.07	1.00	-0.59	0.26	-0.34
Strength of Partisan Identity (SPI)	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.29	-0.04	-0.14	0.13	0.12	-0.59	1.00	-0.20	0.28
Ideology (IDE)	-0.13	0.10	0.02	-0.15	-0.06	0.05	-0.21	-0.08	0.26	-0.20	1.00	-0.70
Ideological Extremity (IDX)	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.21	0.08	-0.08	0.21	0.04	-0.34	0.28	-0.70	1.00

Table S5.2.3.

Correlations between the outcomes and key political variables among Republicans. Only participants assigned to the null control condition who identified as Republicans were included in these analyses. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient with pairwise deletion.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF	PI7	SPI	IDE	IDX
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.08	-0.13	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.31	0.41	-0.19	0.18	0.27	0.21
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.08	1.00	0.55	0.44	0.26	0.05	0.35	0.21	-0.20	0.29	0.02	0.12
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.13	0.55	1.00	0.26	0.20	-0.10	0.22	-0.08	-0.08	0.13	-0.13	0.01
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.26	0.44	0.26	1.00	0.24	0.11	0.28	0.32	-0.35	0.38	0.20	0.29
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.23	0.26	0.20	0.24	1.00	0.14	0.42	0.28	-0.14	0.12	0.11	0.15
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.24	0.05	-0.10	0.11	0.14	1.00	0.20	0.22	-0.04	0.01	0.06	0.03
Social Distance (SDE)	0.31	0.35	0.22	0.28	0.42	0.20	1.00	0.36	-0.19	0.23	0.15	0.16
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.41	0.21	-0.08	0.32	0.28	0.22	0.36	1.00	-0.29	0.25	0.34	0.29
Partisan Identity 7pt (PI7)	-0.19	-0.20	-0.08	-0.35	-0.14	-0.04	-0.19	-0.29	1.00	-0.61	-0.36	-0.46
Strength of Partisan Identity (SPI)	0.18	0.29	0.13	0.38	0.12	0.01	0.23	0.25	-0.61	1.00	0.32	0.41
Ideology (IDE)	0.27	0.02	-0.13	0.20	0.11	0.06	0.15	0.34	-0.36	0.32	1.00	0.76
Ideological Extremity (IDX)	0.21	0.12	0.01	0.29	0.15	0.03	0.16	0.29	-0.46	0.41	0.76	1.00

Table S5.3.1.

Effects of identifying as Republican (vs Democrat) on the outcomes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that Republican participants scored higher on this outcome than Democratic participants.

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Partisan Animosity	5,552	0.35	0.55	0.63	0.529	0.02
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,556	5.44	0.62	8.80	<.001	0.24
Support for Partisan Violence	5,556	-1.09	0.54	-2.01	0.045	-0.05
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,463	2.78	0.64	4.36	<.001	0.12
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	4.93	0.59	8.35	<.001	0.23
Social Distrust	5,405	3.10	0.75	4.12	<.001	0.11
Social Distance	5,401	-9.15	0.73	-12.58	<.001	-0.34
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,388	0.58	0.59	0.99	0.322	0.03

Table S5.4.1.

Effects of strength of partisan identity on the outcomes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were included in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Strength of partisanship as a social identity was also scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that the more strongly participants identified as partisans, the higher they scored on this outcome.

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	5,552	0.12	0.01	11.64	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,556	0.19	0.01	17.66	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	5,556	0.10	0.01	11.03	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,463	0.30	0.01	24.58	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	0.04	0.01	3.00	0.003
Social Distrust	5,405	-0.07	0.02	-4.60	<.001
Social Distance	5,401	0.19	0.01	12.97	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,388	0.15	0.01	13.04	<.001

Table S5.5.1.

Interaction effects of identifying as Republican (vs Democrat) x strength of partisan identity on the outcomes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Strength of partisanship as a social identity was also scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that the effect of strength of partisan identity on the outcome is stronger among Republicans than among Democrats.

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Highest Scoring Group
Partisan Animosity	5,552	0.04	0.02	1.82	0.069	Strongly identified Partisans
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,556	0.12	0.02	5.48	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans
Support for Partisan Violence	5,556	0.00	0.02	-0.12	0.908	Strongly identified Democrats
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,463	0.09	0.02	3.69	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	0.14	0.02	6.12	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans
Social Distrust	5,405	0.16	0.03	5.34	<.001	Weakly identified Democrats
Social Distance	5,401	0.08	0.03	2.99	0.003	Strongly identified Democrats
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,388	0.10	0.02	4.41	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans

Table S5.6.1.

Effects of political ideology on the outcomes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were included in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Political ideology was scaled from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that participants who identify as more ideologically conservative scored more highly on this outcome.

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	5,550	0.54	0.16	3.38	0.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,554	1.65	0.18	8.97	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	5,554	-0.58	0.17	-3.45	0.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,462	0.68	0.19	3.64	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	1.17	0.18	6.58	<.001
Social Distrust	5,404	1.19	0.21	5.58	<.001
Social Distance	5,400	-2.29	0.22	-10.43	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,387	1.03	0.17	6.05	<.001

Table S5.7.1.

Effects of ideological extremity on the outcomes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Ideological extremity was scaled from 0 (moderate) to 3 (extremely liberal/conservative). Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that participants who identify as more ideologically extreme scored more highly on this outcome.

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	5,550	2.82	0.27	10.59	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,554	1.42	0.31	4.52	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	5,554	1.07	0.28	3.84	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,462	5.64	0.30	18.74	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	2.45	0.29	8.31	<.001
Social Distrust	5,404	-0.52	0.37	-1.40	0.162
Social Distance	5,400	4.50	0.36	12.51	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,387	3.20	0.29	11.14	<.001

Table S6.1.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.47	0.70	-15.02	<.001	-0.53
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.22	0.65	-15.6	<.001	-0.51
Common National Identity	-9.20	0.64	-14.34	<.001	-0.46
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.03	0.69	-13.01	<.001	-0.45
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.16	0.65	-12.46	<.001	-0.41
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.03	0.67	-10.45	<.001	-0.35
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.08	0.64	-9.47	<.001	-0.30
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.00	0.69	-8.72	<.001	-0.30
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.37	0.72	-7.49	<.001	-0.27
Befriending Meditation	-5.23	0.72	-7.25	<.001	-0.26
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.21	0.72	-7.25	<.001	-0.26
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.14	0.66	-7.83	<.001	-0.26
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.76	0.67	-7.16	<.001	-0.24
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.05	0.66	-6.10	<.001	-0.20
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.43	0.63	-5.42	<.001	-0.17
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.26	0.65	-5.05	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.97	0.65	-4.60	<.001	-0.15
Democratic System Justification	-2.29	0.65	-3.53	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.15	0.65	-3.33	<.001	-0.11
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.06	0.66	-3.10	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.66	-3.02	0.001	-0.10
Alternative Control	-1.77	0.69	-2.57	0.010	-0.09
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.66	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Common Economic Interests	-1.19	0.67	-1.77	0.038	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.87	0.71	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.61	0.65	0.94	0.827	0.03
Includes controls					

Table S6.2.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.76	0.73	-7.93	<.001	-0.25
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.74	0.76	-6.22	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.24	0.69	-3.25	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.17	0.69	-3.14	0.001	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.63	0.72	-2.28	0.011	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.27	0.76	-1.67	0.048	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-0.99	0.77	-1.29	0.099	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.89	0.71	-1.25	0.105	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.59	0.79	-0.75	0.228	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.50	0.76	-0.66	0.509	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.40	0.81	-0.50	0.310	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.33	0.74	-0.44	0.330	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.08	0.76	0.10	0.542	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.09	0.71	0.12	0.548	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.29	0.72	0.41	0.658	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.36	0.74	0.49	0.689	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.43	0.71	0.61	0.730	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.58	0.72	0.81	0.791	0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.68	0.73	0.93	0.825	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.70	0.70	0.99	0.840	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.94	0.71	1.33	0.908	0.04
Common Economic Interests	1.39	0.77	1.80	0.964	0.06
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.52	0.75	2.01	0.978	0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.62	0.75	2.16	0.984	0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.69	0.74	2.28	0.989	0.07
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.85	0.77	2.39	0.992	0.08
Includes controls					

Table S6.3.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.79	0.55	-5.10	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.58	-3.46	<.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.62	0.62	-2.59	0.005	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.56	0.59	-2.64	0.004	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.49	0.67	-2.22	0.013	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.94	0.62	-1.52	0.064	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-0.82	0.70	-1.16	0.122	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.68	0.60	-1.14	0.127	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.65	0.62	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.64	0.60	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.50	0.70	-0.72	0.237	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.37	0.63	-0.59	0.277	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.21	0.62	-0.34	0.366	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.20	0.64	-0.31	0.378	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.05	0.65	-0.07	0.471	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.08	0.63	0.13	0.551	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.20	0.71	0.28	0.612	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.26	0.67	0.38	0.650	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.30	0.72	0.41	0.660	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.34	0.63	0.54	0.704	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.39	0.65	0.60	0.726	0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.60	0.66	0.90	0.815	0.03
Alternative Control	0.71	0.68	1.04	0.300	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.76	0.66	1.14	0.873	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.27	0.70	1.82	0.965	0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	2.29	0.70	3.28	0.999	0.11
Includes controls					

Table S6.4.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.49	0.80	-5.62	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.17	0.75	-5.60	<.001	-0.18
Common National Identity	-2.78	0.73	-3.84	<.001	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.70	0.74	-3.64	<.001	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.37	0.77	-3.08	0.001	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.64	0.77	-2.14	0.016	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.19	0.75	-1.59	0.056	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.13	0.75	-1.51	0.065	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.04	0.74	-1.42	0.078	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.91	0.78	-1.17	0.122	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.84	0.80	-1.05	0.148	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.57	0.75	-0.76	0.223	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.41	0.73	-0.56	0.288	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.35	0.76	-0.46	0.322	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.33	0.73	-0.45	0.326	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.29	0.76	-0.39	0.698	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.38	0.77	0.49	0.689	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.42	0.73	0.58	0.719	0.02
Befriending Meditation	0.46	0.82	0.56	0.711	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.48	0.78	0.62	0.732	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.53	0.76	0.70	0.757	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.57	0.72	0.80	0.788	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.78	0.74	1.06	0.856	0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.79	0.71	1.11	0.867	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.32	0.75	1.76	0.960	0.06
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.14	0.72	2.97	0.999	0.09
Includes controls					

Table S6.5.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.45	0.68	-3.59	<.001	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.41	0.70	-3.46	<.001	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.69	0.69	-2.44	0.007	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.55	0.75	-2.07	0.019	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.53	0.70	-2.20	0.014	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.30	0.71	-1.83	0.034	-0.06
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.09	0.70	-1.56	0.060	-0.05
Common National Identity	-1.08	0.68	-1.57	0.058	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.08	0.70	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.87	0.68	-1.27	0.102	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.80	0.75	-1.06	0.144	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.75	0.67	-1.11	0.133	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.72	0.67	-1.07	0.142	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.30	0.77	-0.39	0.347	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.22	0.75	-0.30	0.384	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.20	0.76	-0.26	0.397	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.10	0.77	0.13	0.551	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.13	0.72	0.18	0.571	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.18	0.74	0.24	0.594	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.31	0.72	0.42	0.664	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.34	0.73	0.46	0.677	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.47	0.75	0.62	0.732	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.67	0.73	0.92	0.820	0.03
Alternative Control	0.97	0.76	1.28	0.202	0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.68	0.73	2.32	0.990	0.08
Party Overlap on Policies	1.91	0.73	2.62	0.996	0.09
Includes controls					

Table S6.6.

Treatment effects on social distrust. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.05	0.95	-4.26	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.83	0.92	-4.14	<.001	-0.14
Common National Identity	-3.71	0.89	-4.17	<.001	-0.14
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.47	0.93	-3.72	<.001	-0.13
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.94	0.91	-3.23	0.001	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.54	0.93	-2.75	0.003	-0.09
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.46	0.92	-2.67	0.004	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-2.37	0.99	-2.40	0.008	-0.09
Democratic System Justification	-2.10	0.91	-2.32	0.010	-0.08
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.82	0.98	-1.86	0.031	-0.07
Positive Contact Video	-1.73	0.97	-1.78	0.037	-0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.44	0.92	-1.57	0.058	-0.05
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.38	0.97	-1.43	0.076	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.38	0.90	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.31	0.89	-1.47	0.070	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.24	0.91	-1.36	0.087	-0.05
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.21	0.99	-1.23	0.110	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.14	0.88	-1.29	0.098	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.05	0.90	-1.17	0.121	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.84	0.95	-0.89	0.187	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.45	0.96	-0.47	0.640	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.31	0.90	-0.34	0.367	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.25	0.92	-0.27	0.394	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.17	0.93	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.17	0.89	-0.19	0.425	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.92	0.90	1.02	0.847	0.03
Includes controls					

Table S6.7.

Treatment effects on social distance. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.85	0.88	-4.38	<.001	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.44	0.89	-3.85	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.15	0.88	-3.60	<.001	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-2.80	0.91	-3.08	0.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.73	0.84	-3.24	0.001	-0.10
Common National Identity	-2.34	0.86	-2.73	0.003	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.28	0.86	-2.66	0.004	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.27	0.94	-2.41	0.008	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-2.05	0.92	-2.22	0.013	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.89	0.90	-2.11	0.017	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.74	0.87	-1.99	0.023	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.53	0.86	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.25	0.86	-1.45	0.074	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.64	0.88	-0.73	0.233	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.34	0.92	-0.37	0.354	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.27	0.92	-0.30	0.383	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.20	0.92	-0.22	0.412	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.17	0.92	-0.19	0.424	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.06	0.91	-0.07	0.473	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.522	0.00
Alternative Control	0.08	0.93	0.08	0.933	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.19	0.87	0.22	0.587	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.22	0.89	0.25	0.600	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.96	0.88	1.09	0.863	0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.05	0.86	1.22	0.890	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.21	0.90	1.35	0.911	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S6.8.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.76	0.69	-4.03	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.23	0.69	-3.22	0.001	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.03	0.71	-2.86	0.002	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.82	0.73	-2.49	0.006	-0.09
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.35	0.75	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.21	0.78	-1.56	0.060	-0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.03	0.72	-1.44	0.075	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.93	0.69	-1.34	0.090	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.69	0.70	-0.98	0.163	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.50	0.67	-0.75	0.228	-0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.50	0.71	-0.70	0.242	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.26	0.75	-0.34	0.367	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.14	0.77	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.11	0.74	-0.15	0.442	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.06	0.72	-0.08	0.469	0.00
Alternative Control	0.05	0.73	0.07	0.943	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.13	0.68	0.18	0.573	0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.20	0.72	0.28	0.611	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.22	0.69	0.32	0.625	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.25	0.69	0.36	0.641	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.26	0.72	0.35	0.638	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.34	0.71	0.49	0.687	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.35	0.69	0.50	0.691	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.42	0.69	0.61	0.728	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.45	0.79	0.57	0.715	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	2.19	0.69	3.15	0.999	0.10
Includes controls					

Table S6.9.

Treatment effects on the composite of the eight outcomes. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.31	0.40	-8.17	<.001	-0.27
Common National Identity	-3.12	0.39	-7.93	<.001	-0.25
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.88	0.40	-7.14	<.001	-0.23
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.83	0.39	-7.25	<.001	-0.23
Positive Contact Video	-2.57	0.42	-6.19	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.57	0.40	-6.47	<.001	-0.21
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.34	0.41	-5.65	<.001	-0.19
Befriending Meditation	-1.53	0.42	-3.64	<.001	-0.12
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.45	0.44	-3.29	<.001	-0.12
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.13	0.43	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.08	0.39	-2.76	0.003	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.05	0.40	-2.63	0.004	-0.08
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.93	0.39	-2.39	0.008	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.82	0.38	-2.16	0.015	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.81	0.40	-2.04	0.021	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.39	-2.04	0.021	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.63	0.38	-1.64	0.050	-0.05
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.45	0.40	-1.12	0.131	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.45	0.41	-1.11	0.134	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.32	0.43	-0.74	0.230	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.22	0.41	-0.54	0.294	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.15	0.43	-0.35	0.727	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.14	0.41	0.34	0.632	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.21	0.40	0.51	0.697	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.24	0.40	0.60	0.725	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.49	0.39	1.23	0.891	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S6.10.

Treatment effects on cold feelings toward rival partisans. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-11.97	0.77	-15.55	<.001	-0.52
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-11.22	0.79	-14.24	<.001	-0.49
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-10.34	0.78	-13.21	<.001	-0.45
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.15	0.82	-11.13	<.001	-0.39
Positive Contact Video	-8.86	0.81	-11.00	<.001	-0.38
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-7.45	0.76	-9.79	<.001	-0.32
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.04	0.81	-8.68	<.001	-0.3
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-6.20	0.83	-7.47	<.001	-0.27
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.20	0.78	-7.94	<.001	-0.27
Befriending Meditation	-5.54	0.85	-6.52	<.001	-0.24
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.35	0.82	-6.56	<.001	-0.23
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.85	0.78	-6.24	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-4.34	0.75	-5.80	<.001	-0.19
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.23	0.81	-5.25	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.48	0.72	-4.80	<.001	-0.15
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.45	0.75	-4.62	<.001	-0.15
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-3.34	0.77	-4.37	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-3.33	0.79	-4.25	<.001	-0.14
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-2.05	0.75	-2.75	0.003	-0.09
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.91	0.76	-2.52	0.006	-0.08
Democratic System Justification	-1.89	0.75	-2.52	0.006	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.81	0.74	-2.46	0.007	-0.08
Alternative Control	-1.33	0.80	-1.67	0.095	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.23	0.81	-1.51	0.065	-0.05
Common Economic Interests	-0.86	0.76	-1.13	0.129	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.66	0.73	0.89	0.814	0.03
Includes controls					

Table S6.11.

Treatment effects on percentage of withheld money from rival partisan in a dictator game. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-12.22	0.87	-13.97	<.001	-0.50
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-9.24	0.80	-11.58	<.001	-0.37
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-8.89	0.83	-10.68	<.001	-0.36
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-6.99	0.85	-8.24	<.001	-0.28
Common National Identity	-6.40	0.77	-8.32	<.001	-0.26
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-6.03	0.79	-7.67	<.001	-0.24
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-5.87	0.86	-6.80	<.001	-0.24
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.48	0.82	-6.65	<.001	-0.22
Democratic Collapse Threat	-5.35	0.82	-6.56	<.001	-0.22
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.16	0.88	-5.83	<.001	-0.21
Befriending Meditation	-5.01	0.89	-5.61	<.001	-0.20
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.74	0.85	-5.58	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.68	0.81	-5.79	<.001	-0.19
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-4.57	0.91	-5.04	<.001	-0.18
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.39	0.82	-4.15	<.001	-0.14
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.08	0.83	-3.71	<.001	-0.12
Democratic System Justification	-2.71	0.82	-3.30	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.49	0.82	-3.03	0.001	-0.10
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.26	0.84	-2.67	0.004	-0.09
Alternative Control	-2.23	0.84	-2.65	0.008	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.68	0.82	-2.05	0.020	-0.07
Common Economic Interests	-1.57	0.85	-1.85	0.032	-0.06
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.54	0.84	-1.84	0.033	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.65	0.81	-0.79	0.214	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.64	0.89	-0.72	0.237	-0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.55	0.81	0.68	0.751	0.02
Includes controls					

Table S6.12.

Treatment effects on opposition to automatic voter registration. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.07	1.07	-3.81	<.001	-0.11
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.41	1.11	-2.17	0.015	-0.07
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-2.24	1.05	-2.14	0.016	-0.06
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.23	1.11	-2.01	0.022	-0.06
Befriending Meditation	-2.18	1.15	-1.90	0.029	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.14	1.08	-1.98	0.024	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.44	1.14	-1.26	0.103	-0.04
Democratic System Justification	-1.14	1.09	-1.05	0.147	-0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.02	1.10	-0.92	0.179	-0.03
Common Economic Interests	-1.00	1.08	-0.93	0.177	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.92	1.07	-0.86	0.195	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.90	1.18	-0.77	0.222	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.78	1.17	-0.67	0.252	-0.02
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.75	1.08	-0.69	0.245	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.73	1.13	-0.64	0.261	-0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.70	1.07	-0.65	0.258	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.46	1.06	-0.43	0.332	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.33	1.12	-0.29	0.384	-0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.11	1.08	-0.10	0.461	0.00
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.05	1.14	-0.05	0.482	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.12	1.11	0.11	0.543	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.35	1.07	0.33	0.628	0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.80	1.08	0.74	0.771	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.83	1.06	0.78	0.782	0.02
Alternative Control	1.64	1.09	1.50	0.133	0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.94	1.11	1.75	0.960	0.05
Includes controls					

Table S6.13.

Treatment effects on opposition to voter id law. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Befriending Meditation	-0.95	0.95	-1.00	0.160	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.33	0.89	-0.37	0.357	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.27	0.86	-0.32	0.376	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.14	0.90	-0.16	0.437	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.04	0.94	-0.05	0.482	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.13	0.87	0.15	0.560	0.00
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.20	0.87	0.23	0.591	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.50	0.95	0.52	0.699	0.02
Common National Identity	0.60	0.87	0.68	0.753	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.84	0.88	0.96	0.831	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.93	0.92	1.00	0.842	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.01	1.00	1.02	0.845	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.04	0.93	1.12	0.869	0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	1.06	0.88	1.19	0.884	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.07	0.90	1.18	0.882	0.04
Alternative Control	1.10	0.93	1.18	0.237	0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.33	0.91	1.46	0.927	0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1.40	0.90	1.56	0.941	0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.44	0.91	1.58	0.943	0.05
Common Economic Interests	1.62	0.93	1.75	0.960	0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.70	0.94	1.81	0.965	0.06
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.85	0.90	2.07	0.981	0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.86	0.97	1.92	0.973	0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.89	0.91	2.09	0.982	0.06
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	2.15	0.94	2.29	0.989	0.07
Party Overlap on Policies	2.23	0.91	2.46	0.993	0.08
Includes controls					

Table S6.14.

Treatment effects on opposition to voting by mail. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-3.02	1.02	-2.96	0.002	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.82	1.02	-2.76	0.003	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.43	1.01	-1.42	0.077	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.16	1.05	-1.10	0.136	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.15	1.04	-1.10	0.135	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.06	0.99	-1.07	0.142	-0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.94	1.02	-0.92	0.178	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.76	1.04	-0.73	0.232	-0.02
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.57	1.03	-0.55	0.291	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.53	1.04	-0.51	0.306	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.44	1.01	-0.44	0.331	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.37	1.00	-0.37	0.355	-0.01
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.34	1.03	-0.33	0.370	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.29	0.98	-0.29	0.384	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.22	1.02	-0.21	0.416	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.18	1.03	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.02	1.04	-0.02	0.493	0.00
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.27	0.99	0.27	0.606	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.33	1.11	0.30	0.617	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.34	1.01	0.34	0.634	0.01
Common National Identity	0.46	1.01	0.45	0.674	0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.63	1.09	0.57	0.716	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1.08	1.08	1.00	0.840	0.03
Alternative Control	1.27	1.03	1.23	0.217	0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	1.96	1.09	1.80	0.964	0.05
Party Overlap on Policies	2.54	1.01	2.53	0.994	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S6.15.

Treatment effects on opposition to banning partisan gerrymandering. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.81	0.89	-3.15	0.001	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.33	0.89	-2.62	0.004	-0.08
Befriending Meditation	-2.03	0.92	-2.2	0.014	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.54	0.90	-1.71	0.044	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.42	0.94	-1.50	0.067	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.15	0.87	-1.32	0.093	-0.04
Common Economic Interests	-1.00	0.89	-1.12	0.132	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.60	0.88	-0.68	0.250	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.54	0.95	-0.57	0.286	-0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.54	0.89	-0.61	0.272	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.43	0.86	-0.50	0.310	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.38	0.86	-0.44	0.329	-0.01
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.26	0.90	-0.29	0.385	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.19	0.86	-0.22	0.413	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.13	0.92	-0.14	0.891	0.00
Democratic System Justification	-0.11	0.87	-0.12	0.451	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.06	0.85	-0.06	0.474	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.03	0.88	-0.03	0.489	0.00
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.00	0.98	0.00	0.499	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.19	0.88	0.22	0.586	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.44	0.93	0.47	0.681	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.46	0.93	0.50	0.690	0.02
Common National Identity	0.58	0.88	0.65	0.743	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.24	0.93	1.34	0.909	0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.77	0.91	1.94	0.974	0.06
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.81	0.87	2.07	0.981	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S6.16.

Treatment effects on election denial. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.64	1.08	-2.44	0.007	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.03	1.13	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.82	1.13	-1.61	0.054	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.96	1.19	-0.81	0.209	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.79	1.18	-0.67	0.251	-0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.69	1.16	-0.59	0.277	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.08	1.11	-0.07	0.471	0.00
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.05	1.11	-0.05	0.482	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.12	1.10	0.11	0.544	0.00
Democratic System Justification	0.28	1.13	0.24	0.596	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.37	1.13	0.33	0.630	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.50	1.12	0.45	0.673	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.64	1.23	0.52	0.699	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.79	1.11	0.71	0.761	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.84	1.17	0.71	0.763	0.02
Befriending Meditation	1.14	1.21	0.95	0.828	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.15	1.19	0.96	0.831	0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.18	1.13	1.04	0.851	0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.55	1.14	1.36	0.914	0.04
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1.66	1.13	1.47	0.929	0.05
Common Economic Interests	1.89	1.15	1.65	0.951	0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.94	1.11	1.74	0.959	0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.04	1.12	1.82	0.966	0.06
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	2.04	1.12	1.82	0.966	0.06
Alternative Control	2.25	1.15	1.95	0.051	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	4.46	1.13	3.93	1.000	0.13
Includes controls					

Table S6.17.

Treatment effects on perceived dissimilarity with rival partisans. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-9.69	0.87	-11.10	< 0.001	-0.39
Common National Identity	-8.95	0.84	-10.61	< 0.001	-0.36
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-7.14	0.93	-7.69	< 0.001	-0.29
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-5.27	0.84	-6.24	< 0.001	-0.21
Positive Vicarious Contact	-4.47	0.88	-5.08	< 0.001	-0.18
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.16	0.83	-5.03	< 0.001	-0.17
Befriending Meditation	-3.45	0.93	-3.72	< 0.001	-0.14
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-3.17	0.89	-3.58	< 0.001	-0.13
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.95	0.84	-3.51	< 0.001	-0.12
Moral Similarities and Differences	-2.76	0.82	-3.36	< 0.001	-0.11
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.56	0.85	-3.01	0.001	-0.10
Party Overlap on Policies	-2.06	0.80	-2.57	0.005	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.64	0.87	-1.87	0.03	-0.07
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.37	0.85	-1.62	0.053	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.35	0.82	-1.65	0.05	-0.05
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.34	0.88	-1.52	0.064	-0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.94	0.80	-1.17	0.122	-0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.56	0.82	-0.68	0.248	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.52	0.81	-0.64	0.262	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.34	0.81	-0.43	0.335	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.12	0.83	-0.15	0.442	0.00
Alternative Control	-0.09	0.85	-0.10	0.917	0.00
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.00	0.80	0.00	0.501	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.13	0.81	0.16	0.564	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.19	0.79	0.23	0.593	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.28	0.80	0.35	0.638	0.01
Includes controls					

Table S6.18.

Treatment effects on strength of partisanship as a social identity. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.11	0.60	-3.53	< 0.001	-0.07
Positive Vicarious Contact	-2.04	0.61	-3.37	< 0.001	-0.07
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.20	0.59	-2.05	0.020	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.05	0.59	-1.77	0.038	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.88	0.61	-1.43	0.076	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.63	0.55	-1.14	0.127	-0.02
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.47	0.56	-0.84	0.200	-0.02
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.45	0.59	-0.76	0.223	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	-0.38	0.60	-0.62	0.267	-0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.33	0.59	-0.56	0.288	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.31	0.57	-0.54	0.296	-0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.23	0.57	-0.41	0.340	-0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.18	0.56	-0.33	0.373	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.09	0.57	-0.17	0.868	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.10	0.57	0.17	0.567	0.00
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.11	0.59	0.18	0.570	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.14	0.54	0.25	0.600	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.19	0.63	0.29	0.615	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.38	0.52	0.72	0.764	0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.57	0.59	0.97	0.834	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.66	0.53	1.24	0.893	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.74	0.58	1.27	0.898	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.00	0.59	1.69	0.955	0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.20	0.53	2.27	0.988	0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	1.36	0.60	2.27	0.988	0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.60	0.55	2.91	0.998	0.06
Includes controls					

Table S6.19.

Treatment effects on anger toward rival partisans. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-7.72	1.00	-7.71	< 0.001	-0.25
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-5.93	1.01	-5.85	< 0.001	-0.19
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-5.26	1.02	-5.14	< 0.001	-0.17
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.60	1.04	-4.45	< 0.001	-0.15
Befriending Meditation	-3.88	1.10	-3.51	< 0.001	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.77	1.05	-3.60	< 0.001	-0.12
Positive Vicarious Contact	-3.20	1.10	-2.91	0.002	-0.10
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.85	1.02	-2.78	0.003	-0.09
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-2.75	1.03	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.58	1.01	-2.55	0.005	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.48	1.12	-2.21	0.013	-0.08
Alternative Control	-2.03	1.07	-1.89	0.058	-0.06
Moral Similarities and Differences	-2.01	1.03	-1.95	0.026	-0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.79	1.03	-1.74	0.041	-0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.71	1.01	-1.69	0.045	-0.05
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.49	1.09	-1.36	0.086	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.38	1.05	-1.32	0.094	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.32	1.12	-1.18	0.120	-0.04
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.29	1.06	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.22	1.02	-1.19	0.116	-0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.86	1.08	-0.80	0.212	-0.03
Common Economic Interests	-0.58	1.06	-0.55	0.293	-0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.51	1.03	-0.50	0.310	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.41	1.01	-0.41	0.341	-0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.27	1.03	-0.26	0.398	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.70	1.01	0.69	0.756	0.02
Includes controls					

Table S6.20.

Treatment effects on lack of empathy toward rival partisans. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-8.64	0.97	-8.95	< 0.001	-0.33
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-8.19	0.90	-9.10	< 0.001	-0.31
Common National Identity	-7.20	0.88	-8.22	< 0.001	-0.27
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-6.52	0.94	-6.95	< 0.001	-0.25
Positive Vicarious Contact	-6.50	0.94	-6.91	< 0.001	-0.25
Befriending Meditation	-3.90	0.97	-4.02	< 0.001	-0.15
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.57	0.88	-4.05	< 0.001	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.43	0.88	-3.89	< 0.001	-0.13
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.31	0.89	-3.73	< 0.001	-0.12
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-3.27	0.89	-3.70	< 0.001	-0.12
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.23	0.88	-3.67	< 0.001	-0.12
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.15	0.95	-2.27	0.011	-0.08
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.93	0.94	-2.06	0.020	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.78	0.90	-1.98	0.024	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.52	0.87	-1.76	0.039	-0.06
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.43	0.90	-1.58	0.057	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.16	0.87	-1.33	0.091	-0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.11	0.86	-1.28	0.100	-0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.02	0.84	-1.20	0.115	-0.04
Democratic System Justification	-0.92	0.86	-1.07	0.142	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.81	0.92	-0.88	0.377	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.62	0.88	-0.70	0.242	-0.02
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.58	0.85	-0.68	0.248	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.53	0.86	-0.62	0.269	-0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.40	0.87	-0.46	0.322	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.11	0.86	0.13	0.552	0.00
Includes controls					

Table S6.21.

Treatment effects on lack of unity against a common enemy. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.60	0.89	-1.80	0.036	-0.06
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.37	0.88	-1.55	0.060	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.31	0.87	-1.51	0.066	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.10	0.90	-1.23	0.109	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.00	0.89	-1.13	0.130	-0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.81	0.89	-0.91	0.181	-0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.81	0.88	-0.92	0.178	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.75	0.88	-0.85	0.197	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.35	0.88	-0.39	0.347	-0.01
Befriending Meditation	-0.31	0.96	-0.33	0.372	-0.01
Positive Vicarious Contact	-0.18	0.98	-0.18	0.428	-0.01
Common National Identity	-0.16	0.88	-0.19	0.426	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.15	0.92	-0.16	0.435	-0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.06	0.98	-0.06	0.477	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.03	0.90	-0.03	0.487	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.11	0.94	0.12	0.548	0.00
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.25	0.91	0.27	0.606	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.35	0.89	0.39	0.652	0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.41	0.86	0.48	0.683	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.61	0.92	0.67	0.747	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.96	0.90	1.07	0.857	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.01	0.89	1.14	0.872	0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.15	0.92	1.25	0.894	0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.18	0.98	1.20	0.885	0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	1.46	0.88	1.67	0.952	0.06
Alternative Control	1.68	0.96	1.75	0.080	0.06
Includes controls					

Table S6.22.

Treatment effects on perceived threat of rival partisans. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-9.81	0.99	-9.94	< 0.001	-0.33
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-6.81	1.00	-6.79	< 0.001	-0.23
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.25	0.98	-4.32	< 0.001	-0.14
Positive Vicarious Contact	-3.24	1.05	-3.08	0.001	-0.11
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.23	0.98	-3.29	0.001	-0.11
Befriending Meditation	-3.18	1.06	-2.99	0.001	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.96	1.02	-2.91	0.002	-0.10
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.86	0.98	-2.93	0.002	-0.09
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-2.70	1.02	-2.66	0.004	-0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.90	0.96	-1.99	0.023	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.79	0.98	-1.84	0.033	-0.06
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.68	0.95	-1.77	0.039	-0.06
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.40	0.99	-1.41	0.080	-0.05
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.38	1.01	-1.37	0.086	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.28	0.98	-1.31	0.096	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.23	1.05	-1.17	0.121	-0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.18	1.01	-1.16	0.123	-0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.18	0.96	-1.24	0.108	-0.04
Alternative Control	-0.86	1.01	-0.85	0.394	-0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.71	0.98	-0.73	0.233	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.62	1.02	-0.61	0.271	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	-0.10	0.99	-0.10	0.461	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.04	0.97	-0.05	0.482	0.00
Democratic System Justification	0.01	0.96	0.01	0.502	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.21	1.06	0.20	0.579	0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.39	0.97	0.40	0.657	0.01

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S7.1.

Relative efficacy of treatments for partisan animosity. The column “rank” provides the order of treatments by effect size (with the treatment with the largest effect size being ranked first). The column “ranks of treatments with significantly smaller effects” provides the treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question (identified by their ranks in this table). The column “percentage of treatments with significantly smaller effects” provides the percentage of treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question. Statistical significance is examined via two-tailed tests of regression coefficients in models, controlling for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Rank	Treatment	Ranks of treatments with significantly smaller effects	Percentage of treatments with significantly smaller effects
1	Positive Contact Video	5 – 25	88%
2	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	5 – 25	88%
3	Common National Identity	6 – 25	83%
4	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	6 – 25	83%
5	Correcting Division Misperceptions	7 – 25	79%
6	Utility of Outparty Empathy	10 – 25	67%
7	Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	14 – 25	50%
8	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	14 – 25	50%
9	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	15 – 25	46%
10	Befriending Meditation	15 – 25	46%
11	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	15 – 25	46%
12	Moral Similarities and Differences	15 – 25	46%
13	Democratic Collapse Threat	17 – 25	38%
14	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	18 – 25	33%
15	Party Overlap on Policies	22 – 25	17%
16	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	23 – 25	12%
17	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	23 – 25	12%
18	Democratic System Justification	25	4%
19	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	25	4%
20	Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	25	4%
21	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	25	4%
22	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	25	4%
23	Common Economic Interests	25	4%
24	Political Violence Inefficacy	-	0%
25	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-	0%

Table S7.2.

Relative efficacy of treatments for support for undemocratic practices. The column “rank” provides the order of treatments by effect size (with the treatment with the largest effect size being ranked first). The column “ranks of treatments with significantly smaller effects” provides the treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question (identified by their ranks in this table). The column “percentage of treatments with significantly smaller effects” provides the percentage of treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question. Statistical significance is examined via two-tailed tests of regression coefficients in models, controlling for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Rank	Treatment	Ranks of treatments with significantly smaller effects	Percentage of treatments with significantly smaller effects
1	Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	3 – 25	96%
2	Democratic Collapse Threat	3 – 25	96%
3	Correcting Division Misperceptions	11 – 25	62%
4	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	11 – 25	62%
5	Common National Identity	14 – 25	50%
6	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	18 – 25	33%
7	Positive Contact Video	20 – 25	25%
8	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	20 – 25	25%
9	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	22 – 25	17%
10	Befriending Meditation	23 – 25	12%
11	Political Violence Inefficacy	23 – 25	12%
12	Utility of Outparty Empathy	-	0%
13	Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-	0%
14	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-	0%
15	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-	0%
16	Democratic System Justification	-	0%
17	Moral Similarities and Differences	-	0%
18	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-	0%
19	Party Overlap on Policies	-	0%
20	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-	0%
21	Common Economic Interests	-	0%
22	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-	0%
23	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-	0%
24	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-	0%
25	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-	0%

Table S7.3.

Relative efficacy of treatments for support for partisan violence. The column “rank” provides the order of treatments by effect size (with the treatment with the largest effect size being ranked first). The column “ranks of treatments with significantly smaller effects” provides the treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question (identified by their ranks in this table). The column “percentage of treatments with significantly smaller effects” provides the percentage of treatments that had significantly smaller effects than the treatment in question. Statistical significance is examined via two-tailed tests of regression coefficients in models, controlling for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Rank	Treatment	Ranks of treatments with significantly smaller effects	Percentage of treatments with significantly smaller effects
1	Correcting Division Misperceptions	6 – 25	83%
2	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	12 – 25	58%
3	Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	16 – 25	42%
4	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	16 – 25	42%
5	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	18, 20 – 25	29%
6	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	23 – 25	12%
7	Positive Contact Video	24 – 25	8%
8	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	24 – 25	8%
9	Common National Identity	24 – 25	8%
10	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	24 – 25	8%
11	Befriending Meditation	25	4%
12	Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	25	4%
13	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	25	4%
14	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	25	4%
15	Common Economic Interests	25	4%
16	Party Overlap on Policies	25	4%
17	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	25	4%
18	Political Violence Inefficacy	25	4%
19	Utility of Outparty Empathy	25	4%
20	Democratic System Justification	25	4%
21	Moral Similarities and Differences	25	4%
22	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-	0%
23	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-	0%
24	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-	0%
25	Democratic Collapse Threat	-	0%

Table S8.1.1.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on partisan animosity. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.08	1.39	0.78	0.436
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.46	1.45	-1.01	0.314
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.73	1.29	-0.56	0.573
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.05	1.39	-0.76	0.448
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.73	1.28	0.57	0.567
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.38	1.41	-0.27	0.787
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.33	0.04	0.967
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.34	1.34	-0.25	0.799
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.11	1.34	0.83	0.407
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.64	1.35	0.48	0.634
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.86	1.33	-0.65	0.518
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.23	1.33	-0.17	0.862
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.07	1.29	-0.83	0.406
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.6	1.43	-0.42	0.676
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.78	1.31	-0.59	0.554
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.40	1.29	1.08	0.278
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.44	1.28	1.90	0.057
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.21	1.31	-0.16	0.870
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.66	1.38	1.21	0.228
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.7	1.31	-1.29	0.196
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.18	1.44	-0.82	0.413
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.35	1.30	2.58	0.010
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.37	1.26	1.88	0.061
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.73	1.30	-1.34	0.181
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.42	1.33	1.07	0.283
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.81	1.43	0.57	0.571
Includes controls				

Table S8.1.2.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on support for undemocratic practices. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.65	1.52	1.08	0.279
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.85	1.63	0.52	0.601
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.72	1.46	0.49	0.623
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.30	1.53	-1.51	0.131
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.42	1.43	-0.30	0.767
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.74	1.55	1.12	0.261
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.23	1.42	-0.16	0.872
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	4.15	1.53	2.72	0.007
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.91	1.55	1.23	0.218
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.34	1.53	0.22	0.824
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.33	1.47	0.22	0.823
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.22	1.42	0.85	0.393
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.27	1.43	0.19	0.850
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.66	1.58	1.05	0.292
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.07	1.50	-0.71	0.476
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.78	1.43	0.55	0.586
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.36	1.45	-0.93	0.350
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.56	1.38	1.85	0.064
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.52	1.50	-1.01	0.310
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.19	1.43	0.83	0.406
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.43	1.55	1.57	0.117
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.54	1.48	1.04	0.298
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.71	1.41	0.50	0.616
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.46	1.41	-0.32	0.747
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.99	1.38	1.45	0.148
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.73	1.49	0.49	0.622
Includes controls				

Table S8.1.3.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on support for partisan violence. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.04	1.36	0.76	0.445
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.41	1.40	1.01	0.314
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.34	1.21	1.11	0.266
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.54	1.41	-1.09	0.275
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.02	1.23	-0.83	0.406
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.73	1.41	0.52	0.606
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.00	1.24	0.81	0.417
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	4.35	1.39	3.12	0.002
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.61	1.31	0.47	0.639
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.95	1.44	-0.66	0.509
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.44	1.27	1.13	0.258
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.93	1.26	1.54	0.125
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.11	1.18	-0.94	0.347
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.00	1.34	0.00	0.998
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.37	1.32	-0.28	0.783
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.92	1.23	0.75	0.454
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.20	1.25	0.16	0.876
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.39	1.09	1.27	0.204
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.15	1.32	-0.11	0.909
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.53	1.29	1.18	0.237
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.24	1.40	0.17	0.866
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.51	1.20	0.43	0.671
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.06	1.26	-0.05	0.963
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.64	1.26	1.31	0.191
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.83	1.15	0.72	0.473
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.22	1.33	0.17	0.866
Includes controls				

Table S8.1.4.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on support for undemocratic candidates. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	4.43	1.52	2.92	0.004
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.03	1.65	0.62	0.532
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.26	1.50	0.17	0.864
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.90	1.54	1.24	0.216
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.56	1.45	-0.39	0.698
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.83	1.54	1.83	0.067
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.71	1.44	0.49	0.623
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.71	1.60	1.07	0.284
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.07	1.52	0.04	0.964
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.11	1.51	-0.07	0.943
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.72	1.56	0.46	0.643
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.41	1.46	0.28	0.778
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.89	1.47	0.60	0.546
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.97	1.60	1.23	0.220
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.49	1.48	0.33	0.739
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.64	1.42	1.16	0.248
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.16	1.49	0.11	0.916
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.62	1.47	-1.11	0.268
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.21	1.48	-0.14	0.889
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.91	1.49	0.61	0.543
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.98	1.56	2.55	0.011
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.76	1.50	1.84	0.066
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.78	1.43	-0.55	0.585
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.11	1.47	-1.44	0.151
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.12	1.50	1.41	0.157
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.70	1.56	-0.45	0.653
Includes controls				

Table S8.1.5.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.64	1.55	0.41	0.680
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.28	1.55	1.47	0.142
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.19	1.35	1.63	0.104
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.24	1.39	-0.17	0.863
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.36	1.37	-0.99	0.320
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.03	1.52	1.99	0.047
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.92	1.46	1.32	0.187
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.29	1.40	-0.21	0.837
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.03	1.51	0.02	0.984
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.03	1.55	-0.02	0.983
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.63	1.49	-0.42	0.674
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.37	1.42	0.97	0.332
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.47	1.35	0.35	0.726
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.55	1.54	-0.36	0.721
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.17	1.38	0.12	0.905
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.51	1.37	1.10	0.270
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.55	1.39	1.11	0.267
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.96	1.38	0.69	0.489
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.98	1.45	0.67	0.500
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.96	1.46	-0.66	0.512
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.06	1.50	0.04	0.967
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.25	1.46	-0.17	0.866
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.09	1.46	-0.06	0.953
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.51	1.46	-0.35	0.726
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.27	1.42	-0.89	0.371
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.14	1.54	-0.74	0.459
Includes controls				

Table S8.1.6.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on social distrust. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.94	0.03	0.980
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.01	2.01	1.00	0.317
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.58	1.77	0.33	0.745
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.91	1.90	0.48	0.633
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.24	1.78	-0.70	0.485
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.84	1.96	1.45	0.147
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.60	1.80	0.33	0.741
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.35	1.83	1.28	0.199
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.18	1.86	-1.17	0.242
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.86	1.96	-0.95	0.343
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.06	1.80	0.59	0.557
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.79	1.85	0.43	0.670
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.59	1.78	-0.33	0.739
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.84	1.94	-0.43	0.664
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.05	1.86	-0.57	0.570
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.16	1.83	-0.09	0.929
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.08	1.85	1.13	0.261
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.63	1.84	0.88	0.378
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.56	1.79	1.43	0.153
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.53	1.86	-1.36	0.174
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.73	1.90	-0.38	0.700
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.03	1.78	0.58	0.564
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.89	1.84	0.49	0.628
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-3.52	1.81	-1.95	0.051
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.38	1.81	0.21	0.836
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.40	1.99	-1.21	0.228

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.1.7.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on social distance. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.96	1.87	0.51	0.607
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.64	1.82	2.00	0.046
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.04	1.80	-0.58	0.564
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.73	1.79	0.97	0.334
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.42	1.71	0.83	0.408
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.20	1.84	0.65	0.514
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.29	1.74	-0.74	0.459
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.85	1.79	-1.04	0.300
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.09	1.81	-0.60	0.547
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.79	1.83	-0.97	0.330
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.18	1.72	-0.10	0.916
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.53	1.83	1.38	0.167
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-4.24	1.71	-2.48	0.013
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.26	1.88	-0.67	0.504
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.55	1.75	2.03	0.042
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.09	1.71	-0.05	0.960
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.71	1.69	1.61	0.108
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.13	1.76	0.64	0.522
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.84	1.75	0.48	0.632
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.34	1.77	0.76	0.448
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.97	1.84	1.62	0.106
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.43	1.71	0.25	0.801
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.37	1.76	0.21	0.832
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.94	1.78	-1.66	0.098
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.22	1.72	-0.13	0.899
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.37	1.83	-0.75	0.454
Includes controls				

Table S8.1.8.

Condition x partisan identity interaction effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.30	1.46	1.58	0.115
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.07	1.50	0.71	0.475
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.72	1.38	-0.53	0.599
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.46	0.03	0.975
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.16	1.37	1.57	0.115
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.85	1.47	1.25	0.210
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.15	1.37	-0.11	0.911
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.19	1.43	0.13	0.895
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.17	1.45	0.12	0.908
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.34	1.55	0.87	0.387
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.22	1.39	0.88	0.380
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.82	1.43	0.57	0.567
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.48	1.42	-1.05	0.296
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.51	1.58	0.32	0.746
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.66	1.42	0.46	0.644
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.70	1.33	-0.52	0.601
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.44	1.38	1.04	0.299
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.91	1.37	0.66	0.508
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.46	1.42	1.73	0.084
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.87	1.43	0.60	0.546
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.80	1.53	1.17	0.241
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.52	1.40	-0.37	0.711
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.98	1.39	0.71	0.479
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.43	1.39	1.03	0.304
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.38	0.04	0.971
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.25	1.5	-0.16	0.870
Includes controls				

Table S8.1.9.

Simple effects for the significant condition x partisan identity interaction effects. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of partisan identity (Democrat and Republican).

Outcome	Treatment	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Democrat	-1.11	0.97	-1.15	0.252
Partisan Animosity	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Republican	2.24	0.86	2.60	0.009
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Democrat	-6.77	1.00	-6.79	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Republican	-2.62	1.15	-2.27	0.023
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Democrat	0.18	0.95	0.19	0.852
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Republican	4.52	1.02	4.43	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Alternative Control	Democrat	-2.36	1.05	-2.25	0.024
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Alternative Control	Republican	2.06	1.10	1.88	0.060
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Democrat	-1.48	1.10	-1.35	0.178
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Republican	2.50	1.10	2.26	0.024
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Positive Contact Video	Democrat	-2.97	0.88	-3.36	0.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Positive Contact Video	Republican	0.06	1.24	0.05	0.959
Social Distance	Befriending Meditation	Democrat	-4.41	1.26	-3.51	<.001
Social Distance	Befriending Meditation	Republican	-0.78	1.31	-0.59	0.554
Social Distance	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Democrat	3.15	1.27	2.48	0.013
Social Distance	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Republican	-1.09	1.15	-0.95	0.343
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Democrat	-5.54	1.26	-4.39	<.001
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Republican	-1.99	1.21	-1.64	0.100

Table S8.1.10.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.27	0.90	-11.38	<.001	-0.52
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-9.86	0.91	-10.8	<.001	-0.50
Common National Identity	-9.43	0.90	-10.44	<.001	-0.48
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-8.38	0.98	-8.58	<.001	-0.43
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-7.97	0.93	-8.53	<.001	-0.40
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.32	0.98	-7.48	<.001	-0.37
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-7.31	0.87	-8.45	<.001	-0.37
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.79	0.97	-7.01	<.001	-0.34
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-4.97	0.98	-5.06	<.001	-0.25
Party Overlap on Policies	-4.63	0.90	-5.13	<.001	-0.23
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-4.56	1.00	-4.54	<.001	-0.23
Befriending Meditation	-4.55	0.98	-4.66	<.001	-0.23
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.53	0.88	-5.13	<.001	-0.23
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.36	0.94	-4.66	<.001	-0.22
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-3.58	0.91	-3.94	<.001	-0.18
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-3.53	0.93	-3.79	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-2.89	0.88	-3.29	0.001	-0.15
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.71	0.95	-2.86	0.002	-0.14
Alternative Control	-2.25	0.94	-2.4	0.016	-0.11
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.83	0.89	-2.06	0.020	-0.09
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.77	0.9	-1.98	0.024	-0.09
Common Economic Interests	-1.75	0.95	-1.83	0.034	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.56	0.89	-1.75	0.040	-0.08
Democratic System Justification	-1.42	0.92	-1.53	0.063	-0.07
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.36	0.97	-1.4	0.081	-0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-1.00	0.97	-1.03	0.152	-0.05
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.11.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-6.72	0.99	-6.77	<.001	-0.29
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.09	1.02	-4.99	<.001	-0.22
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.42	0.99	-3.47	<.001	-0.15
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-3.11	0.98	-3.19	0.001	-0.13
Positive Contact Video	-1.80	1.04	-1.73	0.042	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.38	1.01	-1.36	0.087	-0.06
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.28	1.14	-1.13	0.130	-0.06
Alternative Control	-1.26	1.03	-1.23	0.219	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.01	1.02	-1.00	0.160	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.89	1.09	-0.81	0.208	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.75	1.03	-0.73	0.232	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.51	0.98	-0.52	0.302	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.18	1.09	-0.17	0.434	-0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.06	1.11	-0.06	0.477	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.04	1.03	-0.04	0.483	0.00
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.04	1.04	0.04	0.516	0.00
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.14	1.05	0.14	0.554	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.32	1.02	0.32	0.625	0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.39	1.04	0.38	0.647	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.60	1.05	0.57	0.716	0.03
Democratic System Justification	0.68	1.00	0.68	0.752	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.69	1.08	0.64	0.740	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.83	1.05	0.79	0.784	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.08	0.98	1.11	0.866	0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.99	1.10	1.81	0.965	0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	2.43	1.06	2.29	0.989	0.11
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.12.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.50	0.80	-4.39	<.001	-0.17
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.43	0.86	-2.84	0.002	-0.12
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.68	0.94	-1.79	0.037	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.47	1.00	-1.48	0.070	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.43	0.90	-1.58	0.057	-0.07
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.31	0.90	-1.45	0.073	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.28	0.87	-1.47	0.070	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.22	0.99	-1.23	0.109	-0.06
Befriending Meditation	-1.16	0.95	-1.22	0.111	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.03	0.89	-1.15	0.124	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-1.02	0.91	-1.12	0.131	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.96	0.89	-1.08	0.141	-0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.69	0.90	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.53	0.90	-0.59	0.279	-0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.36	0.94	-0.39	0.350	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	-0.29	0.95	-0.31	0.380	-0.01
Common National Identity	-0.18	0.94	-0.19	0.426	-0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.16	0.95	0.16	0.565	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.17	0.92	0.18	0.573	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.17	0.95	0.18	0.572	0.01
Alternative Control	0.19	0.97	0.20	0.843	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.74	1.08	0.69	0.754	0.04
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.74	0.98	0.75	0.774	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.75	0.98	0.77	0.779	0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.98	1.07	0.91	0.819	0.05
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.16	1.03	1.12	0.869	0.06
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.13.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-5.22	1.11	-4.73	<.001	-0.23
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.29	1.05	-4.07	<.001	-0.19
Positive Contact Video	-3.67	1.05	-3.50	<.001	-0.16
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.96	1.02	-2.89	0.002	-0.13
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.52	1.07	-2.36	0.009	-0.11
Common National Identity	-2.41	1.03	-2.35	0.009	-0.10
Alternative Control	-2.33	1.05	-2.23	0.026	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.19	1.00	-2.18	0.015	-0.09
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.76	1.11	-1.58	0.057	-0.08
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.62	1.05	-1.54	0.061	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.46	1.05	-1.39	0.082	-0.06
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.44	1.10	-1.31	0.095	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.23	1.07	-1.15	0.125	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.69	1.03	-0.67	0.250	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.64	1.03	-0.62	0.269	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.17	1.04	-0.17	0.434	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.14	1.10	-0.13	0.449	-0.01
Befriending Meditation	-0.10	1.10	-0.09	0.463	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.06	0.99	0.06	0.525	0.00
Common Economic Interests	0.58	1.07	0.54	0.705	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.59	1.04	0.57	0.716	0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.66	1.05	0.63	0.736	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.94	1.02	0.93	0.823	0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	0.96	1.04	0.93	0.823	0.04
Democratic System Justification	1.57	1.04	1.51	0.934	0.07
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.77	1.01	1.76	0.961	0.08
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.14.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-2.98	0.90	-3.32	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.52	0.84	-3.01	0.001	-0.13
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.13	0.91	-2.35	0.010	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.13	0.89	-2.40	0.008	-0.11
Befriending Meditation	-1.92	0.89	-2.15	0.016	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.87	0.84	-2.23	0.013	-0.09
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.75	0.86	-2.02	0.021	-0.09
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.73	0.88	-1.97	0.024	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.59	0.88	-1.81	0.035	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.35	0.89	-1.51	0.065	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.98	0.86	-1.15	0.125	-0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.79	0.88	-0.90	0.184	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.71	0.95	-0.75	0.228	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.27	0.91	-0.29	0.386	-0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.18	0.89	-0.20	0.422	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.15	1.01	-0.15	0.441	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.09	1.03	-0.09	0.465	0.00
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.03	1.01	-0.03	0.486	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.20	0.96	0.21	0.584	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.47	0.97	0.49	0.686	0.02
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.53	0.97	0.55	0.708	0.03
Democratic System Justification	0.55	0.96	0.58	0.718	0.03
Alternative Control	0.74	0.95	0.77	0.439	0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.11	0.98	1.13	0.872	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	1.84	0.96	1.93	0.973	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.87	1.02	1.84	0.967	0.09
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.15.

Treatment effects on social distrust among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.36	1.31	-3.33	<.001	-0.16
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.04	1.21	-3.34	<.001	-0.15
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.61	1.29	-2.8	0.003	-0.13
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.31	1.24	-2.67	0.004	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-3.22	1.27	-2.53	0.006	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.15	1.29	-2.43	0.007	-0.12
Common National Identity	-2.97	1.22	-2.43	0.008	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.93	1.24	-2.36	0.009	-0.11
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.47	1.22	-2.03	0.021	-0.09
Moral Similarities and Differences	-2.12	1.28	-1.66	0.049	-0.08
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.91	1.25	-1.52	0.064	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.41	1.21	-1.17	0.121	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.35	1.21	-1.12	0.131	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.06	1.28	-0.83	0.202	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.97	1.19	-0.82	0.207	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.82	1.29	-0.64	0.261	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.75	1.34	-0.56	0.287	-0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.63	1.25	-0.51	0.307	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.54	1.25	-0.43	0.333	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.50	1.21	-0.41	0.340	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.43	1.31	-0.33	0.370	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.38	1.26	-0.3	0.762	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.28	1.24	-0.23	0.410	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.17	1.31	-0.13	0.447	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.82	1.22	0.67	0.748	0.03
Common Economic Interests	0.95	1.28	0.74	0.770	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.16.

Treatment effects on social distance among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-5.59	1.26	-4.45	<.001	-0.20
Befriending Meditation	-4.46	1.25	-3.56	<.001	-0.16
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.10	1.30	-3.15	0.001	-0.15
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.05	1.21	-3.34	<.001	-0.15
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.69	1.31	-2.81	0.002	-0.13
Common National Identity	-2.89	1.26	-2.30	0.011	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.62	1.27	-2.06	0.020	-0.10
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.26	1.22	-1.85	0.032	-0.08
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.14	1.27	-1.69	0.045	-0.08
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.72	1.28	-1.34	0.090	-0.06
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.60	1.35	-1.19	0.118	-0.06
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.44	1.30	-1.11	0.134	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.43	1.23	-1.17	0.122	-0.05
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.32	1.29	-1.02	0.153	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.23	1.23	-1.00	0.158	-0.05
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.03	1.28	-0.81	0.210	-0.04
Alternative Control	-0.28	1.32	-0.22	0.829	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.04	1.25	-0.03	0.486	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.17	1.32	0.13	0.551	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.44	1.32	0.33	0.630	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.67	1.38	0.49	0.687	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.75	1.26	0.6	0.725	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.81	1.24	0.65	0.743	0.03
Democratic System Justification	1.63	1.34	1.22	0.888	0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.79	1.29	1.39	0.917	0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	3.25	1.26	2.59	0.995	0.12
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.17.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts among Democrats. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-3.62	0.95	-3.82	<.001	-0.17
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.92	1.01	-2.88	0.002	-0.14
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.30	0.98	-2.34	0.010	-0.11
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.85	1.10	-1.69	0.046	-0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.71	1.05	-1.63	0.052	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.60	1.06	-1.51	0.066	-0.07
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.41	1.06	-1.33	0.092	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.07	0.99	-1.08	0.140	-0.05
Alternative Control	-0.94	0.99	-0.95	0.344	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.93	1.00	-0.93	0.176	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.85	1.11	-0.77	0.222	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.69	1.03	-0.67	0.252	-0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.55	1.02	-0.54	0.294	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.47	1.02	-0.46	0.323	-0.02
Democratic System Justification	-0.37	1.03	-0.36	0.359	-0.02
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.20	0.98	-0.2	0.421	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.20	0.99	-0.2	0.420	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.18	1.03	-0.17	0.431	-0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.02	0.95	-0.02	0.492	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.00	1.01	0.00	0.498	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.12	0.99	0.12	0.548	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.22	1.04	0.22	0.585	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.36	1.14	0.32	0.625	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.46	0.97	0.47	0.681	0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.21	1.00	1.21	0.887	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	1.55	0.97	1.59	0.944	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.18.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.84	1.06	-10.23	<.001	-0.54
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.68	0.93	-11.46	<.001	-0.53
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.55	0.98	-9.73	<.001	-0.47
Common National Identity	-8.88	0.91	-9.74	<.001	-0.44
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.12	0.91	-8.89	<.001	-0.40
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-6.70	0.93	-7.24	<.001	-0.33
Befriending Meditation	-6.25	1.06	-5.89	<.001	-0.31
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.98	0.92	-6.53	<.001	-0.29
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.89	1.02	-5.77	<.001	-0.29
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.61	1.03	-5.45	<.001	-0.28
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-5.21	0.98	-5.34	<.001	-0.26
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.98	0.99	-5.02	<.001	-0.24
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.71	0.94	-5.00	<.001	-0.23
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.38	0.95	-4.62	<.001	-0.22
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.49	0.94	-3.70	<.001	-0.17
Democratic System Justification	-3.16	0.91	-3.48	<.001	-0.15
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.61	0.93	-2.82	0.002	-0.13
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.33	0.99	-2.35	0.009	-0.11
Party Overlap on Policies	-2.30	0.88	-2.60	0.005	-0.11
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.28	0.92	-2.47	0.007	-0.11
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.98	-1.80	0.036	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.27	0.92	-1.38	0.083	-0.06
Alternative Control	-1.07	1.01	-1.06	0.291	-0.05
Common Economic Interests	-0.45	0.93	-0.49	0.313	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.36	1.05	-0.34	0.366	-0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.28	0.86	2.66	0.996	0.11
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.19.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.54	1.03	-6.36	<.001	-0.29
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.70	1.16	-2.33	0.010	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.48	1.05	-2.36	0.009	-0.11
Common National Identity	-1.93	1.00	-1.93	0.027	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.31	0.98	-1.34	0.090	-0.06
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.17	0.96	-1.22	0.111	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.64	1.00	-0.64	0.260	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.20	1.14	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.09	1.08	-0.08	0.466	0.00
Befriending Meditation	0.11	1.20	0.10	0.538	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.18	0.99	0.18	0.570	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.23	1.09	0.21	0.582	0.01
Alternative Control	0.28	1.11	0.26	0.798	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.29	1.06	0.27	0.607	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.44	1.03	0.43	0.667	0.02
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.61	1.00	0.61	0.728	0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.63	1.03	0.61	0.730	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.72	1.01	0.72	0.763	0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.83	1.03	0.81	0.792	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.86	1.05	0.82	0.795	0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.827	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.97	1.02	0.95	0.828	0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.08	0.99	1.09	0.862	0.05
Common Economic Interests	2.12	1.13	1.88	0.970	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.22	1.03	2.15	0.984	0.10
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	2.97	1.11	2.69	0.996	0.13
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.20.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.23	0.75	-2.96	0.002	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.11	0.77	-2.73	0.003	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.66	0.84	-1.99	0.023	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.61	0.77	-2.07	0.019	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.56	0.92	-1.70	0.044	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.14	0.79	-1.43	0.076	-0.06
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.61	0.93	-0.65	0.257	-0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.49	0.77	-0.64	0.262	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.48	0.84	-0.58	0.282	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.47	1.02	-0.46	0.321	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.15	0.96	-0.16	0.438	-0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.06	0.84	-0.08	0.470	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.02	0.86	-0.02	0.490	0.00
Common Economic Interests	0.08	0.90	0.09	0.537	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.29	0.92	0.32	0.624	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.36	0.86	0.42	0.662	0.02
Befriending Meditation	0.42	1.06	0.40	0.654	0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.43	0.90	0.48	0.683	0.02
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.46	0.92	0.50	0.693	0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.73	0.88	0.83	0.798	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.76	0.89	0.86	0.805	0.04
Democratic System Justification	1.12	0.88	1.27	0.898	0.06
Alternative Control	1.14	0.96	1.19	0.235	0.06
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.20	0.9	1.33	0.909	0.06
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.46	0.96	1.52	0.936	0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	4.44	1.02	4.37	1.000	0.23
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.21.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.05	1.05	-3.85	<.001	-0.17
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.68	1.15	-3.19	0.001	-0.16
Common National Identity	-3.16	1.03	-3.08	0.001	-0.13
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.51	1.07	-2.35	0.009	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.11	1.02	-1.09	0.138	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-0.92	1.13	-0.82	0.206	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.74	1.11	-0.66	0.253	-0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.67	1.04	-0.64	0.260	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.59	1.12	-0.52	0.301	-0.02
Democratic System Justification	-0.58	1.02	-0.57	0.286	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.52	1.08	-0.48	0.314	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.51	1.02	-0.50	0.308	-0.02
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.43	1.09	-0.40	0.346	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.30	1.03	-0.29	0.387	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.15	1.12	-0.13	0.448	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.01	1.16	-0.01	0.496	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.10	0.99	0.10	0.541	0.00
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.16	1.16	0.14	0.557	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.48	1.07	0.45	0.674	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.71	1.07	0.66	0.746	0.03
Befriending Meditation	0.88	1.22	0.72	0.766	0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1.61	1.03	1.57	0.942	0.07
Alternative Control	2.09	1.10	1.91	0.057	0.09
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	2.45	1.11	2.21	0.986	0.10
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.48	1.03	2.41	0.992	0.10
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.57	1.02	2.52	0.994	0.11
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.22.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.49	1.10	-2.27	0.012	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.45	1.06	-2.31	0.010	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.10	1.06	-1.98	0.024	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.85	1.02	-1.82	0.035	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.74	1.07	-1.63	0.052	-0.08
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.31	1.05	-1.25	0.105	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.86	1.19	-0.72	0.236	-0.04
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.51	1.11	-0.46	0.322	-0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.49	1.16	-0.42	0.337	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.38	1.12	-0.34	0.367	-0.02
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.31	1.10	-0.29	0.388	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.30	1.03	-0.29	0.387	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.20	1.21	-0.17	0.434	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.17	1.13	-0.15	0.440	-0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.14	1.05	-0.13	0.448	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.01	1.09	-0.01	0.498	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.03	1.13	0.02	0.509	0.00
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.15	1.08	0.14	0.555	0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.24	1.25	0.19	0.575	0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.41	1.04	0.39	0.653	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.48	1.14	0.42	0.663	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.83	1.14	0.73	0.768	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.09	1.16	0.94	0.826	0.05
Alternative Control	1.27	1.23	1.03	0.301	0.06
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.42	1.04	1.36	0.913	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	1.67	1.09	1.54	0.938	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.23.

Treatment effects on social distrust among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.77	1.35	-3.54	<.001	-0.17
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.41	1.38	-3.20	0.001	-0.16
Common National Identity	-4.38	1.29	-3.40	<.001	-0.16
Democratic System Justification	-3.81	1.31	-2.90	0.002	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.58	1.38	-2.60	0.005	-0.13
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-2.66	1.42	-1.88	0.030	-0.10
Political Violence Inefficacy	-2.44	1.48	-1.65	0.050	-0.09
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.75	1.36	-1.29	0.098	-0.06
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.7	1.43	-1.18	0.118	-0.06
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.56	1.31	-1.20	0.116	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.48	1.32	-1.12	0.132	-0.05
Befriending Meditation	-1.42	1.55	-0.92	0.180	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.4	1.31	-1.07	0.143	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.38	1.30	-1.06	0.145	-0.05
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.23	1.38	-0.90	0.185	-0.04
Common Economic Interests	-1.13	1.33	-0.85	0.198	-0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.02	1.33	-0.77	0.222	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.67	1.29	-0.51	0.303	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.34	1.46	-0.23	0.818	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.29	1.33	-0.21	0.415	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.27	1.50	-0.18	0.430	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.16	1.33	-0.12	0.452	-0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.10	1.30	-0.08	0.468	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.04	1.36	0.03	0.511	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.29	1.27	0.23	0.592	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1.04	1.33	0.78	0.782	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.24.

Treatment effects on social distance among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.89	1.23	-2.34	0.010	-0.11
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.76	1.31	-2.11	0.018	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.50	1.24	-2.02	0.022	-0.10
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.43	1.16	-2.10	0.018	-0.10
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.32	1.16	-2.00	0.023	-0.09
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.09	1.20	-1.73	0.042	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.64	1.16	-1.42	0.078	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.60	1.20	-1.33	0.092	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.57	1.32	-1.19	0.117	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.39	1.20	-1.15	0.124	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.26	1.24	-1.02	0.154	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.24	1.17	-1.07	0.143	-0.05
Democratic System Justification	-1.23	1.16	-1.06	0.144	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.02	1.21	-0.84	0.201	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.97	1.26	-0.77	0.221	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.92	1.15	-0.80	0.211	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.65	1.32	-0.49	0.311	-0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.51	1.22	-0.42	0.338	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	-0.43	1.23	-0.35	0.362	-0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.09	1.19	-0.07	0.471	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.25	1.16	0.21	0.585	0.01
Alternative Control	0.61	1.32	0.46	0.647	0.02
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.76	1.24	0.61	0.729	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.97	1.22	0.79	0.786	0.04
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1.01	1.3	0.78	0.781	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.21	1.31	0.93	0.823	0.05
Includes controls					

Table S8.1.25.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts among Republicans. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.78	1.01	-1.77	0.038	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.71	0.97	-1.78	0.038	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.65	0.98	-1.68	0.047	-0.08
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.28	1.04	-1.23	0.108	-0.06
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.20	0.92	-1.30	0.097	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.10	0.91	-1.21	0.113	-0.05
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.91	1.01	-0.90	0.183	-0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.88	0.93	-0.95	0.172	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.86	0.94	-0.91	0.182	-0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.44	1.08	-0.41	0.342	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.14	0.99	-0.15	0.442	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.11	0.95	0.12	0.547	0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.16	1.07	0.15	0.560	0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.20	1.00	0.20	0.578	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.23	0.96	0.24	0.597	0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.31	1.01	0.31	0.620	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.53	0.99	0.53	0.702	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.65	0.94	0.70	0.757	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.75	1.05	0.71	0.762	0.04
Positive Contact Video	0.80	1.06	0.75	0.773	0.04
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.82	0.91	0.90	0.816	0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.86	1.05	0.82	0.794	0.04
Democratic System Justification	1.01	0.93	1.09	0.861	0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.10	0.97	1.13	0.871	0.05
Alternative Control	1.43	1.06	1.35	0.179	0.07
Party Overlap on Policies	2.55	0.97	2.64	0.996	0.12
Includes controls					

Table S8.2.1.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on partisan animosity. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.62	0.536
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.08	0.939
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.66	0.509
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.08	0.03	-3.08	0.002
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-2.04	0.041
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.13	0.899
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.04	0.298
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.13	0.033
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.31	0.190
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.86	0.063
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.96	0.337
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.84	0.402
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.958
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.19	0.848
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-2.00	0.045
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.987
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.86	0.389
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.00	0.316
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.55	0.583
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.90	0.367
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.43	0.664
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.23	0.218
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.07	0.284
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.90	0.368
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.48	0.632
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	0.97	0.334
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.2.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on support for undemocratic practices. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.04	0.971
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.69	0.091
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.05	0.295
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.74	0.458
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.47	0.640
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.42	0.673
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.35	0.726
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.59	0.010
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.50	0.618
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.35	0.730
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.30	0.762
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.47	0.639
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.07	0.283
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.74	0.461
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.05	0.03	1.75	0.080
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.36	0.721
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.26	0.207
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.70	0.090
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.77	0.444
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.21	0.836
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.16	0.870
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.40	0.687
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.33	0.743
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.19	0.234
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.19	0.233
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.52	0.606
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.3.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on support for partisan violence. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.999
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.80	0.422
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.02	-0.31	0.757
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.02	0.77	0.439
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	-0.08	0.936
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.52	0.601
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.70	0.483
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	0.525
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.82	0.412
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.56	0.578
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.02	-1.76	0.078
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.02	1.29	0.195
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.02	-1.29	0.197
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.02	0.57	0.570
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.02	1.76	0.078
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.02	0.26	0.797
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.85	0.395
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.02	-2.03	0.043
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.02	0.99	0.320
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.02	-0.53	0.598
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.950
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.02	-1.42	0.154
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.88	0.379
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	0.12	0.901
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.02	-1.78	0.075
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.02	1.25	0.213
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.4.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on support for undemocratic candidates. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.66	0.511
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.71	0.479
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.08	0.03	-2.55	0.011
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.00	0.317
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.63	0.527
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.42	0.157
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.16	0.873
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.08	0.038
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.56	0.575
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.05	0.296
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.23	0.026
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.12	0.263
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.13	0.033
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	0.78	0.437
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.87	0.385
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.03	0.303
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.28	0.202
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.25	0.804
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.99	0.324
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.08	0.281
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.42	0.675
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.05	0.03	1.55	0.120
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.881
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.99	0.321
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.06	0.039
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.39	0.695
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.5.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.1	0.03	-3.07	0.002
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.36	0.174
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.36	0.175
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.11	0.909
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.63	0.529
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.23	0.820
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.04	0.299
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.73	0.083
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.29	0.199
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	0.523
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.908
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.51	0.613
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.97	0.330
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.39	0.693
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.95	0.344
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.40	0.693
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.905
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.03	1.48	0.139
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.21	0.833
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.47	0.637
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	0.520
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.943
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.31	0.753
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.79	0.074
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.54	0.588
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.6.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on social distrust. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.04	0.52	0.603
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.04	0.10	0.918
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	0.83	0.408
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.16	0.875
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.04	-0.34	0.732
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.924
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.68	0.499
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.04	-2.02	0.044
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.04	0.43	0.669
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.23	0.814
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.06	0.03	1.67	0.096
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.04	1.07	0.286
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.04	-1.17	0.241
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.28	0.782
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.04	-0.40	0.688
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.32	0.747
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.45	0.652
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.04	1.04	0.297
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.02	0.306
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.04	0.43	0.665
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.04	-1.39	0.165
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.46	0.647
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.04	0.92	0.356
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.21	0.832
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.37	0.709
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.04	0.66	0.510
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.7.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on social distance. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.09	0.04	-2.27	0.024
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.37	0.709
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.58	0.115
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-1.69	0.092
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.96	0.337
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.54	0.588
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.04	-0.92	0.359
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.09	0.04	-2.48	0.013
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.04	-1.79	0.073
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.45	0.651
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.09	0.03	-2.56	0.011
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.988
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.27	0.205
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.04	-1.21	0.227
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.12	0.034
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.62	0.532
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.904
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.62	0.534
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.77	0.441
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.78	0.436
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.04	-1.58	0.114
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.49	0.624
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.26	0.799
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.04	-0.84	0.399
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.34	0.180
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.04	-1.59	0.111
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.8.

Condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.38	0.167
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.998
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.84	0.066
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.82	0.414
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.15	0.032
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.26	0.798
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.984
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.86	0.389
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.57	0.571
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-1.86	0.062
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.66	0.510
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.878
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.907
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.23	0.819
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.64	0.101
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.73	0.464
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.55	0.584
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.68	0.496
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.14	0.032
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.15	0.882
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.46	0.645
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.57	0.567
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.43	0.666
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.30	0.765
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.63	0.531
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.37	0.710
Includes controls				

Table S8.2.9.

Simple effects for the significant condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of strength of partisan identity (one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean).

Outcome	Treatment	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	Weakly Identified Partisan	-6.81	0.92	-7.41	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	Strongly Identified Partisan	-11.13	1.04	-10.66	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common National Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-7.82	0.86	-9.12	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common National Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-10.56	0.99	-10.64	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-3.28	0.93	-3.54	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-6.20	0.98	-6.31	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-8.86	0.85	-10.42	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-11.58	1.03	-11.26	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-2.75	0.93	-2.96	0.003
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-6.64	1.19	-5.60	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Weakly Identified Partisan	-1.84	0.58	-3.17	0.002
Support for Partisan Violence	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Strongly Identified Partisan	-3.74	0.84	-4.46	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	Weakly Identified Partisan	1.36	1.02	1.34	0.180
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.60	1.14	-2.28	0.023
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-2.67	1.10	-2.42	0.015
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-6.24	1.24	-5.05	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.90	1.06	0.85	0.394
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.76	1.20	-2.30	0.021
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.53	0.97	0.55	0.584
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.76	1.16	-2.37	0.018
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.41	1.01	0.41	0.681
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.72	1.12	-2.44	0.015
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Alternative Control	Weakly Identified Partisan	3.43	1.14	3.01	0.003
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Alternative Control	Strongly Identified Partisan	-1.57	1.09	-1.44	0.150

Table S8.2.9. (continued)

Simple effects for the significant condition x strength of partisan identity interaction effects.
Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of strength of partisan identity
(one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean).

Treatment	Outcome	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Social Distrust	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-0.97	1.29	-0.75	0.452
Social Distrust	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-4.82	1.35	-3.58	<.001
Social Distance	Alternative Control	Weakly Identified Partisan	2.36	1.30	1.81	0.070
Social Distance	Alternative Control	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.27	1.46	-1.55	0.120
Social Distance	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.58	1.27	0.46	0.649
Social Distance	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-4.30	1.39	-3.10	0.002
Social Distance	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.69	1.13	0.61	0.539
Social Distance	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Strongly Identified Partisan	-3.84	1.33	-2.88	0.004
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-1.99	1.14	-1.74	0.082
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-5.73	1.34	-4.29	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Common National Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-1.13	0.95	-1.19	0.235
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Common National Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-4.36	1.08	-4.05	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Weakly Identified Partisan	1.04	0.92	1.13	0.260
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.05	1.10	-1.87	0.062

Table S8.3.1.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on partisan animosity. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	-0.44	0.41	-1.08	0.282
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	-0.24	0.42	-0.57	0.566
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.33	0.38	-0.88	0.380
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	-0.38	0.40	-0.93	0.351
Common National Identity x Ideology	0.04	0.38	0.11	0.909
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	-0.58	0.40	-1.44	0.150
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.23	0.38	0.61	0.540
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.26	0.38	-0.67	0.504
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.29	0.40	0.72	0.471
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.24	0.38	-0.62	0.536
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	-0.33	0.39	-0.85	0.394
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.16	0.39	0.42	0.677
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.37	0.37	-0.99	0.324
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.10	0.41	0.25	0.802
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	-0.79	0.39	-2.00	0.045
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.19	0.38	0.49	0.621
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.60	0.38	1.57	0.117
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.25	0.38	0.65	0.518
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.09	0.40	-0.24	0.813
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	-0.26	0.38	-0.68	0.494
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	-0.60	0.43	-1.41	0.157
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.33	0.39	0.86	0.387
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.11	0.35	0.31	0.758
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.64	0.37	-1.71	0.087
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.09	0.38	0.24	0.810
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.21	0.42	-0.51	0.613

Includes controls

Table S8.3.2.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on support for undemocratic practices. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	1.10	0.45	2.47	0.013
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	-0.14	0.48	-0.30	0.763
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.18	0.43	-0.43	0.671
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	-0.22	0.46	-0.47	0.642
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.20	0.42	-0.48	0.635
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.43	0.43	0.99	0.321
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.10	0.41	0.24	0.813
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	0.90	0.46	1.96	0.050
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.58	0.45	1.28	0.199
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	0.75	0.42	1.78	0.074
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	-0.01	0.44	-0.03	0.973
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.00	0.44	0.00	0.998
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.42	0.43	-0.98	0.327
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.81	0.44	1.84	0.066
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.23	0.43	0.54	0.592
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.27	0.42	-0.63	0.528
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.47	0.44	-1.08	0.280
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.90	0.39	2.33	0.020
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.17	0.44	-0.38	0.704
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.06	0.42	0.15	0.885
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.41	0.45	0.90	0.370
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.70	0.44	1.58	0.114
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.28	0.41	0.70	0.486
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.10	0.41	-0.23	0.817
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.49	0.40	1.23	0.220
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	0.02	0.44	0.05	0.963
Includes controls				

Table S8.3.3.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on support for partisan violence. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	0.88	0.43	2.05	0.040
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.15	0.42	0.36	0.717
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.25	0.36	0.70	0.484
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.03	0.43	0.08	0.937
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.32	0.38	-0.83	0.405
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.43	0.42	1.02	0.307
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.44	0.38	1.17	0.244
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	1.24	0.43	2.85	0.004
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.28	0.40	0.69	0.490
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.15	0.42	-0.35	0.729
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.55	0.40	1.37	0.170
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.40	0.41	0.98	0.329
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.55	0.37	-1.47	0.141
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.40	0.41	0.99	0.321
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.34	0.40	0.85	0.396
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.06	0.37	0.16	0.876
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.25	0.4	-0.63	0.529
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.51	0.32	1.59	0.111
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.05	0.39	0.13	0.894
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.23	0.41	0.56	0.579
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.21	0.42	0.51	0.612
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.88	0.36	2.41	0.016
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.15	0.37	0.40	0.688
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	0.79	0.38	2.08	0.037
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.24	0.35	0.67	0.501
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	0.06	0.43	0.14	0.886
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.3.4.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on support for undemocratic candidates. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	1.58	0.43	3.64	<.001
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.89	0.47	1.88	0.060
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.23	0.44	0.53	0.598
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.62	0.44	1.39	0.164
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.09	0.43	-0.20	0.840
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	1.24	0.45	2.78	0.005
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.63	0.42	1.49	0.138
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	1.03	0.47	2.22	0.026
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.40	0.44	0.89	0.372
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	0.67	0.43	1.56	0.119
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.47	0.47	1.00	0.317
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.13	0.42	0.30	0.761
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	0.13	0.44	0.30	0.761
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	1.14	0.45	2.53	0.012
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.59	0.42	1.39	0.165
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.88	0.41	2.17	0.030
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.62	0.43	1.42	0.155
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.16	0.44	0.37	0.712
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.19	0.42	0.46	0.645
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.77	0.43	1.80	0.072
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.84	0.45	1.86	0.063
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	1.53	0.44	3.44	0.001
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.01	0.41	0.03	0.975
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.45	0.42	-1.07	0.286
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.64	0.44	1.45	0.148
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.18	0.45	-0.39	0.693
Includes controls				

Table S8.3.5.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	-0.22	0.45	-0.48	0.632
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.53	0.46	1.17	0.243
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.58	0.40	1.43	0.153
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.31	0.41	0.75	0.455
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.39	0.42	-0.93	0.353
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.32	0.44	0.73	0.463
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.57	0.46	1.24	0.213
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.15	0.42	-0.36	0.719
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.14	0.46	0.31	0.757
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.23	0.46	-0.50	0.618
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.11	0.47	0.25	0.806
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.31	0.44	0.69	0.488
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	0.38	0.39	0.97	0.334
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.29	0.46	0.62	0.535
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.19	0.41	0.47	0.640
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.54	0.40	1.35	0.176
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.30	0.43	0.70	0.482
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.70	0.42	1.68	0.093
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.02	0.43	0.04	0.966
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	-0.14	0.44	-0.31	0.756
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.23	0.47	0.48	0.629
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.08	0.47	0.17	0.867
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.35	0.42	0.83	0.409
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	0.14	0.45	0.32	0.750
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.41	0.43	-0.94	0.349
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.67	0.48	-1.40	0.162
Includes controls				

Table S8.3.6.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on social distrust. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	0.17	0.56	0.31	0.758
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.20	0.58	0.34	0.735
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.11	0.50	0.22	0.822
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.16	0.53	0.31	0.759
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.26	0.51	-0.52	0.603
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	-0.53	0.56	-0.94	0.349
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	-0.05	0.53	-0.10	0.919
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.02	0.52	-0.03	0.974
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	-0.65	0.53	-1.24	0.216
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.22	0.56	-0.40	0.687
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.02	0.52	0.04	0.969
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	-0.06	0.53	-0.11	0.911
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	0.06	0.52	0.11	0.911
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	-0.19	0.53	-0.36	0.720
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	-0.49	0.53	-0.92	0.358
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.18	0.51	-0.34	0.732
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.65	0.52	1.27	0.205
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.37	0.52	0.71	0.480
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.61	0.50	1.23	0.220
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	-0.51	0.54	-0.95	0.343
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.04	0.53	0.08	0.933
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	-0.39	0.52	-0.76	0.447
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.46	0.52	0.88	0.381
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.87	0.52	-1.69	0.092
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.40	0.51	-0.78	0.438
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.71	0.58	-1.21	0.227
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.3.7.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on social distance. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	0.12	0.55	0.23	0.821
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.37	0.55	0.67	0.501
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.55	0.55	-1.01	0.315
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.60	0.55	1.08	0.282
Common National Identity x Ideology	0.25	0.53	0.46	0.643
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	-0.16	0.54	-0.29	0.774
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.06	0.52	0.11	0.916
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.59	0.55	-1.07	0.285
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.43	0.56	0.77	0.443
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.77	0.55	-1.39	0.165
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	-0.07	0.53	-0.12	0.902
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.41	0.55	0.74	0.459
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.77	0.53	-1.46	0.145
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.20	0.57	0.35	0.725
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.64	0.51	1.25	0.210
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.07	0.52	-0.14	0.889
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.87	0.51	1.70	0.089
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.99	0.53	1.86	0.063
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.08	0.52	0.15	0.882
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.65	0.52	1.25	0.211
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.41	0.56	0.74	0.461
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.19	0.52	0.36	0.720
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	-0.10	0.52	-0.19	0.848
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.72	0.53	-1.36	0.175
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.16	0.52	-0.31	0.756
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-1.02	0.57	-1.79	0.074
Includes controls				

Table S8.3.8.

Condition x political ideology interaction effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	-0.09	0.44	-0.20	0.841
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.66	0.45	1.48	0.139
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.26	0.42	-0.62	0.538
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.23	0.43	0.53	0.599
Common National Identity x Ideology	0.56	0.41	1.37	0.169
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.01	0.43	0.02	0.987
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	-0.04	0.41	-0.09	0.929
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	0.08	0.42	0.19	0.848
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.32	0.42	0.76	0.448
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	0.50	0.45	1.12	0.261
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.17	0.41	0.41	0.684
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.01	0.43	0.03	0.979
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.42	0.42	-1.01	0.311
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.01	0.44	0.03	0.979
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	-0.24	0.42	-0.56	0.573
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.01	0.39	0.03	0.976
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.57	0.40	1.42	0.156
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.54	0.40	1.36	0.172
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.51	0.42	1.22	0.223
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.29	0.42	0.69	0.492
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.64	0.45	1.42	0.156
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	-0.44	0.41	-1.06	0.288
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.16	0.39	0.41	0.679
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.36	0.40	-0.89	0.372
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.12	0.41	0.30	0.764
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.40	0.45	-0.88	0.376
Includes controls				

Table S8.3.9.

Simple effects for the significant condition x political ideology interaction effects. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of political ideology (one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean).

Outcome	Treatment	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Liberals	-8.81	0.97	-9.13	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Conservatives	-11.66	0.97	-12.01	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Alternative Control	Liberals	-2.52	1.07	-2.35	0.019
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Alternative Control	Conservatives	1.49	1.13	1.31	0.190
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Liberals	-3.88	0.98	-3.97	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Conservatives	-0.60	0.99	-0.61	0.540
Support for Partisan Violence	Alternative Control	Liberals	-0.88	1.01	-0.87	0.382
Support for Partisan Violence	Alternative Control	Conservatives	2.31	1.06	2.18	0.029
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberals	0.05	1.05	0.04	0.964
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservatives	4.54	1.05	4.30	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberals	-2.35	0.93	-2.53	0.011
Support for Partisan Violence	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservatives	0.84	0.85	0.98	0.325
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic System Justification	Liberals	-1.15	0.92	-1.24	0.213
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic System Justification	Conservatives	1.73	0.94	1.83	0.067
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Alternative Control	Liberals	-3.16	1.11	-2.85	0.004
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Alternative Control	Conservatives	2.57	1.07	2.40	0.016
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Positive Contact Video	Liberals	-4.59	1.09	-4.20	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Positive Contact Video	Conservatives	-0.07	1.14	-0.06	0.950
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberals	-6.37	1.17	-5.47	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservatives	-2.62	1.16	-2.27	0.023
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Liberals	-2.84	1.15	-2.48	0.013
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Conservatives	1.30	1.14	1.14	0.254

Table S8.3.9. (continued)

Simple effects for the significant condition x political ideology interaction effects. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of political ideology (one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean).

Outcome	Treatment	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Liberals	-0.84	1.08	-0.78	0.435
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Conservatives	2.35	0.96	2.44	0.015
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberals	-6.37	1.17	-5.47	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservatives	-2.62	1.16	-2.27	0.023
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Liberals	-2.84	1.15	-2.48	0.013
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Conservatives	1.30	1.14	1.14	0.254
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Liberals	-0.84	1.08	-0.78	0.435
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Conservatives	2.35	0.96	2.44	0.015
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberals	-1.64	1.19	-1.38	0.168
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservatives	3.93	1.01	3.88	<.001

Table S8.4.1.

Backfire effects for the eight outcomes, across the sample and broken down by political subgroups. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of partisanship (Democrats and Republicans) and two levels of political ideology (one standard deviation below and above the mean).

Outcome	Treatment	Subgroup	b	p-value
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Total	1.52	0.044
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Liberal Democrats	1.59	0.180
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Conservative Democrats	5.38	0.069
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Liberal Republicans	-1.63	0.612
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Conservative Republicans	1.30	0.237
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Total	1.62	0.032
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Liberal Democrats	1.71	0.130
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Conservative Democrats	7.39	0.011
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Liberal Republicans	4.35	0.176
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Conservative Republicans	0.27	0.818
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Total	1.69	0.022
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Democrats	0.19	0.874
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Democrats	2.78	0.269
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Republicans	0.44	0.888
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Republicans	2.70	0.022
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Total	1.85	0.016
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Liberal Democrats	0.37	0.759
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Conservative Democrats	1.67	0.562
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Liberal Republicans	5.38	0.077
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Conservative Republicans	2.73	0.027
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Total	2.29	0.002
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberal Democrats	0.33	0.761
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservative Democrats	-0.97	0.702
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberal Republicans	-2.21	0.505

Table S8.4.1. (continued)

Backfire effects for the eight outcomes, across the sample and broken down by political subgroups. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of partisanship (Democrats and Republicans) and two levels of political ideology (one standard deviation below and above the mean).

Outcome	Treatment	Subgroup	b	p-value
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservative Republicans	5.58	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Total	2.14	0.002
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Liberal Democrats	0.92	0.414
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Conservative Democrats	6.58	0.008
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Liberal Republicans	1.16	0.700
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Conservative Republicans	2.96	0.009
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Total	1.68	0.020
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Democrats	2.14	0.076
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Democrats	0.71	0.794
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Republicans	-1.70	0.524
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Republicans	2.13	0.075
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Total	1.91	0.008
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Democrats	1.42	0.188
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Democrats	4.55	0.072
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Republicans	-1.51	0.614
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Republicans	1.94	0.102
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Total	2.19	0.002
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Democrats	1.65	0.122
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Democrats	0.83	0.741
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Republicans	0.95	0.716
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Republicans	2.35	0.021

Table S9.5.1.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	B	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.48	1.27	-3.52	<.001	-0.21
Positive Contact Video	-4.07	1.31	-3.10	0.001	-0.19
Common National Identity	-3.95	1.20	-3.28	0.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.40	1.21	-2.81	0.002	-0.16
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.85	1.21	-2.36	0.009	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.67	1.29	-2.08	0.019	-0.13
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.02	1.30	-0.78	0.216	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.66	1.23	-0.54	0.295	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.29	1.23	-0.23	0.408	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.10	1.15	0.09	0.535	0
Alternative Control	0.33	1.21	0.27	0.788	0.02
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.2.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.84	1.31	-0.64	0.260	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.80	1.18	-0.68	0.247	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.61	1.30	-0.47	0.320	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.15	1.26	-0.12	0.454	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.11	1.32	0.09	0.534	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.51	1.29	0.39	0.652	0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.64	1.22	0.52	0.700	0.03
Alternative Control	1.01	1.29	0.78	0.435	0.04
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.23	1.31	0.94	0.827	0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.34	1.39	0.97	0.833	0.06
Positive Contact Video	1.49	1.37	1.09	0.862	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.3.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.31	0.88	-2.62	0.004	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.59	1.08	-0.54	0.294	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.54	1.15	-0.47	0.321	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.48	1.06	-0.45	0.325	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.08	1.12	-0.07	0.472	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.32	1.12	0.29	0.613	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.36	1.22	0.29	0.616	0.02
Alternative Control	0.67	1.12	0.59	0.554	0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.81	1.16	0.70	0.757	0.04
Positive Contact Video	0.92	1.28	0.72	0.765	0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.92	1.27	0.73	0.767	0.05
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.4.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.51	1.43	-1.75	0.040	-0.10
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.25	1.34	-1.68	0.046	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.47	1.37	-1.07	0.141	-0.06
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.14	1.44	-0.79	0.215	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.11	1.41	-0.79	0.215	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.06	1.36	-0.78	0.218	-0.04
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.27	1.36	-0.20	0.422	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.17	1.36	-0.12	0.451	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.53	1.55	0.34	0.633	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.67	1.41	0.48	0.684	0.03
Alternative Control	1.89	1.35	1.40	0.163	0.08
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.5.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.7	1.24	-2.17	0.015	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.5	1.19	-2.10	0.018	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.12	1.21	-1.76	0.039	-0.10
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.57	1.31	-1.20	0.115	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.19	1.38	-0.86	0.194	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.65	1.35	-0.48	0.316	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.48	1.42	-0.34	0.366	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.20	1.24	-0.16	0.437	-0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.69	1.38	0.50	0.691	0.03
Positive Contact Video	0.93	1.56	0.59	0.724	0.04
Alternative Control	3.20	1.35	2.37	0.018	0.14
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.6.

Treatment effects on social distrust in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.38	1.54	-1.55	0.061	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.05	1.59	-0.66	0.255	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.89	1.65	-0.54	0.296	-0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.87	1.59	-0.55	0.292	-0.03
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.65	1.72	-0.38	0.352	-0.02
Positive Contact Video	0.12	1.65	0.07	0.529	0.00
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.12	1.60	0.07	0.529	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.01	1.70	0.60	0.724	0.04
Alternative Control	2.34	1.65	1.42	0.156	0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	2.45	1.67	1.46	0.928	0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	2.91	1.54	1.89	0.971	0.11
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.7.

Treatment effects on social distance in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.21	1.73	-1.85	0.032	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.13	1.55	-1.37	0.085	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.33	1.58	-0.84	0.200	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.42	1.65	-0.26	0.399	-0.02
Common National Identity	-0.25	1.58	-0.16	0.437	-0.01
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.19	1.60	-0.12	0.452	-0.01
Alternative Control	0.74	1.62	0.46	0.646	0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.01	1.60	0.63	0.737	0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	1.24	1.59	0.78	0.783	0.05
Positive Contact Video	1.48	1.63	0.91	0.819	0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.76	1.79	0.98	0.837	0.06
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.8.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts in the durability test (preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.92	1.25	-2.34	0.010	-0.13
Common National Identity	-2.82	1.35	-2.09	0.018	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.43	1.23	-1.98	0.024	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.07	1.31	-1.58	0.057	-0.09
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.52	1.39	-1.09	0.137	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.47	1.24	-1.18	0.118	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.19	1.22	-0.97	0.166	-0.05
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.17	1.25	-0.94	0.175	-0.05
Alternative Control	0.27	1.28	0.21	0.834	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.61	1.31	0.46	0.679	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.50	1.38	1.09	0.863	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.9.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-3.19	0.92	-3.49	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.03	0.91	-3.35	<.001	-0.14
Positive Contact Video	-2.89	0.91	-3.18	0.001	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.83	0.89	-3.18	0.001	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.79	0.91	-1.97	0.024	-0.09
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.75	0.89	-1.97	0.024	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.26	0.91	-1.39	0.083	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.70	0.88	-0.80	0.212	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.05	0.88	-0.05	0.479	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.07	0.91	0.07	0.529	0.00
Alternative Control	2.09	0.88	2.37	0.018	0.10
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.10.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.91	0.93	-2.04	0.021	-0.08
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.75	1.01	-0.75	0.227	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.28	0.94	-0.30	0.384	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.26	0.96	-0.28	0.392	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.26	0.93	-0.28	0.388	-0.01
Common National Identity	-0.12	0.90	-0.13	0.448	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.26	0.96	0.27	0.608	0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.27	0.96	0.28	0.609	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.66	0.97	0.69	0.755	0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.835	0.04
Alternative Control	0.98	0.94	1.04	0.297	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.11.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.57	0.70	-2.25	0.012	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.51	0.77	-0.67	0.253	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.19	0.81	-0.23	0.409	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.18	0.76	-0.24	0.403	-0.01
Alternative Control	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.998	0.00
Common National Identity	0.13	0.78	0.17	0.567	0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.19	0.80	0.24	0.596	0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.20	0.79	0.26	0.602	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.26	0.81	0.32	0.627	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.87	0.81	1.07	0.859	0.05
Positive Contact Video	1.09	0.84	1.29	0.902	0.06
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.12.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.09	1.03	-2.03	0.021	-0.09
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.71	1.04	-1.64	0.051	-0.07
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.44	1.02	-1.41	0.079	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.89	1.03	-0.87	0.193	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.70	0.99	-0.71	0.240	-0.03
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.55	1.06	-0.52	0.303	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.21	0.97	-0.22	0.414	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.02	1.01	-0.02	0.492	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.11	1.01	0.11	0.544	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.20	0.97	0.21	0.582	0.01
Alternative Control	1.23	1.02	1.21	0.227	0.05
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.13.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.82	0.96	-1.89	0.029	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.80	0.93	-1.94	0.026	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.77	0.93	-1.90	0.029	-0.08
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.71	0.93	-1.85	0.032	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.21	0.93	-1.30	0.098	-0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.02	0.91	-1.12	0.132	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.79	0.97	-0.82	0.207	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.53	0.97	-0.54	0.294	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.03	0.96	-0.03	0.488	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.01	0.96	-0.01	0.497	0.00
Alternative Control	2.61	1.00	2.61	0.009	0.12
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.14.

Treatment effects on social distrust in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.72	1.15	-2.37	0.009	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.93	1.21	-1.60	0.054	-0.07
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.79	1.22	-1.47	0.071	-0.07
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.78	1.23	-1.44	0.075	-0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.46	1.18	-1.24	0.108	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.38	1.21	-0.32	0.376	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.29	1.21	0.24	0.593	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.51	1.18	0.44	0.669	0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.60	1.23	0.49	0.686	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.78	1.21	0.64	0.740	0.03
Alternative Control	1.48	1.19	1.25	0.213	0.05
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.15.

Treatment effects on social distance in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.20	1.16	-1.89	0.029	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.14	1.15	-0.99	0.161	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.84	1.19	-0.71	0.240	-0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.73	1.19	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.52	1.19	-0.44	0.331	-0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.49	1.22	-0.40	0.345	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.05	1.18	-0.04	0.484	0.00
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.75	1.18	0.63	0.737	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.20	1.21	0.99	0.838	0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.42	1.16	1.23	0.890	0.05
Alternative Control	1.81	1.18	1.53	0.127	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.16.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.38	0.95	-2.49	0.006	-0.11
Common National Identity	-2.12	0.95	-2.23	0.013	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.79	0.95	-1.89	0.029	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.36	0.94	-1.45	0.074	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.56	1.01	-0.55	0.290	-0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.39	0.94	-0.42	0.337	-0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.35	0.96	-0.37	0.356	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.12	0.97	-0.12	0.451	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.33	0.98	0.34	0.632	0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.83	0.96	0.86	0.806	0.04
Alternative Control	2.35	0.95	2.47	0.014	0.11
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.17.

Durability of treatments effects on partisan animosity. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
	d	Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Positive Contact Video	-0.53	-0.19	-0.14	36.51	25.97
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.51	-0.21	-0.14	41.85	28.29
Common National Identity	-0.46	-0.19	-0.15	40.82	33.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.45	-0.13	-0.08	28.23	18.51
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.41	-0.14	-0.09	33.10	20.75
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.35	-0.01	-0.03	3.89	9.54
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.30	-0.16	-0.13	53.87	44.86
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.24	-0.05	-0.06	20.19	24.98
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.11	0.00	0.00	-4.34	1.98
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.10	-0.03	0.00	31.57	-3.11
Average	-0.35	-0.11	-0.08	32.02	23.97

Table S9.5.18.

Durability of treatments effects on support for undemocratic practices. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.25	-0.03	-0.03	10.59	13.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.21	-0.04	-0.08	17.54	39.47
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.10	0.03	-0.01	-27.83	11.50
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.09	-0.04	-0.01	39.04	13.46
Common National Identity	-0.07	-0.01	-0.01	9.098	7.34
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.06	0.02	0.01	-36.78	-19.21
Average	-0.13	-0.01	-0.02	7.04	17.03

Table S9.5.19.

Durability of treatments effects on support for partisan violence. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
	d	Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.14	-0.03	-0.01	22.65	7.16
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.10	-0.03	-0.03	26.20	27.80
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.08	-0.03	-0.01	36.37	12.58
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.08	-0.13	-0.08	156.54	106.16
Average	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03	53.06	33.20

Table S9.5.20.

Durability of treatments effects on support for undemocratic candidates. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
	d	Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
		d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.19	-0.09	-0.09	48.69	45.34
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.18	-0.05	-0.07	26.01	39.10
Common National Identity	-0.12	-0.06	-0.03	50.48	23.97
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.11	-0.10	-0.06	93.89	53.97
Positive Contact Video	-0.10	0.02	0.00	-21.73	0.84
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	65.31	32.13
Average	-0.13	-0.05	-0.04	42.49	34.81

Table S9.5.21.

Durability of treatments effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
	d	Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
		d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.11	-0.11	-0.05	101.90	41.52
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.1	0.03	0.00	-28.03	0.25
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.08	-0.10	-0.08	118.79	96.10
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.07	-0.01	0.00	12.60	1.90
Positive Contact Video	-0.07	0.042	-0.02	-59.36	33.74
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.06	-0.12	-0.08	201.79	134.85
Average	-0.08	-0.04	-0.04	52.93	45.74

Table S9.5.22.

Durability of treatments effects on social distrust. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey d	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered d	Large N d	Preregistered % of Main Survey Effect	Large N % of Main Survey Effect
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.15	-0.02	-0.01	15.80	9.29
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.14	-0.09	-0.07	61.60	50.27
Common National Identity	-0.14	-0.04	-0.10	27.13	70.83
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.11	0.00	-0.05	-3.85	48.46
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.09	-0.03	-0.06	35.73	71.90
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	34.97	72.41
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.07	0.04	0.03	-52.54	-40.50
Positive Contact Video	-0.06	0.00	0.01	-7.30	-17.30
Average	-0.11	-0.02	-0.04	19.55	38.58

Table S9.5.23.

Durability of treatments effects on social distance. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey d	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered d	Large N d	Preregistered % of Main Survey Effect	Large N % of Main Survey Effect
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.14	-0.08	-0.03	55.48	18.85
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.13	-0.02	-0.02	11.84	13.62
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.12	-0.12	-0.08	97.43	66.53
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.10	-0.01	-0.03	6.98	30.59
Common National Identity	-0.09	-0.01	-0.04	10.12	45.81
Positive Contact Video	-0.08	0.05	0.04	-67.59	-54.27
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.07	0.05	0.00	-64.67	2.51
Average	-0.10	-0.02	-0.02	17.36	21.11

Table S9.5.24.

Durability of treatments effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. Only treatments with significant effects in the main survey were included in this analysis.

Treatment	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
	d	Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Common National Identity	-0.13	-0.13	-0.10	97.35	73.48
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.10	-0.13	-0.08	130.98	80.81
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.10	-0.11	-0.11	108.99	107.42
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.09	-0.09	-0.02	103.13	17.76
Average	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07	109.37	71.37

Table S9.5.25.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.81	1.58	-3.05	0.001	-0.23
Positive Contact Video	-4.39	1.61	-2.73	0.003	-0.21
Common National Identity	-4.27	1.52	-2.81	0.002	-0.20
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.72	1.53	-2.44	0.007	-0.18
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.18	1.53	-2.08	0.019	-0.15
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.00	1.59	-1.89	0.029	-0.14
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.35	1.60	-0.84	0.200	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.99	1.54	-0.64	0.260	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.61	1.54	-0.40	0.346	-0.03
Null Control	-0.33	1.21	-0.27	0.788	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.23	1.48	-0.15	0.439	-0.01
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.26.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.85	1.65	-1.12	0.131	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.81	1.54	-1.17	0.120	-0.08
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.61	1.64	-0.99	0.162	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.15	1.61	-0.72	0.237	-0.05
Null Control	-1.01	1.29	-0.78	0.435	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.89	1.65	-0.54	0.295	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.50	1.64	-0.31	0.380	-0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.37	1.58	-0.23	0.408	-0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.23	1.65	0.14	0.555	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.33	1.71	0.19	0.577	0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.49	1.70	0.29	0.613	0.02
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.27.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.98	1.24	-2.41	0.008	-0.16
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.25	1.38	-0.91	0.182	-0.07
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.20	1.44	-0.84	0.202	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.15	1.37	-0.84	0.200	-0.06
Common National Identity	-0.75	1.42	-0.53	0.299	-0.04
Null Control	-0.67	1.12	-0.59	0.554	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.34	1.41	-0.24	0.404	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.31	1.50	-0.21	0.419	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.14	1.45	0.10	0.540	0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.26	1.54	0.17	0.566	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.26	1.53	0.17	0.567	0.01
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.28.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.40	1.75	-2.51	0.006	-0.18
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.14	1.68	-2.47	0.007	-0.17
Common National Identity	-3.36	1.70	-1.98	0.024	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.03	1.76	-1.72	0.043	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.00	1.73	-1.73	0.042	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.95	1.70	-1.74	0.041	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.16	1.69	-1.28	0.101	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.06	1.69	-1.21	0.112	-0.08
Null Control	-1.89	1.35	-1.40	0.163	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.36	1.85	-0.74	0.230	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.22	1.73	-0.70	0.241	-0.05
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.29.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-5.90	1.63	-3.62	<.001	-0.27
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-5.70	1.59	-3.58	<.001	-0.26
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-5.32	1.60	-3.32	<.001	-0.24
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-4.77	1.68	-2.84	0.002	-0.21
Common National Identity	-4.39	1.74	-2.53	0.006	-0.20
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-3.85	1.72	-2.24	0.012	-0.17
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.68	1.77	-2.09	0.018	-0.17
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.40	1.63	-2.08	0.019	-0.15
Null Control	-3.20	1.35	-2.37	0.018	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.51	1.74	-1.45	0.074	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.27	1.88	-1.21	0.113	-0.10
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.30.

Treatment effects on social distrust in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.72	2.00	-2.36	0.009	-0.17
Common National Identity	-3.39	2.04	-1.66	0.048	-0.12
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.23	2.09	-1.54	0.061	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.21	2.04	-1.58	0.058	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.99	2.14	-1.40	0.081	-0.11
Null Control	-2.34	1.65	-1.42	0.156	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-2.22	2.08	-1.07	0.143	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.22	2.04	-1.09	0.138	-0.08
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.33	2.13	-0.62	0.267	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.11	2.10	0.05	0.520	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.57	2.00	0.29	0.613	0.02
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.31.

Treatment effects on social distance in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.95	2.13	-1.86	0.032	-0.14
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.88	1.99	-1.44	0.074	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.08	2.01	-1.03	0.151	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.17	2.06	-0.57	0.286	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.99	2.01	-0.50	0.310	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.94	2.02	-0.46	0.322	-0.03
Null Control	-0.74	1.62	-0.46	0.646	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.27	2.03	0.13	0.553	0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.50	2.01	0.25	0.598	0.02
Positive Contact Video	0.74	2.05	0.36	0.641	0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.02	2.18	0.47	0.680	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.32.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity in the durability test (same strategy as for the preregistered analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.19	1.61	-1.98	0.024	-0.14
Common National Identity	-3.09	1.69	-1.83	0.034	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.70	1.60	-1.69	0.045	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.34	1.66	-1.41	0.079	-0.10
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.79	1.72	-1.04	0.150	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.74	1.60	-1.08	0.139	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.46	1.59	-0.92	0.180	-0.07
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.44	1.61	-0.89	0.186	-0.06
Null Control	-0.27	1.28	-0.21	0.834	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.34	1.66	0.20	0.581	0.02
Positive Contact Video	1.23	1.71	0.72	0.765	0.06
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.33.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-5.29	1.16	-4.56	<.001	-0.25
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-5.13	1.15	-4.45	<.001	-0.24
Positive Contact Video	-4.99	1.16	-4.31	<.001	-0.24
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.92	1.14	-4.32	<.001	-0.23
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.88	1.16	-3.36	<.001	-0.18
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.84	1.14	-3.38	<.001	-0.18
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.35	1.15	-2.90	0.002	-0.16
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-2.79	1.13	-2.47	0.007	-0.13
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.14	1.14	-1.88	0.030	-0.10
Null Control	-2.09	0.88	-2.37	0.018	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.03	1.15	-1.76	0.039	-0.10
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.34.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.89	1.21	-2.39	0.008	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.73	1.27	-1.37	0.085	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.26	1.22	-1.04	0.150	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.25	1.23	-1.01	0.156	-0.05
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.25	1.21	-1.03	0.151	-0.05
Common National Identity	-1.10	1.19	-0.93	0.177	-0.05
Null Control	-0.98	0.94	-1.04	0.297	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.72	1.23	-0.58	0.280	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.72	1.23	-0.58	0.279	-0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.32	1.23	-0.26	0.398	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.05	1.23	-0.04	0.483	0.00
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.35.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.56	0.92	-1.70	0.045	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.51	0.98	-0.52	0.301	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.18	1.01	-0.18	0.428	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.18	0.97	-0.19	0.425	-0.01
Null Control	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.998	0.00
Common National Identity	0.13	0.98	0.14	0.554	0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.20	1.00	0.20	0.578	0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.21	0.99	0.21	0.582	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.26	1.01	0.26	0.603	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.87	1.01	0.86	0.806	0.05
Positive Contact Video	1.09	1.03	1.06	0.855	0.06
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.36.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.32	1.32	-2.51	0.006	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.94	1.34	-2.20	0.014	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.67	1.32	-2.03	0.021	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.13	1.33	-1.60	0.055	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.93	1.29	-1.49	0.068	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.78	1.35	-1.32	0.094	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.44	1.28	-1.13	0.129	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.25	1.31	-0.96	0.169	-0.05
Null Control	-1.23	1.02	-1.21	0.227	-0.05
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.12	1.31	-0.86	0.196	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.03	1.28	-0.81	0.210	-0.04
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.37.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.43	1.27	-3.49	<.001	-0.20
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-4.42	1.25	-3.54	<.001	-0.20
Common National Identity	-4.39	1.25	-3.51	<.001	-0.20
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-4.33	1.24	-3.48	<.001	-0.19
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-3.82	1.25	-3.06	0.001	-0.17
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.63	1.23	-2.95	0.002	-0.16
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-3.41	1.28	-2.67	0.004	-0.15
Positive Contact Video	-3.14	1.28	-2.46	0.007	-0.14
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.64	1.27	-2.09	0.019	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.62	1.27	-2.06	0.020	-0.12
Null Control	-2.61	1.00	-2.61	0.009	-0.12
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.38.

Treatment effects on social distrust in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-4.20	1.50	-2.80	0.003	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.41	1.54	-2.21	0.014	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.27	1.56	-2.10	0.018	-0.12
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.26	1.57	-2.08	0.019	-0.12
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.94	1.53	-1.93	0.027	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.86	1.55	-1.20	0.115	-0.07
Null Control	-1.48	1.19	-1.25	0.213	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-1.19	1.55	-0.77	0.221	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.97	1.52	-0.63	0.263	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.88	1.56	-0.57	0.286	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.70	1.55	-0.45	0.326	-0.03
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.39.

Treatment effects on social distance in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-4.01	1.52	-2.64	0.004	-0.15
Common National Identity	-2.94	1.51	-1.95	0.025	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.65	1.54	-1.72	0.043	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.54	1.54	-1.65	0.050	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.33	1.54	-1.51	0.065	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.30	1.57	-1.47	0.071	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.86	1.53	-1.21	0.112	-0.07
Null Control	-1.81	1.18	-1.53	0.127	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.06	1.53	-0.69	0.245	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.61	1.55	-0.39	0.347	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.38	1.52	-0.25	0.400	-0.01
Includes controls					

Table S9.5.40.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts in the durability test (larger sample size analysis). The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.73	1.23	-3.83	<.001	-0.21
Common National Identity	-4.47	1.23	-3.64	<.001	-0.20
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.15	1.23	-3.37	<.001	-0.19
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.72	1.22	-3.04	0.001	-0.17
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-2.91	1.28	-2.28	0.011	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.75	1.22	-2.25	0.012	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.71	1.24	-2.19	0.014	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.47	1.25	-1.98	0.024	-0.11
Null Control	-2.35	0.95	-2.47	0.014	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.02	1.26	-1.61	0.054	-0.09
Positive Contact Video	-1.52	1.24	-1.23	0.109	-0.07
Includes controls					

Table S11.1.

Effect size correlations across the 25 treatments, relative to the alternative control condition. The effect sizes were calculated in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.25	-0.02	0.56	0.60	0.73	0.71	0.45
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.25	1.00	0.27	0.75	0.50	0.31	0.40	0.34
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.02	0.27	1.00	-0.04	0.16	-0.24	0.13	-0.13
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.56	0.75	-0.04	1.00	0.61	0.57	0.49	0.54
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.60	0.50	0.16	0.61	1.00	0.43	0.68	0.53
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.73	0.31	-0.24	0.57	0.43	1.00	0.58	0.55
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.40	0.13	0.49	0.68	0.58	1.00	0.50
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.45	0.34	-0.13	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.50	1.00

Table S11.2.

Effect size correlations across 24 treatments, without the Democratic Collapse Threat treatment, relative to the null control condition. The effect sizes were calculated in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.28	-0.02	0.64	0.61	0.75	0.71	0.46
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.28	1.00	0.68	0.67	0.47	0.24	0.41	0.33
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.02	0.68	1.00	0.27	0.31	-0.16	0.21	-0.08
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.64	0.67	0.27	1.00	0.60	0.55	0.51	0.56
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.61	0.47	0.31	0.60	1.00	0.41	0.67	0.52
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.75	0.24	-0.16	0.55	0.41	1.00	0.57	0.54
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.41	0.21	0.51	0.67	0.57	1.00	0.49
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.46	0.33	-0.08	0.56	0.52	0.54	0.49	1.00

Table S11.3.

Effect size correlations across the 25 treatments among Democrats, relative to the null control condition. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The effect sizes were calculated in Cohen's *d* for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.16	-0.16	0.49	0.49	0.73	0.71	0.65
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.16	1.00	0.44	0.62	0.33	0.35	0.18	0.15
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.16	0.44	1.00	-0.03	0.25	-0.11	0.03	-0.33
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.49	0.62	-0.03	1.00	0.44	0.54	0.43	0.45
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.49	0.33	0.25	0.44	1.00	0.50	0.52	0.30
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.73	0.35	-0.11	0.54	0.50	1.00	0.66	0.51
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.18	0.03	0.43	0.52	0.66	1.00	0.57
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.65	0.15	-0.33	0.45	0.30	0.51	0.57	1.00

Table S11.4.

Effect size correlations across the 25 treatments among Republicans, relative to the null control condition. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The effect sizes were calculated in Cohen's *d* for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.27	0.03	0.49	0.53	0.51	0.44	0.16
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.27	1.00	0.23	0.75	0.47	0.15	0.51	0.39
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	0.03	0.23	1.00	-0.03	0.06	-0.12	0.13	0.03
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.49	0.75	-0.03	1.00	0.58	0.44	0.45	0.37
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.53	0.47	0.06	0.58	1.00	0.41	0.60	0.53
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.51	0.15	-0.12	0.44	0.41	1.00	0.28	0.38
Social Distance (SDE)	0.44	0.51	0.13	0.45	0.60	0.28	1.00	0.30
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.16	0.39	0.03	0.37	0.53	0.38	0.30	1.00

Table S11.5.

Differences in effect size correlations between Democrats and Republicans.

Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Democrat r	Republican r	z-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.16	0.27	0.38	0.702
Partisan Animosity	Support for Partisan Violence	-0.16	0.03	0.63	0.526
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.49	0.49	0.00	1.000
Partisan Animosity	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.49	0.53	0.18	0.858
Partisan Animosity	Social Distrust	0.73	0.51	1.21	0.225
Partisan Animosity	Social Distance	0.71	0.44	1.38	0.169
Partisan Animosity	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.65	0.16	2.04	0.042
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	0.44	0.23	0.79	0.430
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.62	0.75	0.82	0.411
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.33	0.47	0.55	0.579
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distrust	0.35	0.15	0.71	0.477
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distance	0.18	0.51	1.26	0.207
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.15	0.39	0.86	0.387
Support for Partisan Violence	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	1.000
Support for Partisan Violence	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.25	0.06	0.65	0.517
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distrust	-0.11	-0.12	0.03	0.973
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distance	0.03	0.13	0.33	0.738
Support for Partisan Violence	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.33	0.03	1.24	0.216
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.44	0.58	0.63	0.528
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distrust	0.54	0.44	0.44	0.662
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distance	0.43	0.45	0.08	0.934
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.45	0.37	0.32	0.749
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distrust	0.50	0.41	0.38	0.706

Table S11.5. (continued)

Differences in effect size correlations between Democrats and Republicans.

Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Democrat r	Republican r	z-value	p-value
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distance	0.52	0.60	0.39	0.698
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.30	0.53	0.93	0.352
Social Distrust	Social Distance	0.66	0.28	1.68	0.094
Social Distrust	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.51	0.38	0.54	0.590
Social Distance	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.57	0.30	1.12	0.262

Table S11.6.

Effect size correlations across the 25 treatments among weakly identified partisans, relative to the null control condition. Only participants whose strength of partisanship was in the lower half of the distribution (median split) were included in these analyses.. The effect sizes were calculated in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.33	0.25	0.50	0.64	0.62	0.74	0.18
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.33	1.00	0.25	0.81	0.51	0.49	0.49	0.55
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	0.25	0.25	1.00	0.08	0.51	0.33	0.44	0.13
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.50	0.81	0.08	1.00	0.46	0.51	0.52	0.57
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.64	0.51	0.51	0.46	1.00	0.60	0.75	0.55
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.62	0.49	0.33	0.51	0.60	1.00	0.51	0.21
Social Distance (SDE)	0.74	0.49	0.44	0.52	0.75	0.51	1.00	0.43
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.18	0.55	0.13	0.57	0.55	0.21	0.43	1.00

Table S11.7.

Effect size correlations across the 25 treatments among strongly identified partisans, relative to the null control condition. Only participants whose strength of partisanship was in the upper half of the distribution (median split) were included in these analyses.. The effect sizes were calculated in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.19	-0.15	0.53	0.49	0.63	0.64	0.56
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.19	1.00	0.36	0.59	0.48	0.20	0.25	0.10
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.15	0.36	1.00	-0.02	0.04	-0.47	-0.14	-0.35
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.53	0.59	-0.02	1.00	0.65	0.36	0.39	0.43
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.49	0.48	0.04	0.65	1.00	0.31	0.54	0.30
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.63	0.20	-0.47	0.36	0.31	1.00	0.62	0.68
Social Distance (SDE)	0.64	0.25	-0.14	0.39	0.54	0.62	1.00	0.53
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.56	0.10	-0.35	0.43	0.30	0.68	0.53	1.00

Table S11.8.

Differences in effect size correlations between weakly and strongly identified partisans.

Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Weakly identified partisans r	Strongly identified partisans r	z-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.33	0.19	0.50	0.618
Partisan Animosity	Support for Partisan Violence	0.25	-0.15	1.35	0.178
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.50	0.53	0.14	0.892
Partisan Animosity	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.64	0.49	0.74	0.461
Partisan Animosity	Social Distrust	0.62	0.63	0.05	0.957
Partisan Animosity	Social Distance	0.74	0.64	0.64	0.524
Partisan Animosity	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.18	0.56	1.50	0.135
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	0.25	0.36	0.40	0.687
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.81	0.59	1.49	0.136
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.51	0.48	0.13	0.895
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distrust	0.49	0.20	1.11	0.269
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distance	0.49	0.25	0.93	0.352
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.55	0.10	1.72	0.086
Support for Partisan Violence	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.08	-0.02	0.33	0.740
Support for Partisan Violence	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.51	0.04	1.73	0.083
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distrust	0.33	-0.47	2.83	0.005
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distance	0.44	-0.14	2.03	0.042
Support for Partisan Violence	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.13	-0.35	1.65	0.100
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.46	0.65	0.92	0.357
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distrust	0.51	0.36	0.62	0.538
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distance	0.52	0.39	0.55	0.585
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.57	0.43	0.62	0.534

Table S11.8. (continued)

Differences in effect size correlations between weakly and strongly identified partisans.

Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Weakly identified partisans r	Strongly identified partisans r	z-value	p-value
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distrust	0.60	0.31	1.24	0.217
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distance	0.75	0.54	1.22	0.221
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.55	0.30	1.02	0.306
Social Distrust	Social Distance	0.51	0.62	0.54	0.590
Social Distrust	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.21	0.68	2.04	0.041
Social Distance	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.43	0.53	0.43	0.666

Table S11.9.

Effect size correlations for the eight outcomes and the potential mediators across the 25 treatments, relative to the null control condition. The effect sizes were calculated in Cohen's d for each of the outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF	PD	PSI	ANG	LEM	LUN	PTH
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.25	-0.02	0.56	0.60	0.73	0.71	0.45	0.88	0.65	0.76	0.90	0.30	0.70
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.25	1.00	0.27	0.75	0.50	0.31	0.40	0.34	0.26	-0.06	0.36	0.23	0.43	0.28
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.02	0.27	1.00	-0.04	0.16	-0.24	0.13	-0.13	-0.06	0.12	0.23	-0.14	0.13	0.13
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.56	0.75	-0.04	1.00	0.61	0.57	0.49	0.54	0.56	0.20	0.53	0.53	0.47	0.54
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.60	0.50	0.16	0.61	1.00	0.43	0.68	0.53	0.58	0.34	0.56	0.58	0.69	0.43
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.73	0.31	-0.24	0.57	0.43	1.00	0.58	0.55	0.80	0.35	0.65	0.77	0.30	0.59
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.40	0.13	0.49	0.68	0.58	1.00	0.50	0.75	0.51	0.81	0.69	0.65	0.61
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.45	0.34	-0.13	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.50	1.00	0.62	0.14	0.54	0.64	0.45	0.48
Perceived Dissimilarity with Outpartisans (PD)	0.88	0.26	-0.06	0.56	0.58	0.80	0.75	0.62	1.00	0.62	0.88	0.91	0.35	0.85
Strength of Partisanship as a Social Identity (PSI)	0.65	-0.06	0.12	0.20	0.34	0.35	0.51	0.14	0.62	1.00	0.57	0.58	0.12	0.59
Anger toward Outpartisans (ANG)	0.76	0.36	0.23	0.53	0.56	0.65	0.81	0.54	0.88	0.57	1.00	0.70	0.46	0.91
Lack of Empathy toward Outpartisans (LEM)	0.90	0.23	-0.14	0.53	0.58	0.77	0.69	0.64	0.91	0.58	0.70	1.00	0.33	0.68
Lack of Unity against a Common Enemy (LUN)	0.30	0.43	0.13	0.47	0.69	0.30	0.65	0.45	0.35	0.12	0.46	0.33	1.00	0.36
Perceived Threat of Outpartisans (PTH)	0.70	0.28	0.13	0.54	0.43	0.59	0.61	0.48	0.85	0.59	0.91	0.68	0.36	1.00

Table S12.0.1.

The definitions of characteristics and the interrater reliability for coding the characteristics for the 25 treatments.

Characteristic	Definition	Spearman Brown Correlation
Referenced PA	The extent to which the treatment has content referencing partisan animosity.	0.78
Referenced SUP	The extent to which the treatment has content referencing undemocratic practices.	0.96
Referenced SPV	The extent to which the treatment has content referencing support for partisan violence.	0.94
Misperception Correction	The extent to which the treatment corrects misperceptions of outpartisans as a whole (not just specific outpartisans).	0.99
Invoked Threat	The extent to which the treatment seeks to make the participant feel threatened.	0.98
Portrayed Contact	The extent to which the treatment shows or creates cross-partisan (or cross-ideological) contact. (Note that contact should be interactional in some way, so not sufficient to merely present a specific out-partisan.)	0.99
Positive Exemplar	The extent to which the treatment describes/portrays one or more outparty exemplars in a positive light.	0.98
Elite Cues	The extent to which the treatment invokes the views/encouragements of influential leaders.	1.00
Common Identity	The extent to which the treatment tries to describe Democrats and Republicans (or other rival political groups) as being part of a common group identity.	0.95
Pragmatism	The extent to which the treatment argues that being pro-democracy, anti-violence, or friendly toward outpartisans has positive consequences for oneself or society.	0.99
Extremist	The extent to which the treatment tries to frame people who are anti-democracy, pro-violence, or hostile toward outpartisans as extremists	0.96
Typicality	The extent to which the treatment tries to portray pro-democratic, anti-violence, or warmth toward outpartisans as typical.	0.98
Production Quality	The extent to which the materials are well-produced.	0.90
Engaging	The extent to which the treatment is easy to pay attention to.	0.88
Video	Whether the treatment contains a video.	-
Submitter Background	Whether the treatment was developed by academics, practitioners, or both.	-
Median Time	The median time participants took to complete the treatment.	-

Table S12.1.1.

Associations between treatments' reference to an outcome and their effect sizes. The extent to which each treatment referenced an outcome was measured as the average of the ratings of two coders, scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). The outcome was the size of the effect of the treatment in Cohen's d.

Outcome	Predictor	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Referenced Partisan Animosity	-0.07	0.02	-3.99	0.001
Partisan Animosity	Referenced Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.00	0.01	-0.04	0.969
Partisan Animosity	Referenced Support for Partisan Violence	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.998
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Referenced Partisan Animosity	-0.01	0.03	-0.4	0.691
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Referenced Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.04	0.01	-3.12	0.005
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Referenced Support for Partisan Violence	-0.01	0.01	-0.94	0.357
Support for Partisan Violence	Referenced Partisan Animosity	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.99
Support for Partisan Violence	Referenced Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.01	0.01	-0.62	0.544
Support for Partisan Violence	Referenced Support for Partisan Violence	0.01	0.01	0.95	0.352

Table S12.2.1.

Associations between the number of strategies treatments used and their effect sizes. The extent to which each treatment utilized nine theoretical strategies was measured as the average of the ratings of two coders, scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). The extent to which each treatment utilized different theoretical strategies was calculated as the sum of the nine ratings. The outcome was the size of the effect of the treatment in Cohen's d.

DV	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	-0.01	0.01	-2.02	0.055
Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.01	0.00	-3.55	0.002
Support for Partisan Violence	0.00	0.00	-1.45	0.159
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.01	0.00	-4.42	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.00	0.00	-2.85	0.009
Social Distrust	0.00	0.00	-1.01	0.321
Social Distance	0.00	0.00	-2.04	0.053
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.00	0.00	-1.79	0.086
Composite of Outcomes	-0.01	0.00	-3.80	0.001

Table S12.3.1.

Associations between treatments's engagingness and their effect sizes. The extent to which each treatment was engaging and had high production equality was measured as the average of the ratings of two coders, scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). We also coded whether the treatment used a video. The extent to which each treatment was engaging was calculated as the average of the three indicators (weighted equally). The outcome was the size of the effect of the treatment in Cohen's d.

DV	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	-0.03	0.03	-1.12	0.273
Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.03	0.01	-2.47	0.021
Support for Partisan Violence	-0.01	0.01	-0.55	0.585
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.02	0.01	-2.21	0.038
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	-0.02	0.01	-3.12	0.005
Social Distrust	0.00	0.01	-0.23	0.819
Social Distance	-0.01	0.01	-1.58	0.127
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.00	0.01	0.37	0.714
Composite of Outcomes	-0.02	0.01	-2.10	0.047

Table S12.4.1.

Associations between treatments's length and their effect sizes. The length of each treatment was measured as the median completion time for all participants who completed the treatment. The outcome was the size of the effect of the treatment in Cohen's d.

DV	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	-0.03	0.01	-3.28	0.003
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.00	0.00	0.38	0.708
Support for Partisan Violence	0.01	0.00	2.71	0.013
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.01	0.00	-1.62	0.120
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.00	0.00	-0.48	0.638
Social Distrust	-0.01	0.00	-3.47	0.002
Social Distance	-0.01	0.00	-1.86	0.075
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.00	0.00	-0.64	0.530
Composite of Outcomes	-0.01	0.01	-1.84	0.079

Table S12.5.1.

Associations between the background of the submitters of the treatments and the treatments' effect sizes. The background of the submitters of a treatment was categorized as academic, practitioner, or hybrid (mix of academics and practitioners). 'Academic' was the reference category. The outcome was the size of the effect of the treatment in Cohen's d.

Outcome	Predictor	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.01	0.05	0.23	0.819
Partisan Animosity	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.12	0.08	-1.46	0.159
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.04	0.02	2.11	0.046
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.02	0.04	-0.65	0.524
Support for Partisan Violence	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.01	0.02	0.3	0.764
Support for Partisan Violence	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.03	0.04	-0.65	0.525
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Practitioner (vs Academic)	-0.01	0.02	-0.32	0.748
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Hybrid (vs Academic)	0.01	0.03	0.33	0.744
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.02	0.03	0.84	0.411
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.01	0.05	-0.2	0.847
Social Distrust	Practitioner (vs Academic)	-0.03	0.03	-0.9	0.376
Social Distrust	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.04	0.03	-1.64	0.115
Social Distance	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.06	0.03	1.96	0.062
Social Distance	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.02	0.05	-0.52	0.607
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.952
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Hybrid (vs Academic)	0.03	0.05	0.66	0.516
Composite of Outcomes	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.03	0.02	1	0.326
Composite of Outcomes	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.05	0.07	-0.64	0.532

Table S13.1.1.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-8.69	0.90	-9.62	<.001	-0.44
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-8.45	0.87	-9.68	<.001	-0.42
Common National Identity	-7.42	0.86	-8.61	<.001	-0.37
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-7.26	0.90	-8.04	<.001	-0.36
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-6.39	0.87	-7.32	<.001	-0.32
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-5.26	0.89	-5.94	<.001	-0.26
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.31	0.86	-4.99	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-4.23	0.90	-4.71	<.001	-0.21
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-3.60	0.92	-3.91	<.001	-0.18
Befriending Meditation	-3.46	0.92	-3.75	<.001	-0.17
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-3.44	0.92	-3.73	<.001	-0.17
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.37	0.87	-3.85	<.001	-0.17
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.99	0.88	-3.40	<.001	-0.15
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-2.28	0.88	-2.59	0.005	-0.11
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.66	0.86	-1.94	0.026	-0.08
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.49	0.87	-1.72	0.043	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.20	0.87	-1.39	0.083	-0.06
Democratic System Justification	-0.52	0.87	-0.60	0.274	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.38	0.87	-0.44	0.331	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.29	0.88	-0.33	0.372	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.23	0.88	-0.26	0.397	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.01	0.88	0.02	0.506	0.00
Common Economic Interests	0.59	0.88	0.66	0.746	0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.90	0.92	0.98	0.837	0.04
Alternative Control	1.77	0.69	2.57	0.010	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.38	0.87	2.75	0.997	0.12
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.2.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.26	0.97	-5.45	<.001	-0.23
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.24	0.99	-4.27	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.74	0.94	-1.86	0.032	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.66	0.94	-1.77	0.038	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.13	0.96	-1.18	0.119	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.77	0.99	-0.78	0.219	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.49	1.00	-0.49	0.312	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.39	0.96	-0.41	0.341	-0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.09	1.02	-0.09	0.465	0.00
Befriending Meditation	0.10	1.03	0.10	0.538	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.17	0.98	0.18	0.570	0.01
Alternative Control	0.50	0.76	0.66	0.509	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.58	0.99	0.58	0.720	0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.59	0.95	0.62	0.731	0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.79	0.96	0.83	0.796	0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.86	0.97	0.89	0.813	0.04
Democratic System Justification	0.93	0.95	0.98	0.837	0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.08	0.96	1.13	0.871	0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.18	0.97	1.22	0.889	0.05
Party Overlap on Policies	1.20	0.95	1.27	0.897	0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.44	0.95	1.51	0.935	0.06
Common Economic Interests	1.90	1.00	1.89	0.971	0.08
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	2.02	0.99	2.04	0.980	0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	2.12	0.98	2.15	0.984	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.19	0.98	2.24	0.987	0.09
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	2.35	1.00	2.35	0.991	0.10
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.3.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.49	0.80	-4.39	<.001	-0.17
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.71	0.82	-3.31	<.001	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.32	0.85	-2.73	0.003	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.26	0.83	-2.74	0.003	-0.11
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.19	0.89	-2.48	0.007	-0.11
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.64	0.84	-1.95	0.026	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.52	0.91	-1.67	0.047	-0.08
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-1.38	0.83	-1.67	0.048	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.36	0.85	-1.61	0.054	-0.07
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.34	0.84	-1.61	0.054	-0.07
Befriending Meditation	-1.20	0.90	-1.33	0.092	-0.06
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.08	0.85	-1.26	0.104	-0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.92	0.85	-1.08	0.140	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.90	0.86	-1.05	0.147	-0.04
Common Economic Interests	-0.75	0.87	-0.86	0.194	-0.04
Alternative Control	-0.71	0.68	-1.04	0.300	-0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.62	0.85	-0.73	0.232	-0.03
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.50	0.91	-0.55	0.291	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.45	0.88	-0.51	0.306	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.41	0.92	-0.44	0.328	-0.02
Democratic System Justification	-0.37	0.85	-0.43	0.333	-0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.32	0.87	-0.37	0.357	-0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.11	0.88	-0.12	0.451	-0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.05	0.88	0.06	0.523	0.00
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.57	0.91	0.63	0.734	0.03
Democratic Collapse Threat	1.58	0.91	1.75	0.960	0.08
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.4.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.19	1.02	-4.11	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.88	0.98	-3.96	<.001	-0.17
Common National Identity	-2.49	0.96	-2.58	0.005	-0.11
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.4	0.98	-2.46	0.007	-0.10
Positive Contact Video	-2.08	1.00	-2.08	0.019	-0.09
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.35	1.00	-1.35	0.088	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.89	0.98	-0.91	0.182	-0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.83	0.98	-0.85	0.198	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.75	0.97	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.61	1.00	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.54	1.02	-0.53	0.297	-0.02
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.28	0.98	-0.28	0.389	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.11	0.97	-0.12	0.454	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.05	0.99	-0.05	0.478	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.04	0.97	-0.04	0.485	0.00
Alternative Control	0.29	0.76	0.39	0.698	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.68	1.00	0.68	0.750	0.03
Democratic System Justification	0.72	0.97	0.74	0.771	0.03
Befriending Meditation	0.75	1.04	0.73	0.766	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.78	1.01	0.77	0.781	0.03
Common Economic Interests	0.82	0.99	0.83	0.797	0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	0.87	0.96	0.91	0.818	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.08	0.97	1.11	0.866	0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1.09	0.95	1.14	0.873	0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.61	0.98	1.64	0.949	0.07
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.44	0.96	2.54	0.994	0.10
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.5.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.42	0.94	-3.64	<.001	-0.16
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.38	0.95	-3.56	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.67	0.95	-2.81	0.002	-0.12
Positive Contact Video	-2.52	0.99	-2.55	0.005	-0.12
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.51	0.95	-2.64	0.004	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.27	0.96	-2.37	0.009	-0.11
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.07	0.96	-2.16	0.015	-0.10
Common National Identity	-2.05	0.94	-2.18	0.015	-0.09
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.05	0.95	-2.15	0.016	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.84	0.94	-1.96	0.025	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-1.77	0.99	-1.79	0.037	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.72	0.93	-1.84	0.033	-0.08
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.70	0.93	-1.82	0.035	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.28	1.00	-1.27	0.102	-0.06
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.20	0.99	-1.21	0.114	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.17	1.00	-1.17	0.120	-0.05
Alternative Control	-0.97	0.76	-1.28	0.202	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.87	1.01	-0.87	0.193	-0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.85	0.97	-0.87	0.191	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.98	-0.81	0.209	-0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.67	0.97	-0.69	0.246	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.64	0.98	-0.65	0.257	-0.03
Common Economic Interests	-0.51	0.99	-0.51	0.305	-0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.30	0.98	-0.31	0.379	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.71	0.97	0.73	0.767	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.93	0.98	0.96	0.830	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.6.

Treatment effects on social distrust. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.60	1.25	-2.89	0.002	-0.13
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.38	1.23	-2.75	0.003	-0.12
Common National Identity	-3.26	1.20	-2.71	0.003	-0.12
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.02	1.23	-2.45	0.007	-0.11
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.49	1.22	-2.05	0.020	-0.09
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.09	1.23	-1.71	0.044	-0.08
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.01	1.23	-1.64	0.050	-0.07
Befriending Meditation	-1.93	1.28	-1.51	0.066	-0.07
Democratic System Justification	-1.65	1.21	-1.36	0.087	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.38	1.27	-1.08	0.139	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-1.28	1.26	-1.02	0.155	-0.05
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.99	1.22	-0.81	0.209	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.93	1.26	-0.74	0.230	-0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.93	1.21	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.86	1.20	-0.72	0.236	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.79	1.22	-0.65	0.258	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.77	1.28	-0.60	0.275	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.69	1.20	-0.58	0.281	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.6	1.21	-0.50	0.309	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.40	1.25	-0.32	0.376	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.14	1.21	0.12	0.547	0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.20	1.23	0.16	0.565	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.28	1.23	0.23	0.591	0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.28	1.20	0.23	0.592	0.01
Alternative Control	0.45	0.96	0.47	0.640	0.02
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1.37	1.21	1.13	0.871	0.05
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.7.

Treatment effects on social distance. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.93	1.18	-3.32	<.001	-0.15
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.52	1.19	-2.95	0.002	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.23	1.18	-2.74	0.003	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-2.88	1.21	-2.39	0.008	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.81	1.16	-2.43	0.008	-0.1
Common National Identity	-2.42	1.17	-2.07	0.019	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.36	1.17	-2.02	0.022	-0.09
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.34	1.23	-1.91	0.028	-0.09
Positive Contact Video	-2.13	1.21	-1.75	0.040	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.97	1.19	-1.65	0.050	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.82	1.18	-1.54	0.061	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.61	1.17	-1.38	0.084	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.33	1.17	-1.14	0.128	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.72	1.19	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.42	1.21	-0.35	0.363	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.35	1.21	-0.29	0.386	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.28	1.21	-0.23	0.408	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.25	1.21	-0.21	0.417	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.14	1.20	-0.12	0.453	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.08	0.93	-0.08	0.933	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.03	1.16	-0.03	0.489	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.11	1.18	0.09	0.538	0.00
Democratic System Justification	0.14	1.19	0.12	0.549	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.88	1.18	0.75	0.772	0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.97	1.17	0.83	0.798	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.13	1.20	0.95	0.828	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.8.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.81	0.92	-3.07	0.001	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.28	0.92	-2.47	0.007	-0.11
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.09	0.94	-2.23	0.013	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.87	0.95	-1.97	0.025	-0.09
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.40	0.97	-1.45	0.074	-0.07
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.26	0.99	-1.28	0.101	-0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.08	0.94	-1.15	0.124	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.98	0.92	-1.06	0.144	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.74	0.93	-0.80	0.213	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.55	0.90	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.55	0.94	-0.59	0.278	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.31	0.97	-0.32	0.375	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.19	0.98	-0.19	0.424	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.16	0.96	-0.17	0.433	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.11	0.94	-0.12	0.454	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.05	0.73	-0.07	0.943	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.07	0.92	0.08	0.532	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.15	0.94	0.16	0.563	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.17	0.92	0.18	0.572	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.20	0.95	0.21	0.585	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.20	0.92	0.22	0.585	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.29	0.93	0.31	0.623	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.29	0.92	0.32	0.625	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.36	0.92	0.40	0.654	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.40	1.00	0.40	0.655	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	2.13	0.92	2.31	0.990	0.10
Includes controls					

Table S13.1.9.

Treatment effects on the composite of the eight outcomes. The reference category for condition is the alternative control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.16	0.54	-5.81	<.001	-0.25
Common National Identity	-2.97	0.54	-5.54	<.001	-0.24
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.73	0.54	-5.03	<.001	-0.22
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.68	0.53	-5.03	<.001	-0.21
Positive Contact Video	-2.42	0.55	-4.39	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.42	0.54	-4.50	<.001	-0.19
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.19	0.55	-3.98	<.001	-0.18
Befriending Meditation	-1.38	0.55	-2.48	0.007	-0.11
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.30	0.57	-2.28	0.011	-0.10
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.99	0.56	-1.75	0.040	-0.08
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.93	0.53	-1.74	0.041	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.90	0.54	-1.67	0.048	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.78	0.53	-1.46	0.072	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.67	0.53	-1.28	0.100	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.66	0.54	-1.23	0.109	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.65	0.54	-1.22	0.111	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.48	0.53	-0.91	0.180	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.31	0.55	-0.56	0.288	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.30	0.54	-0.55	0.290	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.17	0.56	-0.30	0.381	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.07	0.55	-0.14	0.446	-0.01
Alternative Control	0.15	0.43	0.35	0.727	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.28	0.54	0.52	0.699	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.36	0.54	0.66	0.744	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.39	0.54	0.72	0.763	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.63	0.54	1.18	0.882	0.05
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.1.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for partisan animosity. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,552	97.6%	50	0.9%	89	1.6%
Alternative Control	1,133	981	86.6%	66	5.8%	86	7.6%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	876	77.0%	125	11.0%	137	12.0%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,025	90.6%	49	4.3%	57	5.0%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	962	84.8%	73	6.4%	99	8.7%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,069	93.6%	27	2.4%	46	4.0%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	892	77.8%	109	9.5%	146	12.7%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,084	95.7%	18	1.6%	31	2.7%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,022	90.0%	50	4.4%	63	5.6%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	1,008	89.0%	56	4.9%	68	6.0%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	896	78.7%	113	9.9%	130	11.4%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	995	87.4%	69	6.1%	74	6.5%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,079	95.8%	16	1.4%	31	2.8%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,070	93.9%	28	2.5%	41	3.6%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	868	76.5%	116	10.2%	150	13.2%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	988	86.4%	68	5.9%	88	7.7%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,083	95.3%	17	1.5%	36	3.2%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,079	94.3%	23	2.0%	42	3.7%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,051	92.8%	31	2.7%	51	4.5%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,028	90.7%	52	4.6%	54	4.8%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	1,010	88.9%	64	5.6%	62	5.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	984	86.3%	68	6.0%	88	7.7%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,073	94.6%	16	1.4%	45	4.0%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,053	92.4%	27	2.4%	60	5.3%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,092	95.8%	19	1.7%	29	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,099	95.9%	19	1.7%	28	2.4%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	916	80.8%	93	8.2%	124	10.9%
Total	35,252	31,835	90.3%	1,462	4.1%	1,955	5.5%

Table S13.2.2.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for support for undemocratic practices. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,556	97.6%	47	0.8%	88	1.5%
Alternative Control	1,133	980	86.5%	65	5.7%	88	7.8%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	873	76.7%	130	11.4%	135	11.9%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,027	90.8%	49	4.3%	55	4.9%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	963	84.9%	72	6.3%	99	8.7%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,070	93.7%	26	2.3%	46	4.0%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	895	78.0%	114	9.9%	138	12.0%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,091	96.3%	15	1.3%	27	2.4%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,026	90.4%	47	4.1%	62	5.5%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	1,006	88.9%	56	4.9%	70	6.2%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	898	78.8%	112	9.8%	129	11.3%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	997	87.6%	72	6.3%	69	6.1%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,083	96.2%	15	1.3%	28	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,068	93.8%	27	2.4%	44	3.9%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	869	76.6%	113	10.0%	152	13.4%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	982	85.8%	69	6.0%	93	8.1%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,082	95.2%	16	1.4%	38	3.3%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,077	94.1%	22	1.9%	45	3.9%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,045	92.2%	31	2.7%	57	5.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,029	90.7%	49	4.3%	56	4.9%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	1,010	88.9%	63	5.5%	63	5.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	984	86.3%	70	6.1%	86	7.5%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,078	95.1%	18	1.6%	38	3.4%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,052	92.3%	28	2.5%	60	5.3%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,093	95.9%	17	1.5%	30	2.6%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,106	96.5%	18	1.6%	22	1.9%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	916	80.8%	95	8.4%	122	10.8%
Total	35,252	31,856	90.4%	1,456	4.1%	1,940	5.5%

Table S13.2.3.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for support for partisan violence. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,556	97.6%	44	0.8%	91	1.6%
Alternative Control	1,133	977	86.2%	72	6.4%	84	7.4%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	876	77.0%	127	11.2%	135	11.9%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,026	90.7%	50	4.4%	55	4.9%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	963	84.9%	74	6.5%	97	8.6%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,068	93.5%	28	2.5%	46	4.0%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	893	77.9%	114	9.9%	140	12.2%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,089	96.1%	18	1.6%	26	2.3%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,025	90.3%	48	4.2%	62	5.5%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	1,003	88.6%	56	4.9%	73	6.4%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	896	78.7%	109	9.6%	134	11.8%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	1,000	87.9%	70	6.2%	68	6.0%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,081	96.0%	17	1.5%	28	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,067	93.7%	24	2.1%	48	4.2%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	866	76.4%	115	10.1%	153	13.5%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	983	85.9%	70	6.1%	91	8.0%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,086	95.6%	16	1.4%	34	3.0%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,082	94.6%	25	2.2%	37	3.2%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,045	92.2%	31	2.7%	57	5.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,025	90.4%	50	4.4%	59	5.2%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	1,012	89.1%	62	5.5%	62	5.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	979	85.9%	67	5.9%	94	8.2%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,079	95.1%	15	1.3%	40	3.5%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,049	92.0%	27	2.4%	64	5.6%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,094	96.0%	18	1.6%	28	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,100	96.0%	19	1.7%	27	2.4%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	917	80.9%	95	8.4%	121	10.7%
Total	35,252	31,837	90.3%	1,461	4.1%	1,954	5.5%

Table S13.2.4.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for support for undemocratic candidates. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey.

Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,463	96.0%	0	0.0%	228	4.0%
Alternative Control	1,133	966	85.3%	0	0.0%	167	14.7%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	870	76.4%	0	0.0%	268	23.6%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,013	89.6%	0	0.0%	118	10.4%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	948	83.6%	0	0.0%	186	16.4%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,061	92.9%	0	0.0%	81	7.1%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	886	77.2%	0	0.0%	261	22.8%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,077	95.1%	0	0.0%	56	4.9%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,013	89.3%	0	0.0%	122	10.7%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	998	88.2%	0	0.0%	134	11.8%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	890	78.1%	0	0.0%	249	21.9%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	983	86.4%	0	0.0%	155	13.6%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,063	94.4%	0	0.0%	63	5.6%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,056	92.7%	0	0.0%	83	7.3%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	862	76.0%	0	0.0%	272	24.0%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	983	85.9%	0	0.0%	161	14.1%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,075	94.6%	0	0.0%	61	5.4%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,066	93.2%	0	0.0%	78	6.8%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,036	91.4%	0	0.0%	97	8.6%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,017	89.7%	0	0.0%	117	10.3%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	999	87.9%	0	0.0%	137	12.1%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	971	85.2%	0	0.0%	169	14.8%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,060	93.5%	0	0.0%	74	6.5%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,045	91.7%	0	0.0%	95	8.3%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,076	94.4%	0	0.0%	64	5.6%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,085	94.7%	0	0.0%	61	5.3%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	908	80.1%	0	0.0%	225	19.9%
Total	35,252	31,470	89.3%	0	0.0%	3,782	10.7%

Table S13.2.5.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for opposition to bipartisan cooperation. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,402	94.9%	0	0.0%	289	5.1%
Alternative Control	1,133	960	84.7%	0	0.0%	173	15.3%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	865	76.0%	0	0.0%	273	24.0%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,010	89.3%	0	0.0%	121	10.7%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	940	82.9%	0	0.0%	194	17.1%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,053	92.2%	0	0.0%	89	7.8%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	882	76.9%	0	0.0%	265	23.1%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,071	94.5%	0	0.0%	62	5.5%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,005	88.5%	0	0.0%	130	11.5%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	989	87.4%	0	0.0%	143	12.6%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	888	78.0%	0	0.0%	251	22.0%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	975	85.7%	0	0.0%	163	14.3%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,057	93.9%	0	0.0%	69	6.1%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,046	91.8%	0	0.0%	93	8.2%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	858	75.7%	0	0.0%	276	24.3%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	976	85.3%	0	0.0%	168	14.7%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,068	94.0%	0	0.0%	68	6.0%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,061	92.7%	0	0.0%	83	7.3%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,034	91.3%	0	0.0%	99	8.7%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,011	89.2%	0	0.0%	123	10.8%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	994	87.5%	0	0.0%	142	12.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	964	84.6%	0	0.0%	176	15.4%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,052	92.8%	0	0.0%	82	7.2%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,037	91.0%	0	0.0%	103	9.0%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,066	93.5%	0	0.0%	74	6.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,079	94.2%	0	0.0%	67	5.8%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	896	79.1%	0	0.0%	237	20.9%
Total	35,252	31,239	88.6%	0	0.0%	4,013	11.4%

Table S13.2.6.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for social distrust. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,405	95.0%	0	0.0%	286	5.0%
Alternative Control	1,133	962	84.9%	0	0.0%	171	15.1%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	864	75.9%	0	0.0%	274	24.1%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,013	89.6%	0	0.0%	118	10.4%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	937	82.6%	0	0.0%	197	17.4%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,052	92.1%	0	0.0%	90	7.9%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	880	76.7%	0	0.0%	267	23.3%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,073	94.7%	0	0.0%	60	5.3%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,009	88.9%	0	0.0%	126	11.1%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	990	87.5%	0	0.0%	142	12.5%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	885	77.7%	0	0.0%	254	22.3%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	976	85.8%	0	0.0%	162	14.2%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,053	93.5%	0	0.0%	73	6.5%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,047	91.9%	0	0.0%	92	8.1%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	855	75.4%	0	0.0%	279	24.6%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	975	85.2%	0	0.0%	169	14.8%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,069	94.1%	0	0.0%	67	5.9%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,057	92.4%	0	0.0%	87	7.6%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,034	91.3%	0	0.0%	99	8.7%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,015	89.5%	0	0.0%	119	10.5%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	994	87.5%	0	0.0%	142	12.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	964	84.6%	0	0.0%	176	15.4%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,052	92.8%	0	0.0%	82	7.2%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,039	91.1%	0	0.0%	101	8.9%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,066	93.5%	0	0.0%	74	6.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,083	94.5%	0	0.0%	63	5.5%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	898	79.3%	0	0.0%	235	20.7%
Total	35,252	31,247	88.6%	0	0.0%	4,005	11.4%

Table S13.2.7.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for social distance. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,401	94.9%	0	0.0%	290	5.1%
Alternative Control	1,133	960	84.7%	0	0.0%	173	15.3%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	866	76.1%	0	0.0%	272	23.9%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,013	89.6%	0	0.0%	118	10.4%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	938	82.7%	0	0.0%	196	17.3%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,052	92.1%	0	0.0%	90	7.9%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	878	76.5%	0	0.0%	269	23.5%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,070	94.4%	0	0.0%	63	5.6%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,009	88.9%	0	0.0%	126	11.1%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	989	87.4%	0	0.0%	143	12.6%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	886	77.8%	0	0.0%	253	22.2%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	974	85.6%	0	0.0%	164	14.4%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,054	93.6%	0	0.0%	72	6.4%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,044	91.7%	0	0.0%	95	8.3%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	856	75.5%	0	0.0%	278	24.5%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	974	85.1%	0	0.0%	170	14.9%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,069	94.1%	0	0.0%	67	5.9%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,059	92.6%	0	0.0%	85	7.4%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,031	91.0%	0	0.0%	102	9.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,012	89.2%	0	0.0%	122	10.8%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	995	87.6%	0	0.0%	141	12.4%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	965	84.6%	0	0.0%	175	15.4%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,049	92.5%	0	0.0%	85	7.5%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,038	91.1%	0	0.0%	102	8.9%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,065	93.4%	0	0.0%	75	6.6%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,082	94.4%	0	0.0%	64	5.6%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	899	79.3%	0	0.0%	234	20.7%
Total	35,252	31,228	88.6%	0	0.0%	4,024	11.4%

Table S13.2.8.

Attrition rates by experimental condition for biased evaluation of politicized facts. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey.

Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Treatment	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,388	94.7%	0	0.0%	303	5.3%
Alternative Control	1,133	963	85.0%	0	0.0%	170	15.0%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	860	75.6%	0	0.0%	278	24.4%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,012	89.5%	0	0.0%	119	10.5%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	940	82.9%	0	0.0%	194	17.1%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,052	92.1%	0	0.0%	90	7.9%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	877	76.5%	0	0.0%	270	23.5%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,070	94.4%	0	0.0%	63	5.6%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,006	88.6%	0	0.0%	129	11.4%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	988	87.3%	0	0.0%	144	12.7%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	884	77.6%	0	0.0%	255	22.4%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	975	85.7%	0	0.0%	163	14.3%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,052	93.4%	0	0.0%	74	6.6%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,041	91.4%	0	0.0%	98	8.6%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	857	75.6%	0	0.0%	277	24.4%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	974	85.1%	0	0.0%	170	14.9%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,068	94.0%	0	0.0%	68	6.0%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,056	92.3%	0	0.0%	88	7.7%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,031	91.0%	0	0.0%	102	9.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,009	89.0%	0	0.0%	125	11.0%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	993	87.4%	0	0.0%	143	12.6%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	962	84.4%	0	0.0%	178	15.6%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,050	92.6%	0	0.0%	84	7.4%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,035	90.8%	0	0.0%	105	9.2%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,067	93.6%	0	0.0%	73	6.4%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,077	94.0%	0	0.0%	69	6.0%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	899	79.3%	0	0.0%	234	20.7%
Total	35,252	31,186	88.5%	0	0.0%	4,066	11.5%

Table S13.2.9.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.53	0.69	-15.19	<.001	-0.53
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.23	0.65	-15.63	<.001	-0.52
Common National Identity	-9.19	0.64	-14.35	<.001	-0.46
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.02	0.70	-12.98	<.001	-0.45
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.17	0.65	-12.51	<.001	-0.41
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.00	0.67	-10.37	<.001	-0.35
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.06	0.64	-9.44	<.001	-0.30
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.02	0.69	-8.74	<.001	-0.30
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.37	0.71	-7.51	<.001	-0.27
Befriending Meditation	-5.26	0.72	-7.31	<.001	-0.26
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.24	0.72	-7.28	<.001	-0.26
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.17	0.66	-7.88	<.001	-0.26
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.78	0.67	-7.19	<.001	-0.24
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.05	0.66	-6.09	<.001	-0.20
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.41	0.63	-5.39	<.001	-0.17
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.26	0.65	-5.04	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.98	0.65	-4.60	<.001	-0.15
Democratic System Justification	-2.31	0.65	-3.55	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.17	0.64	-3.36	<.001	-0.11
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.07	0.66	-3.12	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.01	0.66	-3.02	0.001	-0.10
Alternative Control	-1.79	0.69	-2.59	0.010	-0.09
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.66	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Common Economic Interests	-1.20	0.67	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.92	0.72	-1.29	0.099	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.61	0.65	0.95	0.828	0.03
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.10.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.77	0.73	-7.93	<.001	-0.25
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.74	0.76	-6.22	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.24	0.69	-3.25	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.17	0.69	-3.15	0.001	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.65	0.72	-2.30	0.011	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.28	0.77	-1.67	0.048	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.04	0.77	-1.35	0.089	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.89	0.71	-1.24	0.107	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.61	0.79	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.51	0.76	-0.67	0.504	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.41	0.81	-0.50	0.309	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.38	0.75	-0.51	0.304	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.07	0.71	0.09	0.537	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.13	0.76	0.17	0.569	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.32	0.74	0.44	0.670	0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.32	0.72	0.45	0.674	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.45	0.71	0.63	0.736	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.59	0.72	0.83	0.796	0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.66	0.73	0.91	0.818	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.69	0.70	0.98	0.836	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.92	0.71	1.31	0.904	0.04
Common Economic Interests	1.39	0.77	1.80	0.964	0.06
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.48	0.75	1.96	0.975	0.06
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.62	0.75	2.15	0.984	0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.67	0.74	2.26	0.988	0.07
Describing a Liable Outpartisan	1.84	0.78	2.37	0.991	0.08
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.11.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.79	0.55	-5.10	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.58	-3.45	<.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.63	0.63	-2.60	0.005	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.55	0.59	-2.61	0.005	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.49	0.68	-2.19	0.014	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.94	0.62	-1.52	0.064	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-0.83	0.71	-1.16	0.122	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.68	0.60	-1.15	0.125	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.66	0.61	-1.09	0.139	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.66	0.62	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.50	0.71	-0.70	0.240	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.37	0.63	-0.59	0.278	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.22	0.62	-0.35	0.362	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.20	0.64	-0.31	0.377	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.04	0.66	-0.06	0.476	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.08	0.63	0.12	0.550	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.18	0.71	0.25	0.598	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.27	0.67	0.40	0.656	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.32	0.73	0.44	0.669	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.34	0.63	0.54	0.705	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.41	0.65	0.64	0.738	0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.58	0.67	0.87	0.807	0.03
Alternative Control	0.70	0.68	1.02	0.307	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.74	0.67	1.12	0.868	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.33	0.71	1.87	0.969	0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	2.26	0.70	3.24	0.999	0.11
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.12.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.49	0.80	-5.62	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.18	0.74	-5.61	<.001	-0.18
Common National Identity	-2.79	0.72	-3.86	<.001	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.71	0.74	-3.65	<.001	-0.12
Positive Contact Video	-2.40	0.77	-3.13	0.001	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.66	0.77	-2.16	0.016	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.20	0.75	-1.60	0.055	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.13	0.74	-1.53	0.062	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.05	0.74	-1.42	0.077	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.96	0.78	-1.23	0.108	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.90	0.80	-1.12	0.132	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.59	0.75	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.44	0.73	-0.60	0.274	-0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.33	0.73	-0.46	0.324	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.31	0.76	-0.41	0.683	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.31	0.75	-0.41	0.340	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.35	0.77	0.46	0.676	0.02
Befriending Meditation	0.39	0.82	0.48	0.683	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.44	0.73	0.60	0.725	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.48	0.78	0.62	0.731	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.51	0.76	0.67	0.750	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.56	0.72	0.78	0.781	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.79	0.74	1.08	0.860	0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.82	0.71	1.16	0.876	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.29	0.75	1.72	0.958	0.06
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.10	0.72	2.91	0.998	0.09
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.13.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation practices without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.46	0.68	-3.6	<.001	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.38	0.70	-3.4	<.001	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.72	0.69	-2.49	0.006	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.68	0.74	-2.26	0.012	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.55	0.70	-2.24	0.013	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.32	0.71	-1.87	0.031	-0.06
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.10	0.70	-1.57	0.059	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.10	0.70	-1.58	0.057	-0.05
Common National Identity	-1.06	0.69	-1.54	0.061	-0.05
Befriending Meditation	-0.92	0.75	-1.23	0.110	-0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.87	0.68	-1.27	0.102	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.75	0.67	-1.11	0.133	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.72	0.68	-1.06	0.144	-0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.31	0.75	-0.41	0.339	-0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.29	0.77	-0.38	0.351	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.23	0.76	-0.31	0.380	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.04	0.77	0.05	0.518	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.11	0.72	0.16	0.563	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.18	0.74	0.24	0.596	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.28	0.72	0.39	0.651	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.31	0.73	0.42	0.662	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.44	0.75	0.58	0.721	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.66	0.74	0.90	0.815	0.03
Alternative Control	0.97	0.76	1.27	0.205	0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.71	0.73	2.34	0.990	0.08
Party Overlap on Policies	1.89	0.73	2.59	0.995	0.09
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.14.

Treatment effects on social distrust without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.02	0.95	-4.23	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.80	0.92	-4.12	<.001	-0.14
Common National Identity	-3.72	0.89	-4.18	<.001	-0.14
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.49	0.93	-3.75	<.001	-0.13
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.99	0.91	-3.29	0.001	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.52	0.93	-2.72	0.003	-0.09
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.43	0.92	-2.64	0.004	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-2.41	0.98	-2.44	0.007	-0.09
Democratic System Justification	-2.09	0.91	-2.31	0.010	-0.08
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.72	0.98	-1.76	0.039	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.70	0.97	-1.76	0.039	-0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.42	0.92	-1.55	0.061	-0.05
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.38	0.96	-1.44	0.076	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.36	0.90	-1.51	0.065	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.33	0.89	-1.49	0.068	-0.05
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.26	0.99	-1.27	0.102	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.24	0.91	-1.36	0.087	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.10	0.88	-1.24	0.107	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.97	0.90	-1.08	0.140	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.84	0.95	-0.89	0.187	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.44	0.96	-0.46	0.646	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.31	0.90	-0.35	0.365	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.24	0.92	-0.26	0.398	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.17	0.93	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.16	0.89	-0.18	0.430	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.93	0.90	1.03	0.848	0.03
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.15.

Treatment effects on social distance without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.89	0.88	-4.43	<.001	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.43	0.90	-3.82	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.18	0.87	-3.64	<.001	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-2.80	0.91	-3.06	0.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.72	0.84	-3.23	0.001	-0.10
Common National Identity	-2.30	0.86	-2.68	0.004	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.27	0.86	-2.64	0.004	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.23	0.94	-2.37	0.009	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-2.05	0.92	-2.23	0.013	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.92	0.89	-2.15	0.016	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.77	0.87	-2.03	0.021	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.58	0.86	-1.84	0.033	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.24	0.86	-1.44	0.075	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.67	0.88	-0.76	0.223	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.34	0.92	-0.37	0.357	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.33	0.92	-0.36	0.361	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.21	0.92	-0.23	0.409	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.13	0.92	-0.14	0.443	0.00
Common Economic Interests	-0.09	0.90	-0.10	0.459	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.522	0.00
Alternative Control	0.06	0.94	0.07	0.947	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.19	0.87	0.21	0.585	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.19	0.89	0.21	0.584	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.96	0.88	1.10	0.864	0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.03	0.86	1.20	0.886	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.20	0.90	1.34	0.909	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.16.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.76	0.68	-4.04	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.20	0.69	-3.19	0.001	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.00	0.71	-2.82	0.002	-0.09
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.80	0.73	-2.46	0.007	-0.08
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.35	0.75	-1.80	0.036	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.12	0.77	-1.45	0.074	-0.05
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.04	0.72	-1.46	0.073	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.92	0.69	-1.33	0.092	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.68	0.70	-0.97	0.167	-0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.53	0.71	-0.75	0.227	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.49	0.67	-0.74	0.230	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.26	0.75	-0.34	0.365	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.16	0.77	-0.20	0.419	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.07	0.72	-0.10	0.460	0.00
Positive Contact Video	-0.04	0.73	-0.06	0.478	0.00
Alternative Control	0.03	0.73	0.05	0.963	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.10	0.68	0.15	0.560	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.21	0.72	0.29	0.613	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.21	0.69	0.30	0.617	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.23	0.72	0.32	0.625	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.27	0.69	0.38	0.649	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.33	0.71	0.46	0.677	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.35	0.69	0.50	0.691	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.41	0.69	0.59	0.723	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.47	0.79	0.59	0.724	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	2.17	0.69	3.13	0.999	0.10
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.17.

Treatment effects on the composite of the eight outcomes without weights. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.29	0.40	-8.14	<.001	-0.26
Common National Identity	-3.11	0.39	-7.90	<.001	-0.25
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.88	0.40	-7.11	<.001	-0.23
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.83	0.39	-7.25	<.001	-0.23
Positive Contact Video	-2.61	0.41	-6.29	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.58	0.40	-6.52	<.001	-0.21
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.36	0.41	-5.70	<.001	-0.19
Befriending Meditation	-1.55	0.42	-3.71	<.001	-0.12
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.44	0.44	-3.27	0.001	-0.12
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.12	0.43	-2.63	0.004	-0.09
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.08	0.39	-2.78	0.003	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.06	0.40	-2.68	0.004	-0.08
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.92	0.39	-2.38	0.009	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.82	0.38	-2.15	0.016	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.82	0.40	-2.05	0.020	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.39	-2.03	0.021	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.62	0.39	-1.62	0.053	-0.05
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.49	0.41	-1.20	0.116	-0.04
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.46	0.40	-1.14	0.127	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.34	0.43	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.23	0.41	-0.55	0.290	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.16	0.43	-0.36	0.715	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.12	0.41	0.30	0.617	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.19	0.40	0.48	0.684	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.24	0.40	0.59	0.722	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.49	0.39	1.24	0.893	0.04
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.18.

Association between being recaptured, compared to non-attriters, and the primary outcomes. Only participants who completed either the main survey or the attriter survey were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that recaptured attriters scored higher on this outcome than non-attriters.

Outcome	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	10.17	0.54	18.93	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.51	0.63	0.80	0.425
Support for Partisan Violence	-1.86	0.47	-3.93	<.001

Table S13.2.19.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity with recaptured attriters. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. Inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-9.07	0.65	-13.92	<.001	-0.45
Positive Contact Video	-8.96	0.67	-13.33	<.001	-0.45
Common National Identity	-8.82	0.64	-13.81	<.001	-0.44
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-8.08	0.68	-11.84	<.001	-0.40
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-7.71	0.65	-11.86	<.001	-0.38
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.82	0.64	-9.11	<.001	-0.29
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-5.74	0.65	-8.80	<.001	-0.28
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-5.65	0.67	-8.38	<.001	-0.28
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-4.84	0.68	-7.14	<.001	-0.24
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-4.84	0.70	-6.89	<.001	-0.24
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.58	0.64	-7.13	<.001	-0.23
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.50	0.65	-6.88	<.001	-0.22
Befriending Meditation	-4.25	0.69	-6.17	<.001	-0.21
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-3.59	0.65	-5.5	<.001	-0.18
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.29	0.63	-5.24	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-3.00	0.64	-4.66	<.001	-0.15
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-2.88	0.64	-4.53	<.001	-0.14
Democratic System Justification	-2.27	0.64	-3.54	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.02	0.64	-3.17	0.001	-0.10
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.99	0.66	-3.01	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.95	0.66	-2.96	0.002	-0.10
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.70	0.66	-2.57	0.005	-0.08
Alternative Control	-1.15	0.67	-1.71	0.088	-0.06
Common Economic Interests	-0.82	0.66	-1.25	0.105	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.30	0.69	-0.43	0.334	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.62	0.64	0.96	0.832	0.03
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.20.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices with recaptured attriters. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. Inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.67	0.73	-7.81	<.001	-0.25
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.37	0.75	-5.84	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.36	0.68	-3.48	<.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.22	0.69	-3.22	0.001	-0.10
Common National Identity	-1.62	0.71	-2.29	0.011	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.92	0.75	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.86	0.73	-1.17	0.122	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.74	0.70	-1.05	0.146	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.59	0.75	-0.78	0.216	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.47	0.76	-0.63	0.266	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.41	0.73	-0.56	0.576	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.18	0.71	0.25	0.600	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.25	0.72	0.34	0.634	0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.40	0.71	0.56	0.713	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.42	0.73	0.57	0.715	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.45	0.70	0.64	0.738	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.52	0.70	0.74	0.772	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.68	0.74	0.93	0.823	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.76	0.70	1.08	0.860	0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.88	0.72	1.22	0.889	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.89	0.70	1.27	0.897	0.04
Common Economic Interests	1.10	0.76	1.46	0.927	0.05
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.50	0.75	1.99	0.977	0.06
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.55	0.74	2.10	0.982	0.07
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.57	0.73	2.15	0.984	0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.59	0.73	2.17	0.985	0.07
Includes controls					

Table S13.2.21.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence with recaptured attriters. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. Inverse probability weighting was used.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.80	0.54	-5.22	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.95	0.58	-3.37	<.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.55	0.58	-2.66	0.004	-0.08
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.55	0.62	-2.51	0.006	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.48	0.63	-2.35	0.009	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.94	0.61	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.72	0.59	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.56	0.61	-0.91	0.180	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.53	0.67	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.45	0.60	-0.76	0.224	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.31	0.61	-0.50	0.309	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.27	0.65	-0.41	0.342	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.25	0.63	-0.40	0.346	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.18	0.61	-0.29	0.386	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.17	0.63	-0.26	0.396	-0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.08	0.62	0.13	0.553	0.00
Democratic System Justification	0.25	0.62	0.40	0.657	0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.37	0.63	0.59	0.723	0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.39	0.69	0.56	0.713	0.02
Alternative Control	0.47	0.65	0.73	0.468	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.53	0.65	0.82	0.793	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.73	0.65	1.12	0.868	0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.74	0.68	1.08	0.861	0.04
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.77	0.65	1.18	0.882	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.23	0.68	1.80	0.964	0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	2.32	0.68	3.39	1.000	0.12
Includes controls					

Table S13.3.1. Significance tests for treatment effects on partisan animosity with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.1.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	3	0.006	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	4	0.008	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	5	0.010	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	<.001	6	0.012	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	7	0.014	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	<.001	8	0.016	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	<.001	9	0.018	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	<.001	10	0.020	Significant
Befriending Meditation	<.001	11	0.022	Significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	<.001	12	0.024	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	13	0.026	Significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	<.001	14	0.028	Significant
Party Overlap on Policies	<.001	15	0.030	Significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	<.001	16	0.032	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	<.001	17	0.034	Significant
Democratic System Justification	<.001	18	0.036	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	<.001	19	0.038	Significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.001	20	0.040	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	21	0.042	Significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.004	22	0.044	Significant
Common Economic Interests	0.038	23	0.046	Significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.112	24	0.048	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.827	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.2. Significance tests for treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.2.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.001	3	0.006	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	4	0.008	Significant
Common National Identity	0.011	5	0.010	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.048	6	0.012	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.099	7	0.014	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.105	8	0.016	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.228	9	0.018	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.310	10	0.020	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.330	11	0.022	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.542	12	0.024	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.548	13	0.026	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.658	14	0.028	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.689	15	0.030	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.730	16	0.032	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.791	17	0.034	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.825	18	0.036	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.840	19	0.038	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.908	20	0.040	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.964	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.978	22	0.044	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.984	23	0.046	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.989	24	0.048	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.992	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.3. Significance tests for treatment effects on support for partisan violence with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.3.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.004	3	0.006	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.005	4	0.008	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.013	5	0.010	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.064	6	0.012	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.122	7	0.014	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.127	8	0.016	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.145	9	0.018	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.145	10	0.020	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.237	11	0.022	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.277	12	0.024	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.366	13	0.026	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.378	14	0.028	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.471	15	0.030	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.551	16	0.032	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.612	17	0.034	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.650	18	0.036	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.660	19	0.038	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.704	20	0.040	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.726	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.815	22	0.044	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.873	23	0.046	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.965	24	0.048	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.4. Significance tests for treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.4.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	3	0.006	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	4	0.008	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.001	5	0.010	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.016	6	0.012	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.056	7	0.014	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.065	8	0.016	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.078	9	0.018	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.122	10	0.020	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.148	11	0.022	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.223	12	0.024	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.288	13	0.026	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.322	14	0.028	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.326	15	0.030	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.689	16	0.032	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.711	17	0.034	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.719	18	0.036	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.732	19	0.038	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.757	20	0.040	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.788	21	0.042	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.856	22	0.044	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.867	23	0.046	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.960	24	0.048	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.5. Significance tests for treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.5.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.007	3	0.006	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.014	4	0.008	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.019	5	0.010	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.034	6	0.012	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.058	7	0.014	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.060	8	0.016	Non-significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.062	9	0.018	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.102	10	0.020	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.133	11	0.022	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.142	12	0.024	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.144	13	0.026	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.347	14	0.028	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.384	15	0.030	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.397	16	0.032	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.551	17	0.034	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.571	18	0.036	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.594	19	0.038	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.664	20	0.040	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.677	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.732	22	0.044	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.820	23	0.046	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.990	24	0.048	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.996	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.6. Significance tests for treatment effects on social distrust with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.6.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	3	0.006	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	<.001	4	0.008	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.001	5	0.010	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.003	6	0.012	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.014	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.008	8	0.016	Significant
Democratic System Justification	0.010	9	0.018	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.031	10	0.020	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.037	11	0.022	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.058	12	0.024	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.062	13	0.026	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.070	14	0.028	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.076	15	0.030	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.087	16	0.032	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.098	17	0.034	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.110	18	0.036	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.121	19	0.038	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.187	20	0.040	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.367	21	0.042	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.394	22	0.044	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.425	23	0.046	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.429	24	0.048	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.847	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.7. Significance tests for treatment effects on social distance with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.7.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	3	0.006	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	4	0.008	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.001	5	0.010	Significant
Common National Identity	0.003	6	0.012	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.014	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.008	8	0.016	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.013	9	0.018	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.017	10	0.020	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.023	11	0.022	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.037	12	0.024	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.074	13	0.026	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.233	14	0.028	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.354	15	0.030	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.383	16	0.032	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.412	17	0.034	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.424	18	0.036	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.473	19	0.038	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.522	20	0.040	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.587	21	0.042	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.600	22	0.044	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.863	23	0.046	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.890	24	0.048	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.911	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.8. Significance tests for treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.8.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common National Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	2	0.004	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.002	3	0.006	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.006	4	0.008	Significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.037	5	0.010	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.060	6	0.012	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.075	7	0.014	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.090	8	0.016	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.163	9	0.018	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.228	10	0.020	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.242	11	0.022	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.367	12	0.024	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.429	13	0.026	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.442	14	0.028	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.469	15	0.030	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.573	16	0.032	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.611	17	0.034	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.625	18	0.036	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.638	19	0.038	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.641	20	0.040	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.687	21	0.042	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.691	22	0.044	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.715	23	0.046	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.728	24	0.048	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.9. Significance tests for treatment effects on the composite of the eight outcomes with critical p-values corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.9.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	2	0.004	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	3	0.006	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	4	0.008	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	5	0.010	Significant
Positive Contact Video	<.001	6	0.012	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	7	0.014	Significant
Befriending Meditation	<.001	8	0.016	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	<.001	9	0.018	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.003	10	0.020	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.004	11	0.022	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.004	12	0.024	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.008	13	0.026	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.015	14	0.028	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.021	15	0.030	Significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.021	16	0.032	Significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.050	17	0.034	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.131	18	0.036	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.134	19	0.038	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.230	20	0.040	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.294	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.632	22	0.044	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.697	23	0.046	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.725	24	0.048	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.891	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.10. Significance tests for treatment effects on partisan animosity with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.1.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	3	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	4	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	5	0.002	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	<.001	6	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	7	0.003	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	<.001	8	0.003	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	<.001	9	0.003	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	<.001	10	0.003	Significant
Befriending Meditation	<.001	11	0.003	Significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	<.001	12	0.004	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	13	0.004	Significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	<.001	14	0.004	Significant
Party Overlap on Policies	<.001	15	0.005	Significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	<.001	16	0.005	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	<.001	17	0.006	Significant
Democratic System Justification	<.001	18	0.006	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	<.001	19	0.007	Significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.001	20	0.008	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	21	0.010	Significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.004	22	0.013	Significant
Common Economic Interests	0.038	23	0.017	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.112	24	0.025	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.827	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.11. Significance tests for treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.2.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.001	3	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	4	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.011	5	0.002	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.048	6	0.002	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.099	7	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.105	8	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.228	9	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.310	10	0.003	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.330	11	0.003	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.542	12	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.548	13	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.658	14	0.004	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.689	15	0.005	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.730	16	0.005	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.791	17	0.006	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.825	18	0.006	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.840	19	0.007	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.908	20	0.008	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.964	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.978	22	0.013	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.984	23	0.017	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.989	24	0.025	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.992	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.12. Significance tests for treatment effects on support for partisan violence with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.3.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.004	3	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.005	4	0.002	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.013	5	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.064	6	0.002	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.122	7	0.003	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.127	8	0.003	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.145	9	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.145	10	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.237	11	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.277	12	0.004	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.366	13	0.004	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.378	14	0.004	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.471	15	0.005	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.551	16	0.005	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.612	17	0.006	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.650	18	0.006	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.660	19	0.007	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.704	20	0.008	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.726	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.815	22	0.013	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.873	23	0.017	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.965	24	0.025	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.13. Significance tests for treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.4.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	3	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	4	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.001	5	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.016	6	0.002	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.056	7	0.003	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.065	8	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.078	9	0.003	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.122	10	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.148	11	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.223	12	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.288	13	0.004	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.322	14	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.326	15	0.005	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.689	16	0.005	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.711	17	0.006	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.719	18	0.006	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.732	19	0.007	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.757	20	0.008	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.788	21	0.010	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.856	22	0.013	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.867	23	0.017	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.960	24	0.025	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.14. Significance tests for treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.5.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.007	3	0.002	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.014	4	0.002	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.019	5	0.002	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.034	6	0.002	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.058	7	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.060	8	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.062	9	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.102	10	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.133	11	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.142	12	0.004	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.144	13	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.347	14	0.004	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.384	15	0.005	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.397	16	0.005	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.551	17	0.006	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.571	18	0.006	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.594	19	0.007	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.664	20	0.008	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.677	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.732	22	0.013	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.820	23	0.017	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.990	24	0.025	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.996	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.15. Significance tests for treatment effects on social distrust with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.6.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	3	0.002	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	<.001	4	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.001	5	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.003	6	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.008	8	0.003	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.010	9	0.003	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.031	10	0.003	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.037	11	0.003	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.058	12	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.062	13	0.004	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.070	14	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.076	15	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.087	16	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.098	17	0.006	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.110	18	0.006	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.121	19	0.007	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.187	20	0.008	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.367	21	0.010	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.394	22	0.013	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.425	23	0.017	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.429	24	0.025	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.847	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.16. Significance tests for treatment effects on social distance with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.7.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	3	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	4	0.002	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.001	5	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.003	6	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.008	8	0.003	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.013	9	0.003	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.017	10	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.023	11	0.003	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.037	12	0.004	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.074	13	0.004	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.233	14	0.004	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.354	15	0.005	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.383	16	0.005	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.412	17	0.006	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.424	18	0.006	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.473	19	0.007	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.522	20	0.008	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.587	21	0.010	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.600	22	0.013	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.863	23	0.017	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.890	24	0.025	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.911	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.17. Significance tests for treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.8.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common National Identity	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	2	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.002	3	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.006	4	0.002	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.037	5	0.002	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.060	6	0.002	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.075	7	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.090	8	0.003	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.163	9	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.228	10	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.242	11	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.367	12	0.004	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.429	13	0.004	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.442	14	0.004	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.469	15	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.573	16	0.005	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.611	17	0.006	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.625	18	0.006	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.638	19	0.007	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.641	20	0.008	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.687	21	0.010	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.691	22	0.013	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.715	23	0.017	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.728	24	0.025	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.3.18. Significance tests for treatment effects on the composite of the eight outcomes with critical p-values corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate. Original p-values are from Table S6.9.

Treatment	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	<.001	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	<.001	2	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	<.001	3	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	<.001	4	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	<.001	5	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	<.001	6	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	<.001	7	0.003	Significant
Befriending Meditation	<.001	8	0.003	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	<.001	9	0.003	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.003	10	0.003	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.004	11	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.004	12	0.004	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.008	13	0.004	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.015	14	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.021	15	0.005	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.021	16	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.050	17	0.006	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.131	18	0.006	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.134	19	0.007	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.230	20	0.008	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.294	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.632	22	0.013	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.697	23	0.017	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.725	24	0.025	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.891	25	0.050	Non-significant

Table S13.4.1.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence (dichotomized). The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was coded as 0 (support for partisan violence less than or equal to 25) or 1 (support for partisan violence more than 25). We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Treatment	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.04	0.01	-3.93	< 0.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.03	0.01	-2.92	0.002	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.02	0.01	-2.36	0.009	-0.07
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.02	0.01	-2.22	0.013	-0.07
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.02	0.01	-1.96	0.025	-0.06
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.01	0.01	-1.17	0.121	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.01	0.01	-1.05	0.147	-0.03
Positive Vicarious Contact	-0.01	0.01	-0.90	0.185	-0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.01	0.01	-0.66	0.254	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	-0.01	0.01	-0.46	0.321	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.00	0.01	-0.40	0.343	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.00	0.01	-0.40	0.343	-0.01
Common National Identity	0.00	0.01	-0.36	0.360	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.00	0.01	-0.18	0.430	-0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.511	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.00	0.01	0.11	0.544	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.00	0.01	0.23	0.592	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.00	0.01	0.30	0.619	0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.01	0.01	0.46	0.679	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.01	0.01	0.68	0.751	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.01	0.01	0.71	0.760	0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.01	0.01	0.80	0.788	0.03
Alternative Control	0.01	0.01	0.95	0.342	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.02	0.01	1.37	0.915	0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.02	0.01	1.84	0.967	0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.04	0.01	3.39	> 0.999	0.12
Includes controls					

Table S13.5.1.

Treatment effects on partisan animosity using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Positive Contact Video	-10.49	0.66	-15.97	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.23	0.63	-16.16	<.001
Common National Identity	-9.21	0.63	-14.6	<.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.04	0.67	-13.48	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.19	0.64	-12.71	<.001
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.03	0.64	-11.02	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.08	0.63	-9.63	<.001
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.01	0.67	-8.92	<.001
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.38	0.67	-8.02	<.001
Befriending Meditation	-5.25	0.68	-7.74	<.001
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.22	0.69	-7.51	<.001
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.16	0.64	-8.06	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.77	0.65	-7.35	<.001
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.07	0.64	-6.31	<.001
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.44	0.62	-5.53	<.001
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.27	0.63	-5.17	<.001
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.98	0.64	-4.66	<.001
Democratic System Justification	-2.29	0.64	-3.58	<.001
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.16	0.64	-3.40	<.001
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.07	0.66	-3.15	0.001
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.66	-3.06	0.001
Alternative Control	-1.78	0.67	-2.67	0.008
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.65	-2.69	0.004
Common Economic Interests	-1.18	0.65	-1.82	0.035
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.87	0.68	-1.28	0.100
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.60	0.64	0.95	0.828
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.2.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.65	0.79	-8.41	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-5.14	0.80	-6.42	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.50	0.73	-3.42	<.001
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.32	0.73	-3.17	0.001
Common National Identity	-1.66	0.75	-2.22	0.013
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.56	0.79	-1.96	0.025
Positive Contact Video	-1.17	0.78	-1.51	0.066
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.84	0.75	-1.13	0.130
Alternative Control	-0.69	0.78	-0.88	0.377
Befriending Meditation	-0.55	0.81	-0.68	0.247
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.51	0.78	-0.66	0.255
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.17	0.74	-0.23	0.408
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.19	0.76	0.25	0.599
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.28	0.76	0.37	0.645
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.30	0.74	0.41	0.658
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.35	0.76	0.46	0.677
Democratic System Justification	0.55	0.74	0.75	0.772
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.81	0.73	1.10	0.864
Party Overlap on Policies	0.85	0.73	1.17	0.878
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.90	0.75	1.19	0.884
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.08	0.74	1.47	0.929
Common Economic Interests	1.49	0.79	1.88	0.970
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.61	0.77	2.11	0.982
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.61	0.78	2.07	0.981
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.72	0.78	2.22	0.987
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.94	0.79	2.45	0.993
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.3.

Treatment effects on support for partisan violence using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-4.40	0.72	-6.09	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.96	0.78	-3.78	<.001
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.64	0.72	-3.67	<.001
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.93	0.72	-2.66	0.004
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.90	0.78	-2.44	0.007
Positive Contact Video	-1.64	0.83	-1.98	0.024
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.38	0.75	-1.84	0.033
Common National Identity	-1.03	0.75	-1.38	0.084
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.65	0.72	-0.90	0.183
Befriending Meditation	-0.55	0.79	-0.69	0.245
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.30	0.76	-0.39	0.347
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.29	0.71	-0.40	0.345
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.16	0.82	-0.19	0.423
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.05	0.74	-0.06	0.475
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.04	0.74	0.06	0.524
Party Overlap on Policies	0.17	0.75	0.22	0.588
Common Economic Interests	0.24	0.76	0.31	0.622
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.60	0.79	0.77	0.779
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.66	0.80	0.82	0.793
Democratic System Justification	0.74	0.74	1.00	0.842
Alternative Control	0.83	0.79	1.06	0.289
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.05	0.75	1.41	0.920
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.20	0.75	1.59	0.945
Political Violence Inefficacy	1.20	0.74	1.62	0.947
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.63	0.80	2.03	0.979
Democratic Collapse Threat	3.22	0.78	4.10	1.000
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.4.

Treatment effects on support for undemocratic candidates using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.53	0.79	-5.76	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.23	0.74	-5.68	<.001
Common National Identity	-2.78	0.72	-3.87	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.71	0.72	-3.75	<.001
Positive Contact Video	-2.37	0.73	-3.25	0.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.65	0.75	-2.21	0.013
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.15	0.74	-1.55	0.061
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.09	0.72	-1.51	0.066
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.02	0.73	-1.39	0.082
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.91	0.76	-1.20	0.115
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.82	0.76	-1.09	0.138
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.59	0.74	-0.80	0.212
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.36	0.72	-0.50	0.307
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.33	0.72	-0.47	0.321
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.32	0.73	-0.44	0.330
Alternative Control	-0.30	0.74	-0.41	0.681
Befriending Meditation	0.40	0.78	0.51	0.696
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.41	0.74	0.55	0.709
Democratic System Justification	0.45	0.73	0.61	0.730
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.49	0.76	0.64	0.740
Party Overlap on Policies	0.57	0.71	0.80	0.788
Common Economic Interests	0.60	0.74	0.81	0.790
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.82	0.71	1.16	0.877
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.83	0.72	1.15	0.876
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.32	0.74	1.78	0.962
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.18	0.71	3.06	0.999
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.5.

Treatment effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.96	0.83	-3.55	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.63	0.81	-3.25	0.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.39	0.85	-2.82	0.002
Positive Contact Video	-2.18	0.87	-2.51	0.006
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.09	0.87	-2.42	0.008
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.00	0.84	-2.39	0.009
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.81	0.86	-2.10	0.018
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.48	0.84	-1.75	0.040
Common National Identity	-1.28	0.82	-1.55	0.061
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.20	0.83	-1.45	0.074
Befriending Meditation	-1.02	0.85	-1.20	0.115
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.91	0.81	-1.12	0.132
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.61	0.80	-0.76	0.223
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.37	0.87	-0.43	0.335
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.17	0.87	-0.20	0.421
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.12	0.86	-0.13	0.446
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.06	0.85	0.07	0.526
Democratic System Justification	0.13	0.87	0.15	0.558
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.17	0.86	0.20	0.578
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.25	0.86	0.29	0.614
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.40	0.84	0.48	0.684
Common Economic Interests	0.41	0.88	0.47	0.681
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.92	0.85	1.08	0.861
Alternative Control	1.08	0.88	1.22	0.221
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.81	0.86	2.11	0.983
Party Overlap on Policies	2.47	0.84	2.95	0.998
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.6.

Treatment effects on social distrust using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.09	0.92	-4.44	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.84	0.90	-4.27	<.001
Common National Identity	-3.71	0.88	-4.21	<.001
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.54	0.92	-3.86	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.93	0.89	-3.28	0.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.57	0.92	-2.80	0.003
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.52	0.91	-2.76	0.003
Befriending Meditation	-2.40	0.93	-2.57	0.005
Democratic System Justification	-2.13	0.91	-2.36	0.009
Positive Contact Video	-1.78	0.92	-1.94	0.026
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.78	0.92	-1.92	0.027
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.41	0.91	-1.56	0.060
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.38	0.89	-1.55	0.060
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.37	0.88	-1.55	0.061
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.30	0.90	-1.45	0.074
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.30	0.91	-1.43	0.077
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.21	0.94	-1.29	0.099
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.13	0.87	-1.29	0.098
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.98	0.87	-1.12	0.131
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.80	0.92	-0.87	0.192
Alternative Control	-0.42	0.93	-0.45	0.654
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.31	0.92	-0.34	0.368
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.29	0.89	-0.32	0.373
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.19	0.89	-0.21	0.416
Common Economic Interests	-0.12	0.91	-0.13	0.447
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.93	0.90	1.03	0.849
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.7.

Treatment effects on social distance using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.57	1.01	-4.53	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.91	1.02	-3.83	<.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.90	1.01	-3.86	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.81	1.00	-3.79	<.001
Befriending Meditation	-3.47	1.01	-3.43	<.001
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-3.01	1.05	-2.88	0.002
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.81	1.00	-2.82	0.002
Common National Identity	-2.66	0.99	-2.69	0.004
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.45	1.02	-2.40	0.008
Positive Contact Video	-2.40	1.01	-2.37	0.009
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.10	1.00	-2.10	0.018
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.71	0.98	-1.75	0.040
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.64	1.00	-1.65	0.049
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.60	0.99	-0.60	0.274
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.45	1.03	-0.44	0.329
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.44	1.04	-0.42	0.336
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.13	1.00	-0.13	0.449
Democratic System Justification	-0.11	1.02	-0.11	0.456
Common Economic Interests	-0.10	1.01	-0.10	0.459
Alternative Control	-0.06	1.04	-0.06	0.955
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.04	0.99	0.04	0.516
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.14	0.99	0.14	0.556
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.39	0.96	0.40	0.656
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.11	0.98	1.14	0.872
Party Overlap on Policies	1.17	0.99	1.19	0.883
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.55	1.00	1.54	0.939
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.8.

Treatment effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Common National Identity	-2.78	0.67	-4.13	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.26	0.68	-3.32	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.03	0.68	-2.98	0.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.82	0.70	-2.60	0.005
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.35	0.71	-1.90	0.029
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.20	0.73	-1.66	0.049
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.04	0.70	-1.50	0.067
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.92	0.67	-1.37	0.085
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.65	0.69	-0.96	0.170
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.52	0.70	-0.75	0.226
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.46	0.65	-0.70	0.242
Befriending Meditation	-0.24	0.70	-0.34	0.365
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.12	0.73	-0.16	0.435
Positive Contact Video	-0.09	0.69	-0.13	0.450
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.06	0.70	-0.09	0.466
Alternative Control	0.05	0.70	0.07	0.945
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.14	0.67	0.20	0.580
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.22	0.70	0.31	0.623
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.23	0.68	0.34	0.633
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.25	0.67	0.38	0.647
Common Economic Interests	0.26	0.70	0.38	0.647
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.35	0.69	0.50	0.692
Democratic System Justification	0.36	0.68	0.53	0.702
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.43	0.68	0.64	0.737
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.46	0.73	0.63	0.735
Party Overlap on Policies	2.20	0.68	3.25	0.999
Includes controls				

Table S13.5.9.

Treatment effects on the composite of the eight outcomes using a tobit model. The reference category for condition is the null control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A tobit model was used to correct for potential left-censoring.

Treatment	b	SE	z	p-value
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.31	0.39	-8.39	<.001
Common National Identity	-3.12	0.38	-8.13	<.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.88	0.38	-7.50	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.83	0.37	-7.59	<.001
Positive Contact Video	-2.57	0.39	-6.68	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.57	0.38	-6.69	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.34	0.40	-5.87	<.001
Befriending Meditation	-1.53	0.39	-3.96	<.001
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.45	0.41	-3.56	<.001
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.13	0.40	-2.86	0.002
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.08	0.38	-2.86	0.002
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.05	0.39	-2.70	0.004
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.93	0.38	-2.44	0.007
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.82	0.37	-2.22	0.013
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.81	0.39	-2.11	0.017
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.38	-2.13	0.017
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.63	0.37	-1.70	0.045
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.45	0.39	-1.15	0.126
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.45	0.38	-1.19	0.118
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.32	0.41	-0.77	0.220
Democratic System Justification	-0.22	0.40	-0.55	0.290
Alternative Control	-0.15	0.41	-0.37	0.715
Common Economic Interests	0.14	0.39	0.35	0.637
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.21	0.39	0.53	0.700
Party Overlap on Policies	0.24	0.39	0.62	0.731
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.49	0.38	1.26	0.897
Includes controls				